After all, Kottaras, 25, might have a shot to become the knuckleballer's personal batterymate.
The early odds-on favorite for that position is Josh Bard, but anything can happen during spring training. Bard has caught Wakefield in all three of his outings during camp, but Kottaras will get his opportunity to work with the veteran in a game on Thursday.
During their conversation on Sunday, Wakefield told Kottaras to take charge out there and have fun with it. Red Sox manager Terry Francona has said he wants to see how Kottaras can handle the job.
"We need to do that," Francona said.
Bard did a poor job with Wakefield in his last stint with Boston, so the Red Sox need a backup plan.
Many years ago in one of his Baseball Abstracts, Bill James explored the possibility that Ozzie Smith saved the Cardinals 100 runs with his glove (according to Whitey Herzog). James pegged it at closer to 25. Tom Tango looks at the savings a great fielder provides and finds it's about 25 runs. Nice to see different studies years apart come to the same conclusion.
Regardless of the conclusions of any individual study, scientific or otherwise, there is no question that Derek Jeter is nothing less than a solid defender. For anyone to even infer that he may be the worst fielder in all of baseball is simply ridiculous. Truth be told, the current version of Derek Jeter is flashing better leather than the 23-year-old kid who made those costly errors in 1997.
In 2008 Jeter made fewer errors than all but one American League shortstop (Gold Glove winner Michael Young). Yuniesky Betancourt made 21 errors and swung a very average stick. I have yet to see one article proclaiming Betancourt the "least effective" defensive player in the game. Perhaps that's because articles and studies about Yuniesky Betancourt are about as interesting as an Andy Warhol flick. Derek Jeter's celebrity is enormous. I can't think of another shortstop in the big leagues that makes commercials and dates movie stars. Is there a better way to get people talking about your study or newspaper article than to discount the abilities of one of the most recognizable athletes on the planet?
It's not about the errors Jeter makes, it's about all the balls that he never gets a glove on that other shortstops turn into outs. I'm surprised an article like this made it to Dugout Central.
Dombrowski talked about defense as coverage during Saturday's TigerFest at Comerica Park.
"A lot of guys can make the stationary play, but they have no range to their left or right," Dombrowski said. "(Those balls) are base hits, not outs. Brandon Inge and Adam Everett get not only the stationary ball hit at them, but they have range."
Much more range, in fact, than their predecessors, Guillen and Renteria. In plus-minus rankings by Dewan that document how many more, or how many fewer, ground balls are gathered by a particular fielder, Renteria was 28th among shortstops in 2008.
Guillen, who was being asked to adjust to his second new position in one season, was 23rd among third basemen.
It's nice to see these statistics working their way into newspaper articles. However, I'd like to see something on the offensive tradeoffs here.
Nico at Athletics Nation wonders if Oakland signs Giambi if they'll use a shift of infielders to make up for Jason's lack of range. Chase Utley appeared to shade toward first base to help out Ryan Howard this year, so it just might work.
Both PMR and UZR were calculated using the Baseball Info Solutions (BIS) data set this season. I wonder if David or MGL might be able to give some ideas as to where the differences might come from.
I don't know enough about the UZR calculations to speculate. I base my models mostly on visiting players in parks, however. UZR might use all the data. I also don't know if UZR, like +/-, doesn't penalize players for outs made by others. In PMR. If the right fielder catches a ball that the centerfielder might be able to catch, the centerfielder is penalized. In +/-, the centerfielder is not. Given the low correlation with centerfielders, I suspect that's the case.
Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR) is now available on FanGraphs.com. The version on FanGraphs uses BIS data, not STATS, Inc. data, so it will be interesting to see how it compares to the Probabilistic Model of Range, which also uses BIS. Taking a quick look at shortstop, Jeter finishes in the middle of the pack, just like in PMR.
Jeter is really getting hammered in the media for his rank in the Fielding Bible Awards. How many years does he need to rank at the bottom of shortstops before the Yankees move him?
Centerfield, right now, is still open. Put Jeter there where his speed and fly ball instincts work. Especially if the Yankees end up with Derek Lowe, they are going to need a shortstop who can gobble up the ball.
For those of you who are waiting, Probabilistic Model of Range rankings are coming soon.
"I cut across like it was going to go down but it kept rising," said Cameron. "My first instinct was that it was not going to travel, because of the way the wind was blowing. It just kind of took off."
Mike chases fly balls differently than most outfielders. Instead of tracking the ball all the way, Mike developed an excellent pattern recognizer that allows him to judge where the ball will go off the bat and run there without following the ball too closely. Today, that recognizer made a mistake. Despite that, he almost made a great catch.
It's a good thing Corey Hart stands 6' 6". On a Werth fly to right, Corey fought the sun and picked up the ball at the last second. He stretched out his arm and just reached the ball, tumbling up holding on. The catch came with two on and two out and preserved the Brewers 3-1 lead at the end of five.
Then they presented their subjects with two targets moving at the same speed -- one laterally and one in depth -- and asked them to decide which was faster. On average, they said the lateral motion was 1.3 to 2.7 times faster than an object at the identical speed but moving straight at them.
Finally, they asked their subjects to estimate the angle at which an object was approaching them. The trajectory of an object moving close to the midline of vision was consistently harder to predict than objects moving at greater angles to the observer.
In other words, when the object was moving directly toward them, people were terrible at estimating distance, bad at guessing speed and highly inaccurate at predicting trajectory -- a combination all but guaranteed to increase the opposition's batting average.
Very cool. So next time an outfielder misses a hard shot right at him, cut the player some slack.
The Phillies make two nice catches in the top of the sixth against the Dodgers. Loney hit a long drive to deep centerfield, and Shane Victorino ran it down, making it look easy. With Garciaparra at first with two out, Martin hit a pop foul down the rightfield line. Ryan Howard raced down the line dived near the stands and made the catch. The Phillies are known for their offense, but in a 1-1 game they are flashing a little leather.
Howard, who made the great play to end the top of the inning, leads off the bottom half.
Lyle Overbay just saved the game for the Blue Jays. With the score 2-1 in favor of Toronto in the top of the ninth, Alex Rodriguez hits one off the end of the bat that lands over Overbay's head in right. A-Rod wasn't running that hard, thinking it would either be caught or fall for a single. The ball however, rolled away from Lyle, and Alex turned it on for second. Overbay ran the ball down, slid picking it up and made a perfect throw to second to nab Alex. B.J. Ryan retires the last two batters and Toronto wins 2-1. They are now just one game behind the Yankees for third place in the AL East.
Rare poor defense by the Angels allows the Yankees to tie the game in the eighth. Ivan Rodriguez singles (he homered earlier). Melky Cabrera is sent to sacrifice, but Shields falls behind 3-0, and Melky takes two to run the count 3-2. At that point, Justin Christian pinch runs, and starts on the next pitch. Aybar moves to cover second, and Melky grounds one right to him. He's not ready for it, and the ball bounds off his chest for an error. Then, the two attempt a double steal. Figgins is in as Damon squared to bunt, and Mathis throws to a back-peddling Figgins, but the ball goes into leftfield. Christian scores, and the Yankees now have 2nd and 3rd with one out. Usually, it's the Angels speed and the Yankees poor defense that makes the difference between these two teams.
Update: Abreu walks to load the bases. A-Rod hits a grounder to third, but instead of a double play, Figgins bobbles the ball and doesn't get an out. The Yankees take a 10-9 lead.
Update: Cano knocks in two with a single and the Yankees take a 12-9 lead.
Nate DiMeo pens an article for Slate titled, "Derek Jeter vs. Objective Reality." He's asking why there is a disconnect between what fans think of Jeter's defense and what statistical research shows. There's another question he asks as well:
If the sabermetric case against Jeter's glove has long been closed, why do the sabermetricians keep opening it? In an e-mail, Tom Tango joked that Jeter comes up again and again "because he gets far more girls than his fielding talents should allow." And there's probably something to that: The stat guys want to kick a little sand back at the press-box bullies--all of whom seem to have Word macros for phrases like "nerd writing in his mother's basement"--who lazily swallow the myth of Jeter's fielding prowess.
But the better answer is that Jeter's defense is at the heart of the conflict between sabermetrics and traditional baseball fandom. A recent article by Baseball Prospectus' Dan Fox poses the age-old question, "[W]hat would Sir Francis Bacon, the English philosopher and statesman, have thought of Jeter's defense?" Fox, who recently announced his departure from the blog world to join the front office of the Pittsburgh Pirates, looks back to Bacon's notion that people tend to think that memorable incidents define the whole. So we see Jeter flip the ball to Posada or emerge bloodied after leaping into the stands to catch a Trot Nixon foul ball and think "great fielder." Bacon, like today's statistical innovators, would seek out objective scientific data to understand the larger truth about Mr. Jeter. These data show that--yes, Sox fans--Jeter totally sucks.
I would note, too, that the case for OBA was made in quite the same way. Sabermetricans talked and talked about OBA for years before people started to pay attention. It was probably Sandy Alderson who helped move it into the main stream. I remember an ESPN broadcast where Gary Thorne suddenly started praising OBA because Alderson talked about it in an interview.
At some point, a GM will say something like, "We signed him as a free agent, because despite all the errors our probabilistic models show he turns lots of tough hits into outs." Then these models will start gaining acceptance.
I just saw the highlight of Matt Treanor's double play last night. The ball was bunted, and Matt grabbed it out of the air and threw to second for the double play. Seems like a good time to recall this Treanor story.
The Diamondbacks get a two-run homer from Stephen Drew to take a 2-0 lead over the Marlins in the third.
Joe Christensen describes the fielding drill that helped Alexi Casilla make a spectacular play Wednesday night. It's one of the little things Ron Gardenhire works on to make the team better.
Ryan Langerhans is back with the Nationals and just made a possible game saving catch in San Diego. With the score tied at two in the bottom of the eighth, Kevin Kouzmanoff launches one to the stand in leftfield. Ryan leaped, got his glove over the railing, and pulled the ball back in to preserve the tie. He's also singled and driven in a run.
Update: The catch is for naught as Jody Gerut hits a three-run homer down the rightfield line for a 5-2 lead.
Take the play he made in the third inning of last night's 5-3 win over the Mariners: runners at first and second, two outs, when Jose Lopez hit a ball that for all intents and purposes should have gone through into right field for a run-producing hit. Yet Pedroia, who was positioned more toward second base, got a good jump on the ball and made a diving play to the first base side to retire Lopez and keep Bartolo Colon out of peril.
(Actually, there were runners at first and third.)
I saw the play last night and watched it again this morning. It was a nice play by Dustin, the kind that separates a good fielder from a bad one. It's an easy out if the fielder is positioned differently. Pedroia showed on that play what we normally consider range, the ability to cover a lot of ground to get to a ball.
When I run the Probabalistic Model of Range, I define range as the ability to turn a ball into an out. Positioning plays a large role in that. One would expect the players that can make up for being out of position on a ball with their ability to cover ground will tend to score higher in the rankings. Maybe when we get Joe Maddon's GPS system we'll know for sure.
NESN is reporting that Varitek is the first catcher to receive four no hitters. They left Torborg off their graphic as catchers who caught three. Can anyone think of anyone else who caught four?
Add to that Schilling's near no-hitter last season, and Varitek's had quite the low-hit career.
"It's his decision," Texas manager Ron Washington said. "He said he had looked at the team and thought he could help the squad more at first. This is Hank just being a very intelligent baseball man,"
Blalock has played 686 career games at third base and none at first. Washington was giving Blalock some pointers during infield practice Sunday.
The Rangers are sending Blalock to extended spring training in Arizona on Monday. Washington said Blalock will probably stay in Arizona until he comes off the disabled list -- which may be as early as Friday.
"It's a new position for me and I'm not sure how I'll do," Blalock said. "I wouldn't have initiated it if it wasn't something I was excited about."
Blalock was hitting better this season before he tore the hamstring. Rangers this season have gotten a .602 OPS out of their first basemen coming into Sunday's games.
You don't see this too often. Kuroda strikes out Aybar, but the pitch is not caught cleanly. With a man on second and two out, Aybar starts running to first. The catcher, Bennett, throws the ball over the head of the first baseman down the leftfield line. Kotchman scores from second, and Aybar turns on the afterburner and reaches third base. A strikeout triple! The Angels take a 1-0 lead in the fourth.
The club that bobbled balls, missed cut-off men, made errant throws and beat itself to start the season has morphed into one that is putting together an impressive highlight reel of defensive plays, adding four more to the collection Tuesday.
And it isn't just the defense. These Rangers are manufacturing runs, running the bases smartly, delivering key hits, and, most important, pitching well. Consequently, they are winning games.
That's true, but everyonce in a while the wind shifts back to the old ways. A bobbled ground ball and a mis-read line drive lead to two innings in the seventh inning today, giving the Mariners a 3-2 lead. Scott Feldman pitched very well today, but the two unearned runs mean he's now in line for a loss.
Update: Hamilton makes up for the misplayed line drive with a sacrifice fly in the bottom of the eighth to tie the game at three.
With men on first and third and two out in the top of the ninth, Franklin Gutierrez came up with the second great dive of the game. Mench hit a high liner into right center. It looked like it would drop to plate the first run of the game, but it hung up just long enough for Franklin to get over and make the diving catch. Two batters earlier, with a man on second, Rios hit a hard line drive snared by Victor Martinez at first. Lee completes nine scoreless innings to lower his ERA to 0.67. Now the Indians need to plate a run to get him a win.
Marcum is out of the game after eight innings. Ryan tries to preserve the tie.
Update: Ryan gets two popups as he retires the side in order. The game will be decided in extra innings. The Indians still have just two hits.
Update: Stewart breaks the scoreless tie in the tenth, and Hill follows with a two-run single to give Toronto a 3-0 lead.
Asdrubal Cabrera just turned an unassisted triple play behind Cliff Lee. This offense (Toronto) has become comically bad.
The Indians, of course, have the only unassisted triple play in World Series history, way back in 1920. This evening, the runners were going, Overbay hit a line drive that Asdrubal caught on a dive. The runners had already advanced a base, so Cabrera just had to tag the base and the runner from first to complete the TP. The game remains scoreless in the top of the sixth.
It must be tough to see pop ups in foul area on the third base side in Arizona. Mark Reynolds over-ran a ball near the stands earlier, and just now Schneider called off Wright, then lost the ball. The Mets lead 2-1 in the bottom of the fifth.
With the bases loaded and one out and the Phillies trailing 3-0, second baseman Chase Utley launched himself parallel to the infield dirt and somehow managed to snag Clint Barmes' hard-hit chopper that seemed destined for centerfield. After landing flat on his torso, he raised his glove and shoveled the ball to shortstop Eric Bruntlett, who made a quick throw to first base for an inning-ending doubleplay.
"After the game, I told him 'Thank you,' " said righthander Kyle Kendrick, who pitched five innings and gave up all five Rockies runs on home runs by Yorvit Torrealba and Garrett Atkins.
Utley saved two runs, for sure.
Who knows how many may have followed?
"Bases loaded, it kind of slowed them down a little bit," Utley said. "A base hit there obviously would have hurt a lot."
Power and defense at second base is a rare combination. Morgan and Sandberg are the only two in my lifetime who did both extremely well. Utley was among the best second baseman in range as measured by PMR last season.
The Tigers broadcast pointed out something about the defensive alignment against Magglio Ordonez. The first baseman is playing way off the line, in what would usually be the hole between second and first. According to them, Ordonez hit a good many balls there last season, and few down the first base line. It's a good defensive adjustment so far, as they've kept Magglio's average down to .264.
When I was in college, my roommates and I used to kid that the threshold for an error was set too low. Our opinion was that if the greatest fielder at the position would have made the play, then it should go as an error.
With Kyle Lohse at the plate and the bases loaded, he slapped a ball to the left of Counsell at third. Counsell was in, he dove, but the ball went under his glove for a two-run single. Since Graig Nettles would have not only snagged the ball, but turned it into a double play, Counsell should really get an E5.. :-)
By the way, I love Brian Barton's socks. He's mixed a 50s uniform with a wild hairdo. The contrast looks great.
Alexei Ramirez starts in centerfield for the White Sox today and makes a spectacular throw to get Emil Brown. Brown hit a ball into the gap in right-center. Ramirez got to the hit in a hurry, grabbed the ball spun and threw a strike to second base without setting himself. Brown was out by a mile. Alexei showed off everything on that play; speed, soft hands, and an accurate and powerful arm. Look for that play on Web Gems tonight.
I don't think of Victor Martinez as a defensive catcher, but he just made a great play on Coco Crisp. Crisp laid a bunt down the third base line that died at the grass cut out in front of the plate. Martinez sprang like a cat on the ball threw off balance and got Crisp at first. He showed quickness and a strong, accurate arm on that play.
Orlando Cabrera made a rare poor play for the White Sox. With a man on first, he ranged to his right for a ground ball off the bat of Polanco. Cabrera got there in time, but the ball skipped under his glove. He appeared to be looking for a higher bounce. The official scorer gave Polanco a hit, and a double play cleared the extra runner. The White Sox and Tigers are tied at five in the top of the fifth. Carlos Quentin hit his first home run for the pale hose.
Emil Brown hits a ball to the warning track in straight away center than Ellsbury catches with a backward leap. He crashes into the wall but holds on to the ball. The NESN announcers are calling it a great catch, but I think he leaped too early. If he stays on his feet and keeps running I think he gets under the ball. Still, and out's and out, and it must be difficult playing under that white ceiling.
The A's go 1-2-3 in the eighth. The Sox have three outs to get one run. Lowell, Moss and Varitek are due up.
"The thing I've learned is that you have to change your training," Giambi said. "It stunk going through everything, but it all was a blessing in disguise. Even tearing my foot."
Giambi did much more sprint work this off-season and worked on explosive techniques that made him quicker on his feet.
"A few years ago I would have said there was no chance I'd be training like I am now," said Giambi, who was batting .406 this spring. Tino Martinez is surprised at how well Giambi is playing.
"He's actually moving around better than I thought," Martinez said. "I think he was feeling tentative in the past. The whole key is moving your feet but not being afraid to make a mistake. You don't want to hold the ball when you got an easy out at second and just get the guy at first. In the past he would do that. Now he's not afraid to go and get lead runners. That really helps the pitching staff."
We'll see long that lasts during the regular season. Having Giambi at first, however, gives the Yankees their best offensive team.
But what is being missed here is the preponderance of evidence against Jeter's defensive game. This is not just one set of Ivy League academics calling Jeter the majors' worst fielding shortstop. Just about every respected baseball statistician who has publicized results reveals Jeter is, at best, among the poorest defensive shortstops in the game.
You can attack methodology; you can say no perfect formula has yet been devised to encapsulate all the elements - positioning, speed of the hit ball, field conditions - into a single defensive statistic. However, these metrics keep evolving in sophistication. And Jeter keeps faring poorly in nearly every study year after year. Do you think there is a conspiracy? Do you think statisticians en masse have covertly met and made their quest to soil Jeter's glovely reputation?
"This study has been done a zillion times and the same conclusion is reached every time," an AL official said. "What do you think that means?"
For Jeter devotees, it means assailing the geeks. But as an AL executive said, "this isn't geeks vs. jocks. This is myth vs. reality." In reality, most baseball officials laugh off the three Gold Gloves Jeter won from 2004-06 in the way they do the four Bernie Williams won as having more to do with offense, fame and winning than with actual defense.
I'm very glad this debate is now fully out in the open. It's easy to dismiss one study, but when all of them point in the same direction, year after year, people start to notice. It looks like one of those people was indeed Jeter:
Perhaps the strongest condemnation came from Jeter, who said, "Last year, I didn't have a good year defensively."
It doesn't sound like much, especially since Jeter limited a serial inadequacy to just 2007. Except Jeter is not one to ever publicly apologize for, or criticize, his own game. But this is more than words with Jeter. He rededicated himself in the offseason with exercises designed to improve his lateral quickness and first-step explosiveness. One Yankee official saw this version of Jeter and said, "He set the clock back five years."
"I'm a lot quicker, a lot more agile," Jeter said. "Only time will tell, but that is what I worked on."
Many scouts believe Jeter would be able to make an easy transition to the outfield, where his speed, strong arm and terrific instincts would make him a natural. Asked about the possibility, Jeter waves off the question before it's finished.
"I ain't going out there," Jeter said. "It's not as easy as it sounds to just pick up a glove and say, 'I'm going to be an outfielder today.' It doesn't work like that."
As for his current position, Jeter feels he's a better shortstop now than he was during the early years of his career thanks to experience. By making the necessary adjustments on a regular basis, Jeter is constantly addressing what he feels are his strengths and weaknesses in the field. Just don't ask him what those are.
"I'll leave that to the computers to figure out," he said with a grin.
"Maybe it was a computer glitch," the three-time Gold Glove winner said of the report. But Jeter just didn't laugh this one off. He defended himself, saying, "Every [shortstop] doesn't stay in the same spot, everyone doesn't have the same pitching. Everyone doesn't have the same hitters running, it's impossible to do that."
Jeter, 33, pointed out you can get the exact same ground ball off the exact same pitcher and there could be an average runner or there could be Ichiro running. "How can you compute that?" he asked.
You can't. That's one reason Yankees senior advisor Gene Michael was infuriated by the University of Pennsylvania report.
"Something like that is a disgrace," the scout said. "It made me ill when I read that article. First of all, what pitching staff was out there? Each team has a different staff. Derek doesn't really have a sinkerball pitching staff whereas other shortstops, you sit behind certain pitchers, you're going to get a lot of ground balls.
"You simply can't do that by those charts, that's a bunch of baloney," Michael added. "It's disgraceful. You have to use a scout's eye to determine range."
Of course, we do take most of those factors into account. For every Ichiro running to first, there's a Jason Giambi. Over time, those factors even out. As for the pitching staff, the Yankees have undergone numerous changes over the last few years, and somehow Derek stays at the bottom of the pack.
I'd also like to comment on one thing from the FanHouse post (emphasis added):
Baseball's different. It's very easy to watch Jeter fly deep in the hole, plant, pivot and gun a runner and come to the conclusion that he's a great fielder. It's a pretty play, full of athleticism and grace and that's more memorable than a grounder that finds a hole or a double play that doesn't get turned. That doesn't make it more important, though. These kinds of analysis help us understand baseball in its fullest context. That context, however, doesn't matter much when Jeter cuts off a poor throw, flips it to the plate and saves a run.
04 September 2006: New York Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter makes a throw to 1st base but is unable to get Kansas City Royals center fielder Joey Gathright out in the 5th inning at Kauffman Stadium in Kansas City, MO. Photo: Icon SMI
If Jeter actually planted and pivoted in the hole, I think his numbers would be better. What he actually does is stop, jump and throw, using only his arm to get the ball to first. His movement is more like a skater transferring kinetic energy from the horizontal to the vertical with a toe pick. None of that energy is being used to hurl the ball toward first base. I cringe every time he tries to make that play, because no matter how good it looks, it's the wrong way to throw. If he stopped, planted and used his whole body to send the ball across the diamond, he'd make a stronger and more accurate throw. How many times does that toss pull the first baseman off the bag or sail over his head? David Eckstein can make the plant and throw play, why can't the bigger and stronger Jeter?
Update: 100% Injury Rate chimes in. He points to some old data that shows Jeter wasn't the best fielding shortstop on his team, with the same pitching staff. The same things shows up in 2007 PMR. As a team, the Yankees shortstops produced 38 fewer outs than expected. Jeter, however, produced forty fewer outs than expected! So the replacements were a bit better.
Alan Schwarz, during the talk, wondered if this was more a reflection of strategy on the part of the Rockies as opposed a Garrett Atkins fielding deficiency. Apparently not.
Last spring, rookie Troy Tulowitzki had to take it. This year, as a rich, budding star, he's dishing it out.
Saturday, Tulo's target was third baseman Garrett Atkins.
"Atkins doesn't do much over there," Tulowitzki said with a sly grin. "He kind of just stands there and watches balls."
Tulowitzki was kidding, but there's a element of truth there. Note that the Rockies didn't lock up Atkins long term.
One criticism leveled at the Probabilistic Model of Range this year is that due to building the models based on the visiting team fielders, teams with good offenses get a bonus defensively. The example given is the Yankees, but there are other high offense teams ranked high in terms of PMR.
The idea is that since the Yankees hit well, their opponents DER must by definition be low. A ball put in play by the Yankees must have a lower probability of being turned into an out. This causes the model to underestimate the fielding ability of opponents, and over estimate the fielding ability of the Yankees. If the model contained one parameter, ballpark, then this would be absolutely true. However, there are six parameters, including a vector indicating the direction of the ball. I propose that the Yankees hit better than their opponents not because a random ball in play has a higher probability of falling for a hit, but because the Yankees do a better job of hitting balls where they are tough to field.
The following table shows the number of ground balls hit by the Yankees and their opponents by vector:
Vector
Yankees
Opponents
Predicted DER
25
4
4
0.000
26
12
14
0.000
27
37
26
0.766
28
118
57
0.898
29
175
118
0.706
30
193
156
0.671
31
148
119
0.844
32
111
82
0.934
33
164
136
0.868
34
114
105
0.585
35
100
74
0.535
36
117
124
0.624
37
101
108
0.617
38
116
150
0.838
39
119
131
0.865
40
163
139
0.764
41
165
174
0.550
42
110
130
0.688
43
61
55
0.847
44
35
40
0.572
45
7
13
0.010
46
5
5
0.000
As you can see, the low probability vectors are 29-30, the shortstop hole, 34-37, up the middle, 41-42, the second base hole, and 44, right down the first base line. I'm not looking at the foul vectors where a ball is always a hit. Breaking these down:
Ground balls
Yankees
Opponents
In Holes
1110
1029
At Fielders
882
895
So the Yankees hit more grounders where they are less likely to be fielded, and fewer grounders where they are more likely to be fielded than their opponents. Later I want to look at how the Yankees field home and road. If they field much better at home, then the objection still my have some validity.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Pitchers, 2007 Permalink
To complete the survery of range, here are how pitchers rank. First the teams:
Team Pitchers PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Astros
4530
205
183.71
0.045
0.041
111.59
Padres
4476
243
228.50
0.054
0.051
106.35
Rockies
4599
218
206.59
0.047
0.045
105.52
Indians
4548
181
171.92
0.040
0.038
105.28
Mets
4362
173
164.61
0.040
0.038
105.09
White Sox
4545
196
186.52
0.043
0.041
105.08
Yankees
4511
181
172.92
0.040
0.038
104.67
Tigers
4486
167
159.73
0.037
0.036
104.55
Red Sox
4226
149
142.79
0.035
0.034
104.35
Mariners
4535
174
167.33
0.038
0.037
103.99
Blue Jays
4349
200
194.00
0.046
0.045
103.09
Phillies
4505
193
187.33
0.043
0.042
103.02
Pirates
4608
204
200.82
0.044
0.044
101.58
Cubs
4177
166
163.95
0.040
0.039
101.25
Rangers
4518
197
195.59
0.044
0.043
100.72
Braves
4404
206
204.60
0.047
0.046
100.69
Devil Rays
4378
148
147.07
0.034
0.034
100.63
Twins
4384
150
152.30
0.034
0.035
98.49
Orioles
4403
160
162.54
0.036
0.037
98.44
Nationals
4591
167
170.78
0.036
0.037
97.78
Marlins
4491
178
182.52
0.040
0.041
97.52
Angels
4325
143
146.86
0.033
0.034
97.37
Giants
4467
159
163.87
0.036
0.037
97.03
Diamondbacks
4351
207
213.40
0.048
0.049
97.00
Cardinals
4587
158
166.21
0.034
0.036
95.06
Athletics
4499
165
174.70
0.037
0.039
94.45
Brewers
4392
179
192.64
0.041
0.044
92.92
Dodgers
4310
189
205.96
0.044
0.048
91.76
Reds
4533
162
180.13
0.036
0.040
89.93
Royals
4528
151
179.20
0.033
0.040
84.27
The Padres not only induce the most predicted outs back to the pitcher, they exceed those outs by a great deal. Maddux is one reason:
Individual Pitcher PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (400 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Chris Sampson
414
24
15.23
0.058
0.037
157.55
Matt Cain
571
26
19.79
0.046
0.035
131.37
Chad Durbin
417
15
11.48
0.036
0.028
130.65
Shaun Marcum
456
27
20.71
0.059
0.045
130.37
Steve Trachsel
549
35
26.89
0.064
0.049
130.17
Mike Mussina
512
27
20.84
0.053
0.041
129.54
Woody Williams
632
36
27.90
0.057
0.044
129.04
Aaron Cook
572
37
28.69
0.065
0.050
128.98
Miguel Batista
615
26
20.17
0.042
0.033
128.92
Jon Garland
705
34
26.84
0.048
0.038
126.66
Kelvim Escobar
572
17
13.58
0.030
0.024
125.21
Wandy Rodriguez
536
21
16.87
0.039
0.031
124.46
Greg Maddux
681
53
42.87
0.078
0.063
123.64
Ervin Santana
457
13
10.59
0.028
0.023
122.72
Jake Peavy
571
30
24.58
0.053
0.043
122.03
Brandon Webb
692
53
43.55
0.077
0.063
121.69
Mike Bacsik
414
15
12.35
0.036
0.030
121.42
Tim Wakefield
600
24
19.83
0.040
0.033
121.05
Carlos Zambrano
610
30
25.00
0.049
0.041
119.98
Javier Vazquez
583
28
23.46
0.048
0.040
119.34
Adam Eaton
525
22
18.49
0.042
0.035
119.00
Nate Robertson
573
27
22.77
0.047
0.040
118.56
John Danks
427
15
12.83
0.035
0.030
116.94
James Shields
615
26
22.26
0.042
0.036
116.80
Justin Verlander
577
17
14.69
0.029
0.025
115.76
Chien-Ming Wang
643
34
29.61
0.053
0.046
114.84
Carlos Silva
699
27
23.54
0.039
0.034
114.70
John Smoltz
586
30
26.16
0.051
0.045
114.69
Dustin McGowan
484
31
27.18
0.064
0.056
114.04
Justin Germano
426
21
18.42
0.049
0.043
114.04
Ted Lilly
586
24
21.09
0.041
0.036
113.81
Dontrelle Willis
667
39
34.32
0.058
0.051
113.64
Kyle Davies
432
16
14.08
0.037
0.033
113.60
Sergio Mitre
522
29
25.58
0.056
0.049
113.35
Daisuke Matsuzaka
555
24
21.21
0.043
0.038
113.18
Joe Blanton
750
28
25.10
0.037
0.033
111.54
Jake Westbrook
481
27
24.51
0.056
0.051
110.17
Andy Sonnanstine
408
14
12.81
0.034
0.031
109.28
Matt Chico
548
16
14.77
0.029
0.027
108.33
Jamie Moyer
633
30
27.83
0.047
0.044
107.81
Johan Santana
555
24
22.27
0.043
0.040
107.75
Tom Glavine
674
27
25.15
0.040
0.037
107.37
C.C. Sabathia
701
24
22.47
0.034
0.032
106.80
Brett Tomko
415
16
14.99
0.039
0.036
106.77
Jarrod Washburn
627
20
18.81
0.032
0.030
106.33
Noah Lowry
502
23
21.69
0.046
0.043
106.02
Jeremy Guthrie
527
21
19.85
0.040
0.038
105.81
Chris Capuano
456
28
26.47
0.061
0.058
105.77
Fausto Carmona
654
36
34.14
0.055
0.052
105.43
Roy Halladay
722
36
34.31
0.050
0.048
104.94
Mark Buehrle
648
33
31.47
0.051
0.049
104.86
Bronson Arroyo
661
27
25.79
0.041
0.039
104.71
David Bush
594
24
23.12
0.040
0.039
103.80
Kyle Kendrick
401
20
19.29
0.050
0.048
103.69
David Wells
545
20
19.32
0.037
0.035
103.52
Erik Bedard
431
17
16.46
0.039
0.038
103.29
Jeff Suppan
708
34
32.99
0.048
0.047
103.05
Barry Zito
608
21
20.40
0.035
0.034
102.94
Jason Marquis
626
25
24.34
0.040
0.039
102.70
Jeff Francis
662
30
29.40
0.045
0.044
102.04
Kameron Loe
464
28
27.74
0.060
0.060
100.93
Livan Hernandez
704
38
37.71
0.054
0.054
100.78
Paul Maholm
583
30
29.99
0.051
0.051
100.02
Matt Morris
693
28
28.14
0.040
0.041
99.50
Kip Wells
522
20
20.10
0.038
0.039
99.48
Ian Snell
606
20
20.14
0.033
0.033
99.33
Odalis Perez
494
18
18.33
0.036
0.037
98.20
John Maine
527
17
17.37
0.032
0.033
97.86
Cole Hamels
495
23
23.78
0.046
0.048
96.70
Chad Gaudin
603
21
21.76
0.035
0.036
96.51
A.J. Burnett
414
15
15.67
0.036
0.038
95.73
Mike Maroth
417
17
17.85
0.041
0.043
95.22
Tim Hudson
722
41
43.25
0.057
0.060
94.81
Felix Hernandez
567
26
27.45
0.046
0.048
94.73
Jered Weaver
514
18
19.04
0.035
0.037
94.51
Brian Bannister
540
20
21.19
0.037
0.039
94.40
Oliver Perez
483
11
11.65
0.023
0.024
94.40
Micah Owings
461
22
23.32
0.048
0.051
94.34
Kyle Lohse
615
22
23.48
0.036
0.038
93.71
Jeff Weaver
511
10
10.72
0.020
0.021
93.32
Chuck James
484
15
16.10
0.031
0.033
93.18
Tom Gorzelanny
642
24
25.76
0.037
0.040
93.18
Roy Oswalt
675
36
38.80
0.053
0.057
92.79
Adam Wainwright
654
28
30.29
0.043
0.046
92.44
Jose Contreras
647
22
23.80
0.034
0.037
92.43
Scott Kazmir
534
16
17.46
0.030
0.033
91.64
Lenny DiNardo
430
15
16.48
0.035
0.038
91.04
Derek Lowe
604
27
29.69
0.045
0.049
90.95
Andy Pettitte
690
26
28.59
0.038
0.041
90.93
Paul Byrd
686
21
23.15
0.031
0.034
90.72
Aaron Harang
642
23
25.44
0.036
0.040
90.42
Doug Davis
597
32
36.17
0.054
0.061
88.47
Scott Olsen
578
21
23.75
0.036
0.041
88.41
Josh Fogg
556
21
23.79
0.038
0.043
88.26
Scott Baker
454
13
14.84
0.029
0.033
87.58
Rich Hill
527
21
23.98
0.040
0.046
87.57
Brad Penny
643
25
28.93
0.039
0.045
86.41
Kevin Millwood
571
16
18.75
0.028
0.033
85.32
John Lackey
668
24
28.71
0.036
0.043
83.60
Braden Looper
581
19
23.06
0.033
0.040
82.41
Chad Billingsley
400
17
20.94
0.043
0.052
81.18
Josh Beckett
566
11
13.68
0.019
0.024
80.41
Vicente Padilla
407
12
15.11
0.029
0.037
79.44
Chris Young
448
11
14.27
0.025
0.032
77.08
Claudio Vargas
419
14
18.20
0.033
0.043
76.91
Edwin Jackson
516
12
15.91
0.023
0.031
75.43
Jeremy Bonderman
533
14
18.78
0.026
0.035
74.53
Boof Bonser
539
14
18.92
0.026
0.035
74.00
Jorge de la Rosa
431
11
15.32
0.026
0.036
71.79
Gil Meche
663
20
28.05
0.030
0.042
71.31
Julian Tavarez
455
11
15.86
0.024
0.035
69.38
Brad Thompson
451
10
14.58
0.022
0.032
68.61
Matt Belisle
570
15
22.66
0.026
0.040
66.18
Dan Haren
661
17
26.01
0.026
0.039
65.36
Daniel Cabrera
608
13
20.82
0.021
0.034
62.44
Ben Sheets
431
11
19.19
0.026
0.045
57.31
Curt Schilling
485
7
12.87
0.014
0.027
54.40
Peavy is also very good, however. Looking at Schilling's low ranking should give his opponents a clue as to his weakness next season. Bunting for hits against Curt might be a very good idea.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Catchers, 2007 Permalink
Fielding by catchers isn't the most important aspect of the job, and the number of outs attributed to the postion are few. But for completeness, here are the tables for the position. First, teams:
Team Catchers PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Cardinals
4587
57
47.59
0.012
0.010
119.76
Braves
4404
64
55.33
0.015
0.013
115.67
Rockies
4599
76
66.39
0.017
0.014
114.48
Yankees
4511
66
59.51
0.015
0.013
110.90
Dodgers
4310
68
62.43
0.016
0.014
108.91
Angels
4325
39
35.96
0.009
0.008
108.47
Marlins
4491
57
53.73
0.013
0.012
106.09
Nationals
4591
60
57.21
0.013
0.012
104.87
Astros
4530
58
55.59
0.013
0.012
104.33
Tigers
4486
50
47.96
0.011
0.011
104.25
White Sox
4545
50
49.10
0.011
0.011
101.82
Giants
4467
58
57.06
0.013
0.013
101.64
Cubs
4177
51
50.42
0.012
0.012
101.15
Reds
4533
74
73.68
0.016
0.016
100.44
Blue Jays
4349
50
49.79
0.011
0.011
100.42
Royals
4528
46
45.90
0.010
0.010
100.22
Rangers
4518
48
48.05
0.011
0.011
99.90
Red Sox
4226
49
49.56
0.012
0.012
98.88
Devil Rays
4378
41
41.89
0.009
0.010
97.88
Indians
4548
36
37.23
0.008
0.008
96.70
Diamondbacks
4351
50
51.94
0.011
0.012
96.26
Padres
4476
59
61.48
0.013
0.014
95.97
Orioles
4403
37
38.96
0.008
0.009
94.97
Mariners
4535
42
44.86
0.009
0.010
93.63
Pirates
4608
51
54.75
0.011
0.012
93.15
Phillies
4505
56
60.25
0.012
0.013
92.95
Twins
4384
30
32.50
0.007
0.007
92.32
Athletics
4499
37
41.10
0.008
0.009
90.03
Mets
4362
50
56.67
0.011
0.013
88.22
Brewers
4392
51
59.91
0.012
0.014
85.13
The Mets are Brewers, who just completed a trade at the position, came out at the bottom team wise. New York might have been better off with Torrealba, at least fielding wise.
Individual Catcher PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Yadier Molina
2719
32
26.82
0.012
0.010
119.33
Brian McCann
3433
52
43.65
0.015
0.013
119.14
Yorvit Torrealba
2863
54
45.73
0.019
0.016
118.07
Miguel Olivo
3131
44
37.90
0.014
0.012
116.11
Jorge Posada
3484
50
43.52
0.014
0.012
114.90
Eric Munson
1012
17
15.02
0.017
0.015
113.21
Jeff Mathis
1421
21
18.96
0.015
0.013
110.78
Jose Molina
1431
16
14.52
0.011
0.010
110.18
Kelly Shoppach
1365
14
12.72
0.010
0.009
110.07
Gerald Laird
3118
37
33.82
0.012
0.011
109.40
Russell Martin
3687
60
55.76
0.016
0.015
107.60
Gregg Zaun
2559
32
29.91
0.013
0.012
106.98
Brad Ausmus
2728
33
31.07
0.012
0.011
106.22
Chris Iannetta
1613
20
18.83
0.012
0.012
106.20
Toby Hall
1002
10
9.45
0.010
0.009
105.82
Gary Bennett
1223
15
14.18
0.012
0.012
105.75
Jesus Flores
1258
21
19.87
0.017
0.016
105.69
Ivan Rodriguez
3216
41
38.98
0.013
0.012
105.19
John Buck
2879
30
28.52
0.010
0.010
105.18
Brian Schneider
3333
39
37.34
0.012
0.011
104.43
Mike Napoli
1814
12
11.53
0.007
0.006
104.09
Miguel Montero
1629
20
19.57
0.012
0.012
102.20
Javier Valentin
1494
20
19.72
0.013
0.013
101.42
Bengie Molina
3389
42
41.51
0.012
0.012
101.17
Mike Rabelo
1270
9
8.99
0.007
0.007
100.16
Dave Ross
2603
46
46.32
0.018
0.018
99.32
A.J. Pierzynski
3270
37
37.40
0.011
0.011
98.92
Ronny Paulino
3423
40
40.81
0.012
0.012
98.02
Michael Barrett
2291
33
33.76
0.014
0.015
97.74
Ramon Hernandez
2617
24
24.82
0.009
0.009
96.71
Josh Bard
2761
38
39.31
0.014
0.014
96.67
Mike Redmond
1461
11
11.42
0.008
0.008
96.30
Kurt Suzuki
1696
14
14.61
0.008
0.009
95.82
Paul Lo Duca
2922
33
34.63
0.011
0.012
95.29
Dioner Navarro
2901
25
26.29
0.009
0.009
95.09
Jason LaRue
1537
16
16.89
0.010
0.011
94.72
Jason Kendall
3448
31
32.85
0.009
0.010
94.37
Carlos Ruiz
2802
44
46.89
0.016
0.017
93.83
Jason Varitek
3061
33
35.49
0.011
0.012
92.99
Chris Snyder
2611
26
28.37
0.010
0.011
91.64
Johnny Estrada
2922
36
39.51
0.012
0.014
91.12
Kenji Johjima
3548
32
35.22
0.009
0.010
90.85
Rob Bowen
1268
11
12.14
0.009
0.010
90.59
Jarrod Saltalamacchia
1201
11
12.25
0.009
0.010
89.78
Victor Martinez
3183
22
24.51
0.007
0.008
89.76
Joe Mauer
2331
16
18.22
0.007
0.008
87.83
Paul Bako
1290
8
9.42
0.006
0.007
84.90
Matt Treanor
1317
13
15.83
0.010
0.012
82.12
Jason Phillips
1025
7
8.88
0.007
0.009
78.82
Damian Miller
1367
13
17.73
0.010
0.013
73.30
Two of the old men, Posada and Ivan Rodriguez, are still cat like behind the plate.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Firstbasemen, 2007 Permalink
Here's a look at the range of first basemen. First, the team table. The Yankees at least did a good job of improving their defense at the position:
Team First Basemen PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Cardinals
4587
366
329.22
0.080
0.072
111.17
Yankees
4511
314
285.78
0.070
0.063
109.87
Giants
4467
325
304.72
0.073
0.068
106.66
Royals
4528
315
296.64
0.070
0.066
106.19
Padres
4476
311
295.59
0.069
0.066
105.21
Cubs
4177
283
269.44
0.068
0.065
105.03
Braves
4404
320
306.86
0.073
0.070
104.28
Angels
4325
308
296.32
0.071
0.069
103.94
Pirates
4608
315
304.66
0.068
0.066
103.39
Rockies
4599
336
326.21
0.073
0.071
103.00
Astros
4530
335
328.42
0.074
0.072
102.00
Red Sox
4226
323
321.65
0.076
0.076
100.42
Brewers
4392
294
293.80
0.067
0.067
100.07
Diamondbacks
4351
292
292.06
0.067
0.067
99.98
Devil Rays
4378
316
317.18
0.072
0.072
99.63
Blue Jays
4349
337
339.17
0.077
0.078
99.36
Orioles
4403
273
277.29
0.062
0.063
98.45
Athletics
4499
303
310.84
0.067
0.069
97.48
Dodgers
4310
285
293.60
0.066
0.068
97.07
Mariners
4535
297
308.37
0.065
0.068
96.31
Mets
4362
285
296.03
0.065
0.068
96.27
White Sox
4545
309
321.66
0.068
0.071
96.06
Indians
4548
295
307.96
0.065
0.068
95.79
Tigers
4486
296
310.16
0.066
0.069
95.44
Rangers
4518
283
297.18
0.063
0.066
95.23
Phillies
4505
302
317.82
0.067
0.071
95.02
Marlins
4491
291
307.52
0.065
0.068
94.63
Twins
4384
311
337.63
0.071
0.077
92.11
Reds
4533
263
290.87
0.058
0.064
90.42
Nationals
4591
270
299.99
0.059
0.065
90.00
It looks like the Nationals missed Nick Johnson's glove at first base. It's even more evident in the individual listing:
Individual First Basemen PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Doug Mientkiewicz
1427
109
92.24
0.076
0.065
118.17
Rich Aurilia
1115
70
59.31
0.063
0.053
118.02
Andy Phillips
1325
93
80.91
0.070
0.061
114.95
Albert Pujols
4220
349
308.82
0.083
0.073
113.01
Ryan Shealy
1336
88
78.66
0.066
0.059
111.87
Derrek Lee
3691
254
239.65
0.069
0.065
105.99
Casey Kotchman
3085
225
214.03
0.073
0.069
105.12
Adrian Gonzalez
4401
307
292.23
0.070
0.066
105.06
Tony Clark
1345
98
93.58
0.073
0.070
104.72
Scott Thorman
1859
126
120.75
0.068
0.065
104.35
Todd Helton
4170
306
293.61
0.073
0.070
104.22
Ryan Klesko
2504
190
183.08
0.076
0.073
103.78
Ben Broussard
1057
72
69.60
0.068
0.066
103.45
James Loney
2355
168
162.45
0.071
0.069
103.42
Ross Gload
2169
153
148.21
0.071
0.068
103.23
Carlos Pena
3708
277
268.41
0.075
0.072
103.20
Adam LaRoche
4141
283
274.52
0.068
0.066
103.09
Nick Swisher
1075
91
88.68
0.085
0.082
102.61
Kevin Youkilis
3208
253
249.42
0.079
0.078
101.44
Matt Stairs
1024
86
85.07
0.084
0.083
101.10
Lance Berkman
3315
229
229.22
0.069
0.069
99.91
Lyle Overbay
2887
221
221.32
0.077
0.077
99.86
Prince Fielder
4073
266
271.21
0.065
0.067
98.08
Conor Jackson
2647
173
176.80
0.065
0.067
97.85
Mark Teixeira
3404
240
246.41
0.071
0.072
97.40
Carlos Delgado
3649
244
251.39
0.067
0.069
97.06
Kevin Millar
2666
171
176.83
0.064
0.066
96.70
Robert Fick
1221
80
82.79
0.066
0.068
96.64
Aubrey Huff
1295
67
69.45
0.052
0.054
96.47
Ryan Howard
3871
263
274.29
0.068
0.071
95.88
Paul Konerko
3864
256
267.48
0.066
0.069
95.71
Richie Sexson
3137
201
210.24
0.064
0.067
95.61
Aaron Boone
1219
85
89.73
0.070
0.074
94.72
Brad Wilkerson
1444
82
86.94
0.057
0.060
94.32
Ryan Garko
3271
209
223.33
0.064
0.068
93.58
Sean Casey
3100
198
211.63
0.064
0.068
93.56
Dan Johnson
2679
166
177.43
0.062
0.066
93.56
Justin Morneau
3872
281
302.07
0.073
0.078
93.02
Mike Jacobs
2821
170
183.72
0.060
0.065
92.53
Jeff Conine
1595
86
94.78
0.054
0.059
90.74
Scott Hatteberg
2457
144
160.66
0.059
0.065
89.63
Nomar Garciaparra
1678
106
118.73
0.063
0.071
89.28
Dmitri Young
2808
162
184.81
0.058
0.066
87.66
Once again, Albert Pujols comes out on top among every day first basemen. If the Yankees had kept Miguel Cairo off first, they might have finished first as a team. Not only did Nomar not hit like a first baseman, he didn't even field well.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Leftfielders, 2007 Permalink
Here's something the Orioles excelled at during 2007, fielding by leftfielders:
Team Leftfielders PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Orioles
4403
362
343.61
0.082
0.078
105.35
Indians
4548
339
325.23
0.075
0.072
104.23
Braves
4404
316
306.69
0.072
0.070
103.04
Rangers
4518
337
327.32
0.075
0.072
102.96
Nationals
4591
352
341.94
0.077
0.074
102.94
Yankees
4511
334
324.93
0.074
0.072
102.79
Brewers
4392
322
314.81
0.073
0.072
102.28
Mets
4362
324
317.91
0.074
0.073
101.91
Padres
4476
310
305.07
0.069
0.068
101.62
Royals
4528
373
367.39
0.082
0.081
101.53
Devil Rays
4378
339
334.26
0.077
0.076
101.42
Cubs
4177
341
337.65
0.082
0.081
100.99
Diamondbacks
4351
349
345.83
0.080
0.079
100.92
Blue Jays
4349
294
292.63
0.068
0.067
100.47
Dodgers
4310
288
287.78
0.067
0.067
100.08
Angels
4325
340
341.60
0.079
0.079
99.53
Giants
4467
314
317.61
0.070
0.071
98.86
Tigers
4486
327
331.60
0.073
0.074
98.61
Marlins
4491
274
278.60
0.061
0.062
98.35
Astros
4530
285
290.69
0.063
0.064
98.04
Athletics
4499
337
344.34
0.075
0.077
97.87
White Sox
4545
318
325.73
0.070
0.072
97.63
Pirates
4608
303
310.81
0.066
0.067
97.49
Rockies
4599
317
326.69
0.069
0.071
97.03
Reds
4533
326
336.27
0.072
0.074
96.95
Twins
4384
334
345.60
0.076
0.079
96.64
Phillies
4505
282
295.91
0.063
0.066
95.30
Red Sox
4226
284
299.24
0.067
0.071
94.91
Cardinals
4587
320
346.16
0.070
0.075
92.44
Mariners
4535
288
315.31
0.064
0.070
91.34
Among individuals, Matt Diaz had a career year with the glove as well as the bat.
Individual Leftfielder PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Matt Diaz
2064
155
142.05
0.075
0.069
109.11
Jose Cruz
1099
89
82.33
0.081
0.075
108.10
Joey Gathright
1595
154
142.69
0.097
0.089
107.93
Jay Payton
2776
231
214.85
0.083
0.077
107.52
David Dellucci
1210
97
91.32
0.080
0.075
106.22
Scott Hairston
1689
115
108.48
0.068
0.064
106.01
Wily Mo Pena
1126
68
64.97
0.060
0.058
104.66
Ryan Church
2304
196
188.59
0.085
0.082
103.93
Geoff Jenkins
2985
243
234.55
0.081
0.079
103.60
Carl Crawford
3623
286
276.65
0.079
0.076
103.38
Hideki Matsui
3091
214
207.16
0.069
0.067
103.30
Adam Lind
1969
137
132.73
0.070
0.067
103.22
Jason Michaels
1567
117
113.59
0.075
0.072
103.00
Reggie Willits
1557
151
146.83
0.097
0.094
102.84
Reed Johnson
1518
108
105.47
0.071
0.069
102.40
Emil Brown
1909
155
153.22
0.081
0.080
101.16
Eric Byrnes
2924
239
236.90
0.082
0.081
100.89
Alfonso Soriano
3074
245
243.79
0.080
0.079
100.50
Rob Mackowiak
1468
98
97.52
0.067
0.066
100.49
Kenny Lofton
1189
82
82.28
0.069
0.069
99.66
Willie Harris
1873
138
139.21
0.074
0.074
99.13
Ryan Ludwick
1011
86
86.83
0.085
0.086
99.04
Frank Catalanotto
1540
98
99.82
0.064
0.065
98.18
Jason Bay
3974
266
271.62
0.067
0.068
97.93
Luis Gonzalez
3008
192
196.31
0.064
0.065
97.81
Matt Holliday
4331
296
303.68
0.068
0.070
97.47
Carlos Lee
4244
261
268.68
0.061
0.063
97.14
Moises Alou
2105
138
142.80
0.066
0.068
96.64
Shannon Stewart
3606
277
287.12
0.077
0.080
96.47
Kevin Mench
1139
55
57.41
0.048
0.050
95.81
Craig Monroe
2512
166
174.76
0.066
0.070
94.99
Garret Anderson
2169
143
150.84
0.066
0.070
94.81
Scott Podsednik
1421
108
114.15
0.076
0.080
94.61
Josh Willingham
3653
211
223.26
0.058
0.061
94.51
Adam Dunn
3691
245
259.98
0.066
0.070
94.24
Terrmel Sledge
1192
77
82.16
0.065
0.069
93.72
Barry Bonds
2588
162
173.93
0.063
0.067
93.14
Jason Kubel
2153
159
172.31
0.074
0.080
92.27
Raul Ibanez
3559
224
243.95
0.063
0.069
91.82
Manny Ramirez
2925
182
198.85
0.062
0.068
91.53
Chris Duncan
2437
158
175.74
0.065
0.072
89.90
Pat Burrell
3176
176
198.31
0.055
0.062
88.75
There's no real surprises at the bottom of the list. Bonds, however, fell off quite a bit. He was average in 2006, but well below average in 2007. You can also see that there are few regular leftfielders. Only twelve players on the list were on the field at that position for at least 3000 balls in play.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Rightfielders, 2007 Permalink
The following table presents probabilistic model of range data for team rightfielders:
Team Rightfielders PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Phillies
4505
363
328.75
0.081
0.073
110.42
Rangers
4518
341
317.30
0.075
0.070
107.47
Yankees
4511
341
328.36
0.076
0.073
103.85
Royals
4528
410
397.12
0.091
0.088
103.24
Nationals
4591
392
381.19
0.085
0.083
102.84
Indians
4548
313
304.41
0.069
0.067
102.82
Marlins
4491
379
368.66
0.084
0.082
102.81
Astros
4530
360
354.55
0.079
0.078
101.54
Brewers
4392
393
387.42
0.089
0.088
101.44
Diamondbacks
4351
336
331.82
0.077
0.076
101.26
Athletics
4499
330
327.02
0.073
0.073
100.91
Blue Jays
4349
281
278.50
0.065
0.064
100.90
Cubs
4177
303
301.51
0.073
0.072
100.50
Angels
4325
311
310.00
0.072
0.072
100.32
Padres
4476
331
331.59
0.074
0.074
99.82
Twins
4384
306
307.17
0.070
0.070
99.62
Tigers
4486
318
319.88
0.071
0.071
99.41
Red Sox
4226
287
289.46
0.068
0.068
99.15
Mets
4362
340
343.80
0.078
0.079
98.89
Orioles
4403
314
317.86
0.071
0.072
98.79
Braves
4404
331
336.45
0.075
0.076
98.38
Devil Rays
4378
309
314.27
0.071
0.072
98.32
Reds
4533
377
384.09
0.083
0.085
98.15
Pirates
4608
312
319.06
0.068
0.069
97.79
Cardinals
4587
316
323.36
0.069
0.070
97.72
White Sox
4545
345
354.49
0.076
0.078
97.32
Dodgers
4310
317
326.76
0.074
0.076
97.01
Giants
4467
338
349.14
0.076
0.078
96.81
Mariners
4535
305
323.57
0.067
0.071
94.26
Rockies
4599
296
316.91
0.064
0.069
93.40
As shown below, Jayson Werth and Shane Victorino made quite the dynamic duo in rightfield for the Phillies. My uncle Anthony will not be happy with this list, however. He's a Yankees season ticket holder and he loves to tell me how much Bobby Abreu is afraid of the wall. It looks like he's still getting to lots of balls.
Individual Rightfielder PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Jayson Werth
1389
109
95.35
0.078
0.069
114.32
Shane Victorino
2837
229
210.62
0.081
0.074
108.72
Nick Swisher
1289
109
101.65
0.085
0.079
107.23
Carlos Quentin
1718
138
129.11
0.080
0.075
106.89
Franklin Gutierrez
1757
136
128.55
0.077
0.073
105.79
Nelson Cruz
1922
148
141.26
0.077
0.073
104.77
Luke Scott
2560
198
190.34
0.077
0.074
104.02
Bobby Abreu
4148
313
302.45
0.075
0.073
103.49
Corey Hart
2641
253
246.33
0.096
0.093
102.71
Austin Kearns
4356
375
366.16
0.086
0.084
102.41
Mark Teahen
3663
318
311.33
0.087
0.085
102.14
Alex Rios
3730
243
240.17
0.065
0.064
101.18
Travis Buck
1561
110
109.03
0.070
0.070
100.89
Jeremy Hermida
3035
247
245.88
0.081
0.081
100.46
Randy Winn
2686
209
208.12
0.078
0.077
100.42
Delmon Young
3463
252
251.16
0.073
0.073
100.33
Trot Nixon
2140
129
129.17
0.060
0.060
99.86
Michael Cuddyer
3749
256
256.95
0.068
0.069
99.63
Nick Markakis
4279
303
306.74
0.071
0.072
98.78
Magglio Ordonez
3835
261
264.54
0.068
0.069
98.66
Jeff Francoeur
4356
328
333.45
0.075
0.077
98.37
Jermaine Dye
3682
284
289.80
0.077
0.079
98.00
Shawn Green
2771
203
207.55
0.073
0.075
97.81
Vladimir Guerrero
2819
208
213.12
0.074
0.076
97.60
Matt Kemp
1851
129
132.50
0.070
0.072
97.36
Brian Giles
3199
216
223.54
0.068
0.070
96.63
J.D. Drew
3128
212
219.98
0.068
0.070
96.37
Ken Griffey Jr.
3649
291
302.61
0.080
0.083
96.16
Andre Ethier
2315
177
184.39
0.076
0.080
95.99
Xavier Nady
2390
162
168.97
0.068
0.071
95.88
Jose Guillen
4063
268
284.73
0.066
0.070
94.13
Juan Encarnacion
1983
125
132.90
0.063
0.067
94.06
Jack Cust
1205
79
84.93
0.066
0.070
93.01
Brad Hawpe
3851
247
267.07
0.064
0.069
92.48
Cliff Floyd
1185
69
78.30
0.058
0.066
88.12
Mark Teahen did a much better job of adjusting to rightfield than Ken Griffey, Jr. Of course, Junior is old and slow, and with all the injuries might be better off as a DH in AL at this point.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Second Basemen, 2007 Permalink
Here are the PMR numbers for second basemen. First the team stats.
Team Second Basemen PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Reds
4533
517
470.97
0.114
0.104
109.77
Phillies
4505
507
486.30
0.113
0.108
104.26
Yankees
4511
551
528.65
0.122
0.117
104.23
Diamondbacks
4351
536
514.78
0.123
0.118
104.12
Rangers
4518
561
541.66
0.124
0.120
103.57
Twins
4384
508
491.17
0.116
0.112
103.43
Athletics
4499
610
592.38
0.136
0.132
102.97
Blue Jays
4349
589
574.80
0.135
0.132
102.47
Tigers
4486
505
494.43
0.113
0.110
102.14
Royals
4528
453
444.63
0.100
0.098
101.88
Red Sox
4226
524
515.37
0.124
0.122
101.67
Rockies
4599
558
548.82
0.121
0.119
101.67
Angels
4325
505
497.11
0.117
0.115
101.59
Mariners
4535
554
546.62
0.122
0.121
101.35
Nationals
4591
491
485.03
0.107
0.106
101.23
Indians
4548
564
557.26
0.124
0.123
101.21
Orioles
4403
534
528.33
0.121
0.120
101.07
White Sox
4545
467
466.32
0.103
0.103
100.15
Mets
4362
493
494.92
0.113
0.113
99.61
Cubs
4177
471
476.31
0.113
0.114
98.88
Brewers
4392
447
456.43
0.102
0.104
97.93
Braves
4404
521
533.24
0.118
0.121
97.70
Pirates
4608
428
440.07
0.093
0.096
97.26
Devil Rays
4378
493
507.26
0.113
0.116
97.19
Dodgers
4310
480
494.92
0.111
0.115
96.99
Cardinals
4587
509
525.15
0.111
0.114
96.92
Padres
4476
556
575.50
0.124
0.129
96.61
Marlins
4491
463
487.55
0.103
0.109
94.96
Giants
4467
450
478.37
0.101
0.107
94.07
Astros
4530
461
495.20
0.102
0.109
93.09
Looking at the teams at the bottom of the list, old second basemen are a detriment to defense. Not only did Biggio at second not help the Astros offensively, it hurt them defensively as well. Now for the individual players.
Individual Second Base PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Brandon Phillips
4288
488
442.09
0.114
0.103
110.38
Chase Utley
3571
410
386.97
0.115
0.108
105.95
Jose Valentin
1123
154
145.56
0.137
0.130
105.80
Orlando Hudson
3552
435
412.20
0.122
0.116
105.53
Esteban German
1248
117
111.06
0.094
0.089
105.35
Ian Kinsler
3581
459
438.84
0.128
0.123
104.59
Ronnie Belliard
3168
337
322.49
0.106
0.102
104.50
Robinson Cano
4380
532
509.76
0.121
0.116
104.36
Josh Barfield
3237
396
381.63
0.122
0.118
103.76
Mark Ellis
4119
561
540.88
0.136
0.131
103.72
Kaz Matsui
2634
335
323.55
0.127
0.123
103.54
Aaron Hill
4230
576
558.01
0.136
0.132
103.22
B.J. Upton
1305
174
168.87
0.133
0.129
103.04
Placido Polanco
3724
420
409.07
0.113
0.110
102.67
Jose Lopez
3899
486
475.59
0.125
0.122
102.19
Mike Fontenot
1343
152
148.82
0.113
0.111
102.14
Howie Kendrick
2222
276
270.90
0.124
0.122
101.88
Alexi Casilla
1262
144
141.60
0.114
0.112
101.70
Mark Grudzielanek
3021
312
307.78
0.103
0.102
101.37
Luis Castillo
3569
370
365.52
0.104
0.102
101.23
Tadahito Iguchi
3285
359
354.84
0.109
0.108
101.17
Geoff Blum
1481
178
176.84
0.120
0.119
100.65
Brian Roberts
4068
487
487.37
0.120
0.120
99.92
Dustin Pedroia
3365
417
417.32
0.124
0.124
99.92
Kevin Frandsen
1044
111
112.56
0.106
0.108
98.61
Danny Richar
1554
152
154.45
0.098
0.099
98.42
Jamey Carroll
1396
165
168.34
0.118
0.121
98.02
Adam Kennedy
2060
250
256.18
0.121
0.124
97.59
Freddy Sanchez
4064
378
387.80
0.093
0.095
97.47
Kelly Johnson
3474
412
423.58
0.119
0.122
97.27
Felipe Lopez
1208
129
134.76
0.107
0.112
95.72
Jeff Kent
3237
355
372.41
0.110
0.115
95.33
Mark DeRosa
2056
223
234.54
0.108
0.114
95.08
Marcus Giles
2883
364
383.01
0.126
0.133
95.04
Aaron Miles
1834
183
194.00
0.100
0.106
94.33
Dan Uggla
4310
438
466.30
0.102
0.108
93.93
Rickie Weeks
3003
301
320.45
0.100
0.107
93.93
Ray Durham
3183
320
343.81
0.101
0.108
93.08
Craig Biggio
2878
283
308.32
0.098
0.107
91.79
Brendan Harris
1206
110
124.59
0.091
0.103
88.29
Rickie Weeks and Dan Uggla need to be at the top of their offensive games to stay at this important defensive position.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Centerfielders, 2007 Permalink
Here are the team rankings for centerfielders:
Team Centerfielder PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Mariners
4535
452
423.84
0.100
0.093
106.64
Red Sox
4226
481
452.99
0.114
0.107
106.18
Tigers
4486
468
445.78
0.104
0.099
104.98
Cubs
4177
414
400.21
0.099
0.096
103.45
Mets
4362
464
449.88
0.106
0.103
103.14
Braves
4404
431
421.41
0.098
0.096
102.28
Dodgers
4310
379
371.16
0.088
0.086
102.11
Rockies
4599
414
407.81
0.090
0.089
101.52
Padres
4476
409
404.18
0.091
0.090
101.19
Cardinals
4587
417
412.78
0.091
0.090
101.02
Reds
4533
455
451.03
0.100
0.100
100.88
Giants
4467
438
437.08
0.098
0.098
100.21
Nationals
4591
486
485.40
0.106
0.106
100.12
Royals
4528
424
425.45
0.094
0.094
99.66
Yankees
4511
468
470.38
0.104
0.104
99.49
Phillies
4505
418
421.10
0.093
0.093
99.26
Twins
4384
415
418.19
0.095
0.095
99.24
White Sox
4545
415
418.55
0.091
0.092
99.15
Angels
4325
441
445.14
0.102
0.103
99.07
Marlins
4491
453
458.41
0.101
0.102
98.82
Astros
4530
433
439.56
0.096
0.097
98.51
Blue Jays
4349
366
372.05
0.084
0.086
98.37
Pirates
4608
448
456.67
0.097
0.099
98.10
Diamondbacks
4351
406
414.42
0.093
0.095
97.97
Indians
4548
413
422.64
0.091
0.093
97.72
Rangers
4518
388
399.38
0.086
0.088
97.15
Athletics
4499
398
410.38
0.088
0.091
96.98
Orioles
4403
409
423.66
0.093
0.096
96.54
Devil Rays
4378
419
444.79
0.096
0.102
94.20
Brewers
4392
410
437.27
0.093
0.100
93.76
The Mariners come out on top of the Red Sox overall, but Boston has the better individual fielder:
Individual Centerfielder PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Coco Crisp
3560
408
377.29
0.115
0.106
108.14
Ichiro Suzuki
4233
424
394.49
0.100
0.093
107.48
Felix Pie
1169
120
112.75
0.103
0.096
106.43
Curtis Granderson
3995
424
402.22
0.106
0.101
105.42
Jacque Jones
1911
195
187.25
0.102
0.098
104.14
Darin Erstad
1117
105
101.18
0.094
0.091
103.77
Willy Taveras
2274
212
204.80
0.093
0.090
103.52
So Taguchi
1190
118
114.17
0.099
0.096
103.35
Ryan Church
1024
118
114.35
0.115
0.112
103.19
Andruw Jones
4080
396
385.38
0.097
0.094
102.76
Juan Pierre
4215
366
356.47
0.087
0.085
102.67
Josh Hamilton
1702
168
163.71
0.099
0.096
102.62
Carlos Beltran
3733
389
380.89
0.104
0.102
102.13
Johnny Damon
1211
121
118.84
0.100
0.098
101.82
Gary Matthews Jr.
3462
362
356.66
0.105
0.103
101.50
Mike Cameron
4016
365
360.75
0.091
0.090
101.18
Nook Logan
2398
248
245.18
0.103
0.102
101.15
Norris Hopper
1280
133
132.11
0.104
0.103
100.67
Dave Roberts
2334
224
222.68
0.096
0.095
100.59
Torii Hunter
4034
389
389.12
0.096
0.096
99.97
David DeJesus
4256
400
400.98
0.094
0.094
99.76
Alfredo Amezaga
2005
208
208.88
0.104
0.104
99.58
Jim Edmonds
2688
244
245.68
0.091
0.091
99.32
Aaron Rowand
4243
392
394.89
0.092
0.093
99.27
Hunter Pence
2636
260
261.99
0.099
0.099
99.24
Chris Duffy
1693
172
174.17
0.102
0.103
98.75
Melky Cabrera
3297
347
351.54
0.105
0.107
98.71
Rajai Davis
1162
124
125.75
0.107
0.108
98.60
Ryan Freel
1419
136
138.16
0.096
0.097
98.44
Vernon Wells
3813
321
326.31
0.084
0.086
98.37
Grady Sizemore
4383
399
407.44
0.091
0.093
97.93
Jerry Owens
2294
208
212.80
0.091
0.093
97.75
Chris Young
3824
354
364.20
0.093
0.095
97.20
B.J. Upton
2014
204
210.16
0.101
0.104
97.07
Mark Kotsay
1492
141
145.40
0.095
0.097
96.98
Nick Swisher
1515
139
144.94
0.092
0.096
95.90
Marlon Byrd
1541
114
119.68
0.074
0.078
95.25
Nate McLouth
1583
142
150.82
0.090
0.095
94.15
Kenny Lofton
2219
188
199.69
0.085
0.090
94.15
Corey Patterson
3225
281
298.69
0.087
0.093
94.08
Bill Hall
3159
295
314.62
0.093
0.100
93.76
Elijah Dukes
1010
82
92.28
0.081
0.091
88.86
Note to that the shift of Bill Hall to center worked neither offensively nor defensively. Andruw Jones may not be as good as he once was, but he can still go get the ball.
I will say this again just so his fanboys won't think I am engaging in gratuitous Jeter bashing:
Derek Jeter is a hall of fame offensive player. He could end up over 3,500 hits in his career. He is a great and loyal Yankee. He's a smart player and an excellent hitter in the 2 hole. Yes. Yes. Yes.
But the point is the Yanks must entertain the idea of moving Jeter to another position. I suggest first base, but he could also handle the outfield or even 3B.
The right move for the Yankees would have been to move Jeter to center when they acquired A-Rod, and push Bernie to DH.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Shortstops Permalink
A number of people are suggesting new ways to construct the models, but before I try those methods I'd like to present the model used last year for the nine fielding positions, starting with shortstops. I am including something new, however, the full team at the position.
Team Shortstop PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Rockies
4599
657
602.67
0.143
0.131
109.01
Twins
4384
556
523.57
0.127
0.119
106.19
Dodgers
4310
556
526.50
0.129
0.122
105.60
Royals
4528
543
514.33
0.120
0.114
105.57
Blue Jays
4349
567
544.69
0.130
0.125
104.09
Phillies
4505
531
516.45
0.118
0.115
102.82
Indians
4548
571
558.76
0.126
0.123
102.19
Pirates
4608
588
575.51
0.128
0.125
102.17
Red Sox
4226
500
492.12
0.118
0.116
101.60
Giants
4467
592
584.51
0.133
0.131
101.28
Diamondbacks
4351
493
488.99
0.113
0.112
100.82
Brewers
4392
501
497.76
0.114
0.113
100.65
Angels
4325
502
498.77
0.116
0.115
100.65
Marlins
4491
508
506.53
0.113
0.113
100.29
Mariners
4535
515
514.50
0.114
0.113
100.10
Orioles
4403
505
506.89
0.115
0.115
99.63
Astros
4530
561
563.85
0.124
0.124
99.49
Braves
4404
516
520.04
0.117
0.118
99.22
Cardinals
4587
539
544.84
0.118
0.119
98.93
Reds
4533
496
502.70
0.109
0.111
98.67
Athletics
4499
531
538.40
0.118
0.120
98.62
Padres
4476
536
544.49
0.120
0.122
98.44
Mets
4362
506
518.72
0.116
0.119
97.55
Cubs
4177
481
495.42
0.115
0.119
97.09
White Sox
4545
563
580.23
0.124
0.128
97.03
Tigers
4486
517
536.95
0.115
0.120
96.28
Rangers
4518
531
556.38
0.118
0.123
95.44
Devil Rays
4378
441
466.20
0.101
0.106
94.59
Nationals
4591
532
566.26
0.116
0.123
93.95
Yankees
4511
478
516.85
0.106
0.115
92.48
The above table will give you an idea of how the regular shortstop fit in the team context. You might imagine that Troy Tulowitzki was very good and Derek Jeter very bad:
Individual Shortstop PMR, 2007, Visit Smooth Distance Model, 2007 data only (1000 balls in play)
Player
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Troy Tulowitzki
4294
615
564.54
0.143
0.131
108.94
Tony F Pena
4010
480
449.44
0.120
0.112
106.80
Rafael Furcal
3574
473
445.28
0.132
0.125
106.23
John McDonald
2389
311
294.27
0.130
0.123
105.69
Jason Bartlett
3631
466
443.58
0.128
0.122
105.05
Jimmy Rollins
4447
528
511.62
0.119
0.115
103.20
Jack Wilson
3657
470
457.15
0.129
0.125
102.81
Yunel Escobar
1116
135
131.47
0.121
0.118
102.69
Jhonny Peralta
4206
512
502.37
0.122
0.119
101.92
Omar Vizquel
3739
504
497.76
0.135
0.133
101.25
Julio Lugo
3592
431
426.14
0.120
0.119
101.14
Adam Everett
1631
217
214.61
0.133
0.132
101.12
Orlando Cabrera
3997
462
456.91
0.116
0.114
101.11
Alex Gonzalez
2728
306
306.06
0.112
0.112
99.98
J.J. Hardy
3873
442
442.35
0.114
0.114
99.92
Cesar Izturis
1904
216
216.36
0.113
0.114
99.83
Bobby Crosby
2524
313
313.77
0.124
0.124
99.75
Stephen Drew
3877
434
435.25
0.112
0.112
99.71
Hanley Ramirez
4054
460
462.96
0.113
0.114
99.36
Ryan Theriot
2494
301
303.06
0.121
0.122
99.32
Khalil Greene
4206
504
507.64
0.120
0.121
99.28
Mark Loretta
1537
177
178.28
0.115
0.116
99.28
Yuniesky Betancourt
4103
464
467.60
0.113
0.114
99.23
Edgar Renteria
3067
361
365.13
0.118
0.119
98.87
Eric Bruntlett
1075
131
132.81
0.122
0.124
98.63
Royce Clayton
1538
200
202.77
0.130
0.132
98.63
Marco Scutaro
1064
122
124.14
0.115
0.117
98.28
Juan Uribe
4113
513
524.43
0.125
0.128
97.82
Jose Reyes
4295
500
511.97
0.116
0.119
97.66
David Eckstein
3002
349
357.57
0.116
0.119
97.60
Miguel Tejada
3317
363
373.46
0.109
0.113
97.20
Jeff Keppinger
1209
130
135.67
0.108
0.112
95.82
Carlos Guillen
3361
389
408.05
0.116
0.121
95.33
Felipe Lopez
2949
359
377.76
0.122
0.128
95.03
Michael Young
4083
476
504.85
0.117
0.124
94.29
Josh Wilson
1340
141
151.37
0.105
0.113
93.15
Brendan Harris
2336
234
253.12
0.100
0.108
92.45
Derek Jeter
4117
421
461.63
0.102
0.112
91.20
Cristian Guzman
1189
117
130.96
0.098
0.110
89.34
Troy really blew the competition away in terms of PMR, and Tony Pena did his best to make up for his poor hitting. And while New York enjoys two fine offensive shortstops, neither exactly sparkles with the glove. You can also see why the Tigers are moving Carlos Guillen to first. Michael Young may not be far behind him.
Rawlings presented the 2007 Gold Glove winners today. Maddux set a record with his 17th. David Wright won at third base, which I think would make it difficult for the Mets to move him to first if they sign A-Rod. Four outfielders won the NL award as there was a tie in the voting.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Defense Behind Pitchers Permalink
One thing PMR can measure is the luck of pitchers by looking at the predicted DER and actual DER behind them. The following table rates pitchers with at least 300 balls in play against them:
Probabilistic Model of Range, Defense Behind Pitchers, 2007. Visit Smoothed Distance Model. 2007 Data Only
Pitcher
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Chien-Ming Wang
NYY
643
448
414.94
0.697
0.645
107.97
Jeremy Guthrie
Bal
527
375
356.60
0.712
0.677
105.16
Dustin McGowan
Tor
484
346
330.21
0.715
0.682
104.78
Sean Marshall
ChC
330
231
221.12
0.700
0.670
104.47
Roger Clemens
NYY
307
215
205.94
0.700
0.671
104.40
Brian Bannister
KC
540
393
376.52
0.728
0.697
104.38
Jarrod Washburn
Sea
627
440
422.32
0.702
0.674
104.19
Mike Bacsik
Was
414
291
279.42
0.703
0.675
104.14
Tom Glavine
NYM
674
474
455.80
0.703
0.676
103.99
Jason Hirsh
Col
340
252
242.53
0.741
0.713
103.91
Ted Lilly
ChC
586
427
411.59
0.729
0.702
103.74
Braden Looper
StL
581
416
401.23
0.716
0.691
103.68
Chris Sampson
Hou
414
292
281.66
0.705
0.680
103.67
Cole Hamels
Phi
495
348
336.00
0.703
0.679
103.57
Brad Penny
LAD
643
450
435.62
0.700
0.677
103.30
Dontrelle Willis
Fla
667
442
428.96
0.663
0.643
103.04
Yovani Gallardo
Mil
318
216
209.67
0.679
0.659
103.02
Jesse Litsch
Tor
371
259
251.51
0.698
0.678
102.98
Jason Bergmann
Was
332
248
241.02
0.747
0.726
102.90
Anthony Reyes
StL
332
236
229.52
0.711
0.691
102.82
Curt Schilling
Bos
485
338
328.75
0.697
0.678
102.82
Chuck James
Atl
484
352
342.43
0.727
0.707
102.80
Nate Robertson
Det
573
389
378.44
0.679
0.660
102.79
Aaron Cook
Col
572
401
390.44
0.701
0.683
102.70
Tim Lincecum
SF
389
277
269.87
0.712
0.694
102.64
Jon Garland
CWS
705
493
480.70
0.699
0.682
102.56
Steve Trachsel
Bal
491
351
342.47
0.715
0.697
102.49
Daisuke Matsuzaka
Bos
555
384
375.16
0.692
0.676
102.36
Noah Lowry
SF
502
349
340.97
0.695
0.679
102.35
Tim Hudson
Atl
722
504
492.65
0.698
0.682
102.30
C.C. Sabathia
Cle
701
476
465.40
0.679
0.664
102.28
Chad Durbin
Det
417
304
297.37
0.729
0.713
102.23
Carlos Zambrano
ChC
610
439
429.45
0.720
0.704
102.22
Micah Owings
Ari
461
332
324.88
0.720
0.705
102.19
James Shields
TB
615
435
425.93
0.707
0.693
102.13
Erik Bedard
Bal
431
306
299.70
0.710
0.695
102.10
Jake Westbrook
Cle
481
329
322.43
0.684
0.670
102.04
John Lackey
LAA
668
459
450.14
0.687
0.674
101.97
Oliver Perez
NYM
483
341
334.57
0.706
0.693
101.92
Justin Verlander
Det
577
407
399.34
0.705
0.692
101.92
Barry Zito
SF
608
441
432.73
0.725
0.712
101.91
Roy Halladay
Tor
722
497
488.79
0.688
0.677
101.68
Jason Marquis
ChC
626
440
432.86
0.703
0.691
101.65
Zack Greinke
KC
350
239
235.18
0.683
0.672
101.63
Buddy Carlyle
Atl
335
229
225.46
0.684
0.673
101.57
A.J. Burnett
Tor
414
301
296.47
0.727
0.716
101.53
Johan Santana
Min
555
394
388.14
0.710
0.699
101.51
Jake Peavy
SD
571
409
403.20
0.716
0.706
101.44
Kyle Kendrick
Phi
401
284
280.03
0.708
0.698
101.42
Greg Maddux
SD
681
466
459.63
0.684
0.675
101.39
Tim Wakefield
Bos
600
425
419.24
0.708
0.699
101.37
Fausto Carmona
Cle
654
463
456.92
0.708
0.699
101.33
Kelvim Escobar
LAA
572
387
382.00
0.677
0.668
101.31
Joe Blanton
Oak
750
520
513.28
0.693
0.684
101.31
Rich Hill
ChC
527
378
373.19
0.717
0.708
101.29
Odalis Perez
KC
494
325
320.93
0.658
0.650
101.27
Matt Morris
SF
473
315
311.16
0.666
0.658
101.23
Carlos Silva
Min
699
485
479.14
0.694
0.685
101.22
Adam Eaton
Phi
525
356
351.83
0.678
0.670
101.19
Felix Hernandez
Sea
567
372
367.73
0.656
0.649
101.16
Wandy Rodriguez
Hou
536
366
361.86
0.683
0.675
101.14
Vicente Padilla
Tex
407
270
266.96
0.663
0.656
101.14
Aaron Harang
Cin
642
451
446.11
0.702
0.695
101.10
Livan Hernandez
Ari
704
488
482.76
0.693
0.686
101.08
Orlando Hernandez
NYM
388
299
295.82
0.771
0.762
101.08
Jamie Moyer
Phi
633
432
427.41
0.682
0.675
101.08
Ian Snell
Pit
606
413
408.93
0.682
0.675
101.00
Andy Pettitte
NYY
690
457
452.68
0.662
0.656
100.96
Tom Gorzelanny
Pit
642
439
435.75
0.684
0.679
100.75
Matt Albers
Hou
362
247
245.52
0.682
0.678
100.60
Lenny DiNardo
Oak
430
302
300.28
0.702
0.698
100.57
John Danks
CWS
427
289
287.39
0.677
0.673
100.56
Mark Hendrickson
LAD
395
262
260.58
0.663
0.660
100.55
Jorge Sosa
NYM
361
256
254.94
0.709
0.706
100.42
Brandon Webb
Ari
692
480
478.35
0.694
0.691
100.34
Carlos Villanueva
Mil
318
229
228.36
0.720
0.718
100.28
John Maine
NYM
527
377
376.07
0.715
0.714
100.25
Justin Germano
SD
426
302
301.31
0.709
0.707
100.23
Chad Billingsley
LAD
400
279
278.70
0.697
0.697
100.11
Ben Sheets
Mil
431
307
306.74
0.712
0.712
100.09
Roy Oswalt
Hou
675
456
456.10
0.676
0.676
99.98
Jered Weaver
LAA
514
348
348.13
0.677
0.677
99.96
Mike Mussina
NYY
512
335
335.31
0.654
0.655
99.91
Josh Beckett
Bos
566
385
385.40
0.680
0.681
99.90
Matt Chico
Was
548
380
380.44
0.693
0.694
99.88
Matt Belisle
Cin
570
378
378.52
0.663
0.664
99.86
Shaun Marcum
Tor
456
329
329.69
0.721
0.723
99.79
Jeff Weaver
Sea
511
340
340.84
0.665
0.667
99.75
Derek Lowe
LAD
604
412
413.67
0.682
0.685
99.60
Kameron Loe
Tex
464
305
306.28
0.657
0.660
99.58
Joe Saunders
LAA
358
235
236.04
0.656
0.659
99.56
Brad Thompson
StL
451
307
308.45
0.681
0.684
99.53
Josh Fogg
Col
556
381
383.08
0.685
0.689
99.46
Horacio Ramirez
Sea
361
231
232.31
0.640
0.644
99.44
Jeff Francis
Col
662
447
449.57
0.675
0.679
99.43
Miguel Batista
Sea
615
415
417.51
0.675
0.679
99.40
Paul Byrd
Cle
686
465
467.91
0.678
0.682
99.38
Gil Meche
KC
663
459
462.21
0.692
0.697
99.31
Claudio Vargas
Mil
419
281
283.02
0.671
0.675
99.29
Mark Buehrle
CWS
648
455
458.82
0.702
0.708
99.17
Boof Bonser
Min
539
359
362.02
0.666
0.672
99.17
Javier Vazquez
CWS
583
409
412.68
0.702
0.708
99.11
Edwin Jackson
TB
516
333
336.02
0.645
0.651
99.10
Bartolo Colon
LAA
328
205
206.87
0.625
0.631
99.09
Tony Armas Jr.
Pit
305
208
209.93
0.682
0.688
99.08
Jorge de la Rosa
KC
431
285
287.91
0.661
0.668
98.99
Jason Jennings
Hou
319
214
216.25
0.671
0.678
98.96
Edgar Gonzalez
Ari
324
228
230.41
0.704
0.711
98.96
Chris Young
SD
448
336
339.55
0.750
0.758
98.96
Julian Tavarez
Bos
455
307
310.39
0.675
0.682
98.91
Woody Williams
Hou
632
443
448.01
0.701
0.709
98.88
Daniel Cabrera
Bal
608
415
419.74
0.683
0.690
98.87
Bronson Arroyo
Cin
661
449
454.60
0.679
0.688
98.77
Kyle Lohse
Cin
426
293
296.71
0.688
0.697
98.75
Cliff Lee
Cle
317
216
218.74
0.681
0.690
98.75
Paul Maholm
Pit
583
391
396.00
0.671
0.679
98.74
Chad Gaudin
Oak
603
413
418.34
0.685
0.694
98.72
Ervin Santana
LAA
457
302
306.05
0.661
0.670
98.68
Doug Davis
Ari
597
400
405.62
0.670
0.679
98.61
Sergio Mitre
Fla
522
343
347.92
0.657
0.667
98.59
Adam Wainwright
StL
654
441
447.57
0.674
0.684
98.53
Byung-Hyun Kim
Fla
316
212
215.40
0.671
0.682
98.42
Ramon Ortiz
Min
324
217
220.56
0.670
0.681
98.39
Kevin Correia
SF
306
217
220.82
0.709
0.722
98.27
Kevin Millwood
Tex
571
364
370.63
0.637
0.649
98.21
Jeremy Bonderman
Det
533
354
360.70
0.664
0.677
98.14
Scott Baker
Min
454
302
308.06
0.665
0.679
98.03
Dan Haren
Oak
661
457
466.27
0.691
0.705
98.01
Randy Wolf
LAD
309
205
209.32
0.663
0.677
97.93
Jeff Suppan
Mil
708
472
482.96
0.667
0.682
97.73
Josh Towers
Tor
347
229
234.38
0.660
0.675
97.71
Matt Cain
SF
571
409
419.20
0.716
0.734
97.57
John Smoltz
Atl
586
400
410.60
0.683
0.701
97.42
Brandon McCarthy
Tex
340
232
238.54
0.682
0.702
97.26
Taylor Buchholz
Col
305
207
212.87
0.679
0.698
97.24
Andy Sonnanstine
TB
408
272
280.02
0.667
0.686
97.13
Brian Burres
Bal
378
249
256.88
0.659
0.680
96.93
Brett Tomko
LAD
339
219
226.04
0.646
0.667
96.89
Joe Kennedy
Oak
346
242
250.10
0.699
0.723
96.76
Scott Kazmir
TB
534
346
358.19
0.648
0.671
96.60
Chris Capuano
Mil
456
297
307.78
0.651
0.675
96.50
Robinson Tejeda
Tex
302
204
212.16
0.675
0.703
96.16
David Wells
SD
416
271
282.44
0.651
0.679
95.95
David Bush
Mil
594
395
412.87
0.665
0.695
95.67
Zach Duke
Pit
399
246
258.54
0.617
0.648
95.15
Jose Contreras
CWS
647
420
441.74
0.649
0.683
95.08
Kip Wells
StL
522
342
360.50
0.655
0.691
94.87
Scott Olsen
Fla
578
366
387.16
0.633
0.670
94.53
Chien-Ming Wang comes out on top by far, not surprising given the Yankees overall defensive rating. What bothers me about Wang, however, is the low level of his predicted DER. You would think that someone who gets a lot of ground balls would be somewhat higher. The following chart breaks down Wang by ball in play type:
CM Wang by Batted Ball Type, 2007
Batted Ball Type
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
Fly
112
101
98.85
0.902
0.883
102.18
Liner
92
29
16.14
0.315
0.175
179.66
Grounder
377
291
269.40
0.772
0.715
108.02
Bunt Grounder
6
4
4.20
0.667
0.700
95.24
Bunt Fly
1
1
1.00
1.000
1.000
100.00
Fliner (Fly)
29
13
14.12
0.448
0.487
92.09
Fliner (Liner)
26
9
11.23
0.346
0.432
80.12
Notice that the defense behind Wang caught a lot more line drives than predicted. Line drives tend to fall for hits, so by adding thirteen extra outs with liners, the Yankees really helped Wang. So Chien-Ming got a bit lucky that way. The grounders, however, is where the defense really shined. They picked up about twenty one more outs than expected on ground balls. How did they do that? The Yankees made a lot of plays on low probability vectors:
Wang Ground Balls by Vector, 2007
Vector
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Ratio
28
8
6
7.02
0.750
0.877
85.52
29
17
13
12.05
0.765
0.709
107.90
30
29
21
17.57
0.724
0.606
119.49
31
28
27
24.76
0.964
0.884
109.04
32
19
18
18.43
0.947
0.970
97.66
33
32
29
26.75
0.906
0.836
108.40
34
17
12
9.48
0.706
0.558
126.59
35
11
9
7.38
0.818
0.671
121.97
36
23
14
13.01
0.609
0.566
107.58
37
22
12
13.66
0.545
0.621
87.82
38
27
24
23.07
0.889
0.854
104.04
39
31
30
25.58
0.968
0.825
117.26
40
22
19
17.41
0.864
0.792
109.11
41
34
24
17.12
0.706
0.504
140.19
42
27
17
19.83
0.630
0.734
85.73
43
11
9
9.71
0.818
0.883
92.67
44
10
5
4.56
0.500
0.456
109.71
The vectors go from a low of 28 at the third base line to a high of 44 at the first base line. By looking at the Predicted DER column, you can see where the holes are in the infield. Vector 30 represents the hole between third and short, vectors 34-37 the area around second base where ground balls go into centerfield, and vector 41, the hole between first and second. Note that Wang does well in the holes, as if the defense were shifted a bit toward first base. Both the line drive and ground ball data make me wonder if someone was doing a very good job of positioning the Yankees fielders. I don't know who was in charge of that, but in the case of Wang, they did a very good job.
That brings up a point I haven't made in a while. Range is probably a poor word for the ability measured here. Range implies that the fielder can move a long way to get a ball. But sometimes anticipating where the ball gets hit is just as important. So the ability to move and the ability to position are two factors in what the model means by range.
On the other end of the spectrum, Matt Cain not only received no run support, he didn't get much defensive support either. And the defense behind Kazmir was just ridiculous. Here's a pitcher who keeps balls in play to a minimum, and his defense can't turn the few hit to them into outs.
Probabilistic Model of Range, 2007, Teams Permalink
Baseball Info Solutions sent me their final stats for 2007 over the weekend. That means it's time to start presenting the 2007 Probabilistic Model or Range. If you're new to this, you can find explanations in this archive. Basically, for each fieldable (non inside the park home runs) ball put in play, six parameters are used to determine how difficult it was to field the ball. A probability of turning the ball into an out is calculated, and those probabilities are summed. That gives us expected batted balls turned into outs. We turn that into a predicted DER (defensive efficiency record), compare that to the actual DER and calculate a ranking.
The model is based primarily on visiting player data, smoothed, distance on fly balls. Only 2007 data was used to construct the model.
Note that a team can post a poor DER during the season, but do well in this model if the balls put into play were extremely difficult to field. In fact, the team ranked first in 2007 is a bit of a surprise for that very reason.
Probabilistic Model of Range, 2007 Data, Teams, Visit Smooth Distance Model, Ranked by Difference
Team
In Play
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Yankees
4511
3103
3041.46
0.688
0.674
0.01364
Red Sox
4226
2974
2919.61
0.704
0.691
0.01287
Cubs
4177
2943
2895.51
0.705
0.693
0.01137
Blue Jays
4349
3060
3017.22
0.704
0.694
0.00984
Royals
4528
3093
3058.20
0.683
0.675
0.00768
Angels
4325
2930
2900.79
0.677
0.671
0.00675
Phillies
4505
3085
3056.00
0.685
0.678
0.00644
Rockies
4599
3221
3195.95
0.700
0.695
0.00545
Tigers
4486
3094
3072.58
0.690
0.685
0.00477
Braves
4404
3069
3048.96
0.697
0.692
0.00455
Mets
4362
3050
3033.08
0.699
0.695
0.00388
Giants
4467
3108
3096.80
0.696
0.693
0.00251
Orioles
4403
3017
3006.12
0.685
0.683
0.00247
Rangers
4518
3071
3061.36
0.680
0.678
0.00213
Nationals
4591
3198
3191.04
0.697
0.695
0.00152
Indians
4548
3112
3107.26
0.684
0.683
0.00104
Padres
4476
3131
3128.60
0.700
0.699
0.00054
Mariners
4535
3050
3051.99
0.673
0.673
-0.00044
Diamondbacks
4351
3013
3016.84
0.692
0.693
-0.00088
Dodgers
4310
2942
2945.91
0.683
0.684
-0.00091
Cardinals
4587
3150
3154.99
0.687
0.688
-0.00109
Twins
4384
3003
3014.01
0.685
0.688
-0.00251
Astros
4530
3099
3120.86
0.684
0.689
-0.00483
Reds
4533
3068
3096.08
0.677
0.683
-0.00619
Pirates
4608
3099
3132.67
0.673
0.680
-0.00731
Athletics
4499
3110
3144.35
0.691
0.699
-0.00763
Brewers
4392
2966
3011.82
0.675
0.686
-0.01043
White Sox
4545
3089
3141.16
0.680
0.691
-0.01148
Marlins
4491
2962
3039.28
0.660
0.677
-0.01721
Devil Rays
4378
2867
2943.31
0.655
0.672
-0.01743
That's right, the Yankees are number one. Without running the individual numbers, I'm guessing that a full season of Melky Cabrera and keeping Giambi off first really helped. The Red Sox defense turned a higher percentage of their balls in play into outs, but they also were given easier balls to field in general.
I wondered why the Tampa Bay pitching staff did so poorly with the high number of strikeouts they collected, and the reason is clear in these numbers. The Devil Rays defense was horrible. In fact, the state of Florida just can't play defense, with the Marlins ranking 29th in the majors.
For the second year in a row, the Kansas City Royals look a lot better than their posted DER. If they ever get a good set of pitchers on that team, they're going to post a low ERA.
For those of you who prefer a ranking by ratio of DER/Predicted DER, here's the table with that data.
Probabilistic Model of Range, 2007 Data, Teams, Visit Smooth Distance Model, Ranked by Difference
"You gotta tip your hat," Arizona Diamondbacks manager Bob Melvin said. "We hit some balls hard. Seemed like every ball we hit hard, someone ended up making a good play, whether it's in the outfield or infield.
"It's different than the Rockies you've seen in the past defensively. They're as good as anybody in baseball, and it's shown up all series."
The Rockies DER this season was .703, which is remarkable given their ballpark. Lots of hits tend to fall in the big outfield. I can't wait to see what PMR says about their team defense.
Coco Crisp almost makes a great defensive play in centerfield on Izturis. Crisp dives and gets the ball in his glove, but he loses it as he hits the ground. Izturs gets a double, the first extra-base hit allowed by Schilling in the game.
Update: Kendrick grounds to second, moving Izturis to third. The Angels don't have that many outs left, however, so even productive ones are costly.
Update: Rivera pops out to first on a split-finger that was sinking fast. Schilling's doing a great job today of keeping the Angels hitters off balance.
Update: Schilling strikes out Napoli to end the inning and get a short shutout. At 100 pitches, Curt is unlikely to come out for the eighth. It's an impressive outing that seems to be the norm for the new Schilling. He strikes out just four, and he only walked one. Instead of striking out a lot of batters, Schilling is causing them to hit the ball poorly. He's getting a lot of outs even with a lot of balls in play. The Red Sox defense helps there as well.
The Phillies load the bases with two outs in the second inning, but Oliver induces a ground ball to short. Ruiz was cutting in front of Reyes as the ball approached him, and Jose booted the grounder. He recovered and tried to throw to second, but the runner was already safe and the throw goes through Castillo. Two runs score on two errors by Reyes, and the normally sure-handed Mets defense costs them.
Perez continues to walk Phillies, as he walked Rollins to start the game and Eaton to load the bases. He's now walked 14 Phillies in 10 2/3 innings.
David Ortiz doubles off the wall in left, then Lowell singles hard to center. I was absolutely amazed that the third base coach sent Ortiz. Posada had to wait a second for David to slide into him. Melky picks up his fourteenth assist of the year, and the Red Sox have two outs and a man on second instead of first and third, one out.
Update: Giambi gets eaten up by a hot shot off Drew's bat and the Red Sox score their second run. There's been poor infield defense by the Yankees tonight.
Jeter's made too poor plays in the first inning. He made a bad throw on a ground by Lugo resulting in an error, and just now he booted a double play ground by David Ortiz, only getting an out at first. How he wins Gold Gloves is beyond me.
A very nice play by the Mariners in the top of the first inning. Willits leads off with a single, then goes on a hit and run with Cabrera at the plate. Orlando hits the ball the other way, just to the rightfield side of second. But Seattle had the shortstop cover on the play, so Lopez was in the perfect spot to make the play, make a quick toss to Betancourt who then completed the double play. They guessed right on that one.
Once again, you can help determine the best and worst defenders in baseball. TangoTiger needs your help. He want your opinions of fielders as he puts together The 2007 Scouting Report by the Fans for the Fans. If you watch a lot of games and have opinions on fielders, please take his survey and be part of the wisdom of the crowds approach to quantifying defense.
Posada and Clemens combine for an interesting double play. With Inge on third and Maybin on first, Clemens strikes out Thames. Maybin was running, and as Posada threw, Inge broke for the plate. But Posada threw the ball to Clemens, not second base. Roger ran down Brandon for the second out to end the inning.
Roger has the strikeout pitch working today as he's K'd six through three innings. The Yankees lead 1-0 on a Posada homer as it's a Jorge Day on both sides of the ball.
Update: Maybin hits his first home run, a shot to straight-away center. The solo shot in the fifth gives the Tigers a 2-1 lead.
In the bottom of the eight in Cleveland, Byrdak walks two batters with two out to bring up Travis Hafner. He lines one to left center, where Granderson lays out to make a fantastic diving catch to keep the game tied. If Detroit wins this one, Curtis gets the game ball.
Update: In the bottom of the ninth, Chris Gomez leads off with a double. That brings up Peralta against Rodney. Jhonny was 0 for 8 vs. Rodney with three Ks. However, he's batted very well this season with men on base and with runners in scoring position. The announcers thought Peralta should bunt, but Wedge has him swing away and he strikes out on a heater right down the middle of the plate. I could go either way on this one, but it seems Peralta has a decent chance of ending the game by letting him swing away.
Update: Rodney strikes out the final two batters in the inning. They'll go to extra innings. The Indians struck out 13 times in the first nine, Detroit 11.
The Phillies defeated the Braves 5-3 tonight to take second place in the NL East. But Jeff Francoeur kept the Braves in the game with two base runner kills. That brings Jeff's total of outfielder assists to seventeen, six more than anyone else in the NL. I suspect coaches will stop sending runners on Francoeur soon.
Johnny Damon and Derek Jeter reach bases leading off the third inning on balls that could have been outs. Both went for hits. The first was a pop up behind second that just ticked off Peralta's glove, but he didn't take a great route to the ball. I would have given him an error. The second was a grounder up the middle by Jeter. Peralta dived for the ball, and it just ticked off his glove to put runners at first and third.
Then Abreu hit one up the middle, Peralta fielded it on the first-base side of second, but Barfield didn't cover, and by the time Jhonny was able to tag second, he couldn't get the double play. The Yankees lead 3-0 in the third.
The Toronto Blue Jays show off their arms in the top of the fifth. McDonald made a great throw from deep in the hole to nip A-Rod at first. Then for the second time tonight, Posada gets thrown out trying to stretch a double into a double. Rios got him in the fifth, and Reed Johnson caught him earlier. Finally, McDonald makes another nice play in the hole to force a runner at second to end the inning. The defense kept a 4-0 Yankees lead from expanding.
Great play at the plate in the Toronto-New York game. With the score 2-1 Toronto in the bottom of the ninth, Phillips singles and Cairo pinch runs and steals second. Cabrera singles to shallow right, and Miguel tries to score from second. Rios makes a great throw, and Zaun blocks the plate perfectly, flipping Cairo away from home and holding onto the ball for the out. Miguel may have injured his shoulder on the play.
Cabrera took second on the throw, then stole third with one out. Damon walks, and Jeter is up with the tying run 90 feet away.
Update: Accardo balks to force in the tying run and take away the double play. The great defensive play saves a run, but we'll see if it saves the game.
Update: Jeter hits a perfect double play ball to short, as does Abreu to end the inning. Without the balk, the Blue Jays win the game. Instead, the teams go to the tenth tied at two.
Update: Robinson Cano singles home A-Rod in the 10th and the Yankees take the game 3-2. The gain a game on the Red Sox and put a little more distance between them and the Blue Jays.
I just saw a very bad example of the umpire giving the second baseman the out on a double play just for being close to the bag. Fontenot took the throw from the third baseman about a foot in front of the bag. The camera work was bad and blurry, but the picture cleared as the camera came to rest on the second baseman. It was clear at that point he was no where near the bag, and there was no runner bearing down on him. You need to be a little closer than that.
The Milwaukee Brewers made four errors this afternoon, and at least one other bad play that went for a triple as they lose to Pittsburgh 6-2. The errors led to two unearned runs. Milwaukee had opportunities to score. They loaded the bases in the second but did not score. Shane Youman gave up eight hits, a walk and a hit batter in six innings of work, but allowed just two runs. Last year, despite walking ten and striking out just five in 21 2/3 innings, he posted a 2.91 ERA. It appears this pitcher bends but he doesn't break.
The Twins came up in the bottom of the ninth inning last night trailing 5-4 with Joe Mauer leading off the inning. Joe smacked a hard grounder up the middle, and off the bat I thought, "There's a hit." But as the camera turned to show the field, Royce Clayton was crouching in front of the ball, and made an easy play for an out. Clayton played Mauer perfectly, and what would be a single in many cases started a 1-2-3 inning for a Toronto victory.
The Blue Jays obviously did their homework. And of course, it's so easy to do today. Mauer seldom hits ground balls to the right of where Clayton was stationed. By positioning himself correctly, Royce Clayton is increasing his range without having to move a long distance for a ball. That's why, at some point, I'd love to get positioning information for players, so we can separate those player who can move long distances to get to balls vs. players who know where to stand before a ball is put in play.
With the win, the Blue Jays move over .500 and to 9 games behind Boston.
Jason Michaels shows off his vertical leap as he skys over the fence in left to steal a home run from Craig Monroe. The Tigers picked up three straight hits, a triple by Guillen and singles by Rodriguez and Casey to cut the lead to 2-1. Monroe's shot would have put the Tigers up 4-2. Who says white men can't jump?
Hunter Pence makes a catch off Rich Aurilia at the 404 sign in centerfield. He was feeling for the wall, and thought he was close. He leaped for the ball, caught it, and looked like he thought he would crash against the padding. Instead, he fell over and hit his head in the seam where the wall angles in toward left. It was a scary crash, but Hunter held on and stayed in the game. If he was more aware of his position, he could have just kept going back to make the catch without leaping.
The outfielders don't flip the ball to each other for outs like Carlos Guillen and Placido Polanco do. But they consider their defense a collaboration.
"We communicate really well the whole game about (where) we're positioning ourselves," Ordonez said.
Monroe said: "Curtis makes sure that when he moves, he makes the rightfielder and leftfielder move. We talk about where to play the hitters. Curtis might look at me and say, 'What do you think?' We sometimes make the wrong decision, but when you do it as a group, it always feels better to know we were all committed to the same plan."
In the 1980s I used to sit in the centerfield bleachers at Fenway Park. I was always amazed that teams would come in that didn't do anything to position outfielders. No matter the hitter, they played everyone straight away. It's good to see the Tigers thinking about this and putting a plan into action.
Jacob Lous attended the Oakland game today and sends a word on Jason Kendall:
One of the craziest things to watch in baseball this year is the Jason Kendall shift. His name is announced, and three outfielders instantly start jogging - jogging - to a new spot. I've never seen anything like it.
LF and CF jog 20 feet to the right since he pulls the ball so seldomly, and the rightfielder moves in at least 15 feet. Part of the reason his BA is so low this year is that teams have figured out that a high percentage of his hits come on dinkers to right. With so few XBH, he rarely makes anyone pay by hitting it over their head, and the CF shades far enough to right to prevent a triple if it's hit over the RF's head.
The Braves are losing 8-0 in the bottom of the sixth, but Andrew Jones just channelled Willie Mays. On a ball to deep centerfield, Andruw ran straight back, looking over his right shoulder, and made a basket catch for the out. Here's the Mays catch. Both are pretty plays.
Orlando Cabrera clocks Reggie Willits in the jaw as they both go for a fly ball down the line in leftfield. Cabrera was calling for the ball but it's not clear that Willits did also. Cabrerra made the catch, and ran the ball in to prevent Blalock from scoring from third while Willits lay on the ground. Reggie stayed in the game.
Kevin Millwood re-injured his hamstring. He gave up a grand slam to Kotchman in the first, and the Angels lead 4-0 in the top of the third.
The Mariners turn two pretty plays in the top of the third. Phelps hits a bouncer in the hole that Betancourt backhands, jumps and throws to beat Phelps by a mile. He made the catch and throw in one smooth motion. Then Cano hit a nubber between the catcher and the pitcher toward third base. Ramirez was quick off the mound, made a strong throw but wide, but Sexson used his height to stretch, catch and hold the bag for the third out.
Brew Crew Ball notes a number of good defensive plays by the Brewers last night. They're not a great defense right now. The Hardball Times puts their DER at .694, tied for eighth in the NL. But THT's +/- rating assigns better numbers to the fielders than the pitchers, so in fact Milwaukee's defens is doing a pretty good job.
This season, Crisp caught nine balls that weren't caught last year. There was a small sample size on each of those, so zero might not be accurate, but nine of those catches came in the last two weeks. Overall, he caught fifteen balls where the probability was less than or equal to .5, and 13 of those came from 4/23 on. If I had data on balls he didn't catch, we could do a complete analysis, but it sure looks like Bill's observation is true, that over the last two week Crisp is making difficult plays.
Bill James sent an e-mail to a few sabermetric friends this afternoon praising Coco Crisp. Seth Mnookin posted here. The main quote from James:
"It seems to me that the BIGGEST factor in our team's performance over the last week or so has been that Coco has been just unbelievable in center field...he's just catching EVERYTHING that looks like it might be trouble. There's been no gap in right center, no gap in left center, nothing getting over his head and nothing has been landing in front of him."
Seth gives an example from Friday night's game. I was able to obtain data on Crisp's putouts, and since April 23rd, Coco started seven games, collecting 34 putouts or about five a game. In his previous 15 starts, Coco recorded 41 putouts, or less than three per game. So over the last couple of weeks, Crisp is up about two putouts per game. There's not a lot of context here. I don't know if more balls are being hit in his general area. But I'm trying to get a handle on the degree of difficulty of the catches, and I'll post when I have something on that.
Update: Here's a chart of Crisp's putouts this season. Second base is at 180 degrees. (Click for a larger image.)
As you can see, he's catching balls close and far, and he's covering thirty degrees of the field.
A ball just dropped between Jason Kubel and Torii Hunter because Torii didn't do his job as a centerfielder and try to catch everything. He jogged after a ball he thought Kubel could catch, rather than running full speed and calling Kubel off. Kubel thought Hunter would get the ball, and it fell for a hit to put runners on first and second with one out.
Update: Santana gets a strikeout and ground out to end the inning. No score at the end of two in Detroit.
Nate Robertson picks up an error on a throw to first, because he faked out his own first baseman. Nate takes off his hat and is wiping his brow when he throws quickly to first. Casey, seeing Robertson apparently taking a moment, takes off his glove for an adjustment. The ball sails by, and Ozuna ends up at second. He's at third after a single, and ties the game on a sacrifice fly by Thome.
Manny made a bad throw earlier today, so I should I should praise a good defensive play as well. He just made a nice running catch over his shoulder as he ran back toward the leftfield wall, just on the edge of the warning track. The fact that Manny can make plays like that is one of the infuriating things about his defense. You get the feeling sometimes he doesn't try.
Gary Matthews, Jr. just made another great catch, robbing Michael Young of a home run at the centerfield fence. He's making the Rangers really miss him.
Update: Matthews then leads off the inning with a high chop that lands behind McCarthy for a single. A wild pitch and two singles later the Angels lead 1-0. Not surprisingly, Guerrero drove in the run with another hit against the Angels.
Update: The Angels score four in the first, ruining McCarthy's debut with Texas.
The Mets pitchers so far allowed a .348 OBA. That's high for a staff. But that number gets cut down by the number of ground double plays induced. Overall, New York pitchers allowed 16 Cardinals to reach base via a hit, walk or hit by pitch in sixty nine plate appearances. But if you remove the seven runners taken out on double plays, the effective OBA against the Mets is just .246, which is excellent.
Emil Brown glanced at the lineup card Sunday morning in the Royals' clubhouse, turned and observed to anyone within listening distance:
"I guess my defense is good enough for me to be in right field today."
The words came out as a challenge and borderline belligerent. The message was unmistakable. Brown has had it with those who label him "an adventure," or worse, in the outfield, on the bases or anywhere else.
His irritation centers on the media, first and foremost, but not exclusively. His fed-up list includes anyone trashing his skills, be they players or officials with other clubs -- or within the Royals' organization.
"I hear it all of the time," Brown said. "He's an adventure out there. Why? Because I'm actually trying to make plays happen?
"It isn't an adventure for (Twins outfielder) Torii Hunter when he dives for a ball and misses it. Then, it's, 'Oh, he just missed it.' He gets the benefit of the doubt because he's a Gold Glover. But it's an adventure when I do it."
Emil makes a good point. If you look at his defensive charts for 2006, Brown isn't a star defender, but he's basically making the plays. It doesn't matter how smooth you look catching the ball, as long as you make the catch.
A few days ago I introduced the idea of a probabilistic model of Ground into Double Plays (GDP). The probabilistic model of range just measures the ability to turn a ball into an out. For infielders, however, they're often asked to turn a ground ball into more than one out. The idea is to take a very specific situation; ground ball hit, man on first, less than two out and build a model that measures both plays made and GDP turned. With that model, we can ask which fielders perform well in that situation.
In building this model, I left parks out of the parameters. Basically, I thought the sample size would be too small if I left the parks in. This probably hurts the three teams that play of artifical turf.
Let's start by looking at the ability of shortstops to start a double play. The following table looks at three indexes for each fielder. The Plays Made (PM) index measures Plays Made / Predicted Plays Made. This measures the fielder's ability to turn a ball into an out. The GDP index does the same for ground double plays. Does the fielder start the expected number of double plays? And finally, an outs index that looks at the total number of outs accured to the fielder on these balls in play. It could be a fielder is making up for a lack of range by being really good at starting GDPs, or vice versa. Remember, this says nothing about the pivot man or the receiver at first base. In this context, we're only looking at the fielder who starts the play.
Probabilistic Model of GDPs, Ground Balls, Man on First, Less than Two Out, Shortstops Starting GDP (2006 Data Used to Build Model)
Player
Ground Balls In Play
Actual Plays Made
Predicted Plays Made
PM Index
Actual GDP
Predicted GDP
GDP Index
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
Outs Index
Craig Counsell
183
40
32.14
124.44
32
21.23
150.72
72
53.38
134.89
Khalil Greene
219
53
45.27
117.08
31
28.68
108.07
84
73.95
113.59
Stephen Drew
121
26
23.68
109.82
17
14.29
118.92
43
37.97
113.25
Clint Barmes
283
56
53.75
104.18
42
33.03
127.16
98
86.78
112.92
Juan Uribe
274
58
50.75
114.29
34
31.85
106.75
92
82.60
111.38
Hanley Ramirez
352
71
67.58
105.05
49
43.18
113.48
120
110.76
108.34
Miguel Tejada
342
76
72.84
104.33
52
45.35
114.66
128
118.20
108.30
David Eckstein
298
61
56.74
107.50
38
34.92
108.81
99
91.67
108.00
Jack Wilson
290
64
62.47
102.45
46
39.39
116.77
110
101.86
107.99
Rafael Furcal
396
92
85.54
107.55
58
55.24
104.99
150
140.78
106.55
Bill Hall
228
55
50.83
108.21
33
32.90
100.30
88
83.73
105.10
Bobby Crosby
237
44
42.12
104.47
29
27.37
105.94
73
69.49
105.05
Alex Gonzalez
244
50
51.18
97.69
38
33.41
113.74
88
84.59
104.03
Jimmy Rollins
333
70
69.50
100.72
48
44.05
108.97
118
113.54
103.92
Carlos Guillen
303
65
64.24
101.18
45
41.63
108.10
110
105.87
103.90
Adam Everett
309
66
63.51
103.91
41
40.15
102.11
107
103.67
103.22
Ronny Cedeno
240
49
46.28
105.87
28
29.54
94.79
77
75.82
101.55
Michael Young
410
88
86.89
101.28
54
55.41
97.46
142
142.30
99.79
Jason A Bartlett
214
50
47.40
105.49
28
31.86
87.90
78
79.25
98.42
Jose Reyes
304
67
66.70
100.45
40
43.66
91.62
107
110.36
96.96
Omar Vizquel
297
64
65.48
97.73
42
44.00
95.45
106
109.49
96.82
John McDonald
170
25
26.52
94.26
18
17.91
100.50
43
44.43
96.77
Orlando Cabrera
319
58
60.40
96.03
38
39.02
97.38
96
99.42
96.56
Felipe Lopez
319
67
64.47
103.93
34
40.58
83.78
101
105.05
96.15
Angel Berroa
337
69
72.29
95.44
46
47.91
96.02
115
120.20
95.67
Jhonny Peralta
357
82
84.45
97.10
50
55.63
89.88
132
140.08
94.23
Alex Cora
127
30
32.94
91.07
21
22.16
94.76
51
55.10
92.56
Marco Scutaro
146
34
37.58
90.47
24
25.22
95.15
58
62.81
92.35
Edgar Renteria
347
63
67.67
93.10
39
43.19
90.30
102
110.86
92.01
Yuniesky Betancourt
350
60
66.40
90.36
43
46.02
93.44
103
112.42
91.62
Julio Lugo
182
32
35.29
90.68
21
23.66
88.74
53
58.95
89.90
Ben T Zobrist
131
25
28.09
89.00
17
18.93
89.82
42
47.02
89.33
Juan Castro
146
23
25.18
91.33
13
15.27
85.11
36
40.46
88.98
Derek Jeter
336
63
70.96
88.79
40
45.81
87.32
103
116.77
88.21
Royce Clayton
234
43
47.02
91.44
20
29.67
67.40
63
76.70
82.14
Aaron W Hill
108
16
20.33
78.70
7
12.82
54.62
23
33.14
69.39
Notice how few chances fielders get to turn GDPs. On the best teams, they get a little over two chances a game. Secondly, Arizona does a good job of picking out shortstops, as Counsell and Drew are near the top of the list. And if you don't like Derek Jeter, here's another area where you can pick on him.
The other thing that strikes me about the list is that shortstops who are good at making plays are also the ones good at starting double plays. Ronny Cedeno is unusual in that he's good at getting an out, but didn't do well starting DPs. Could it be that Todd Walker was just a poor pivot man? I hope further research using these models will help answer that question.
The truth most likely lies in the middle: the average of the P.B.P. systems' results for RamÃrez is 15 to 20 runs below average. That's enough to take a significant bite out of his value. If his hitting begins to deteriorate this season (he turns 35 in May), and his base running remains poor (subtracting another two runs or so), he is likely to be worth about as much in 2007 as Oakland's up-and-coming Nick Swisher. In other words, an All-Star, but not a franchise player, and certainly not worth anywhere near his $20 million salary.
I put the cost of Manny in left field at no more than 16 runs in 2006, whereas Dan believes that the minimum. Dan is also basing Manny's worth on Ramriez's worth on his continuing at that level of defense and his offense declining due to age. But of the three years I've measured Ramirez, 2006 was by far the worst reading I've seen on him. Manny complained of a bad right knee in 2006. If that's better and he becomes more mobile, I suspect the number of balls he gets to goes up as well.
So I'm not quite as dire as Dan in assessing the worth of Ramirez. He a great player in his mid 30's, and I'm not surprised he is showing signs of decline.
Shiner said Tejada's workouts have been focused on improving his foot speed and movement. During one drill, Tejada shuffles back and forth between cones as Shiner rolls baseballs to him. The exercise is designed to maximize the steps to get to the ball, simulating the act of fielding a baseball while moving left or right. Team officials have been pleased with the range Tejada has shown thus far in camp.
"He is moving around a lot better than he did last year," Perlozzo said. "When his knee was bad [last year], I knew there was nothing that I can do about that. ... It was an up-and-down year for him defensively for multiple reasons."
Teammates said Tejada got a bad rap for his defense last season, considering that he was nursing knee and hamstring injuries the first couple of months of the season. Tejada did make 19 errors, tying his lowest total for a full season in his career. But it was his range that was often criticized by scouts and baseball officials.
"He wasn't fully healthy early last year and yet he still went out there and did all he could. Of course, your range is going to be limited, but most guys wouldn't have even been out there," Gomez said. "He got healthy soon thereafter, and I thought he was great. I don't think anybody could deny that. He got this label, where someone says one thing about range and all of a sudden you don't have range. It sticks. I think it is really unfair."
We'll see if his PMR improves at the end of the season.
Born in the imagination of a minor-league pitching coach, carried from Class A to the brink of the big leagues by an over-achieving, side-arming right-hander, "The 3-2" is a pick-off move that is challenging umpires at least as much as it is eliminating baserunners.
Footage of the move, captured accidentally Friday night by a Venezuelan film crew stationed behind home plate at Surprise Stadium, has been carried on compact disc from Arizona to the Major League Baseball offices in New York City. Duplicates will go out to umpiring supervisors and trickle into the minor leagues.
The pickoff play begins with the bases loaded or runners at second and third. The pitcher fakes the throw to third, then allows that momentum to carry him - 270 degrees counter-clockwise - into a throw to second base. It works best with the bases loaded, when it comes disguised as the more familiar third-to-first pickoff.
I can't find a link to the video on Google or YouTube, so if someone finds it let me know.
But the Angels' veteran left fielder also was somewhat offended by media reports framing the Matthews signing as one that would ease the burden on Anderson and right fielder Vladimir Guerrero.
"I've heard that several times this winter, and I don't really know what it means," Anderson said. "I don't think I've been a liability out there, other than the fact I haven't been able to play. I know I took a lot of heat last year because I played hurt. I should have just not played. I wouldn't have taken any heat for that."
An inflamed arch in his left foot hindered Anderson for most of 2006 and contributed to knee and lower-back problems. He was relegated to a career-high 45 games at designated hitter, but in 94 games in the outfield, Anderson didn't commit an error.
Ron Washington drilled into the Texas pitching staff the importance of fielding their position, using the Detroit Tigers World Series performance as an example. The pitchers then went through their drills:
And so for about 45 minutes on Sunday, Rangers' pitchers shuttled through three different stations.
At one, they fielded slow-rolling grounders and practiced getting into throwing position without ever releasing a ball. At a second station, they fielded hard-hit ground balls. At the third, they raced to first to be prepared for tosses when the first baseman had to make the play.
None of it was new. It's a drill that goes on in every camp for at least 10 days.
Often that is the end of it. It may be for the Rangers, too, but during his interview, Washington brought up the idea of occasionally taking defensive practice during the season.
It's amazing to me that pitchers don't do defensive drills during the season. Once a week for 45 minutes, would likely be good for all of them.
It looks like Ken Griffey, Jr. is going to start the season in centerfield for the Reds. Red Reporter disagrees.
Why is there so much dismissal of Chris Denorfia? The Reds don't seem to take him seriously, which is bizarre to me because you'd think he'd fit the profile of what Krivsky likes in a player. His effort level is off the charts, and he's a good defender.
John Walsh delivers his outfield arm rankings for 2006 at The Hardball Times. I especially like the graph he includes, showing where the outfielders lie on a runners held vs. runners killed basis. The upper right quadrant is fascinating. It's the quadrant where fielders are good at both, but within that quadrant an increase in an ability to kill a runner leads to a decrase in the ability to hold a runner. So no one comes close to being great at both.
Is Felix Pie ready, then? Probably not, if ready means doing much more than flashing his offensive potential. But great athletes learn to hit, largely because their defense buys them the time that Jason Dubois won't have. Meanwhile Pie can anchor center field, which is something, not nothing. Cub fans in particular might have a problem with this patient approach because it didn't work with Corey Patterson. We waited and waited and he never got better.
The problem with Corey Patterson, I would argue, was not so much his slow progress as a hitter but the fact that his defense couldn't carry him, get him over the rough spots, ease the pressure. Bottom line, he was not a great fielder, and it's a little mysterious why, since he could run and he could throw. But the catching part sometimes eluded him. Midway through his tenure with the Cubs, I started asking myself, if he's a great fielder, how come he never makes great plays? My teenage son used to put together homemade highlight reels, and once he asked me to sit down to watch a collection of Patterson web-gems. I said, okay, but look closely and you'll see that in every catch his left elbow is bent. And it was true, both when he dove and when he leaped. There was something tentative about it. The sort of thing that Juan Pierre did ten times last year, where you lay flat out in a dive, parallel to the ground, arm and glove fully extended-Patterson didn't do that. He lacked the physical commitment, or courage, that defines an athlete. Patterson was the image of an athlete. He may have been born to play a great athlete in a movie. But he wasn't one. Several scouts out there with egg on their faces should be implementing a new Patterson Rule: don't say a guy has five tools until you've seen him do something special in the field. Patterson is partly a victim of bad scouting (he said, with great hindsight).
It may be six, seven years before we know what kind of hitter Pie is going to become, especially in terms of power numbers. But it will only take about a month to tell if he's the real deal as an athlete. If he is, then the comparisons with Patterson should stop right there.
The Floyd deal, which might be completed this week, has been in the works since the winter meetings, but the Cubs weren't sure whether they would add Floyd or a veteran center fielder to hold down the fort until prospect Felix Pie is ready at midseason. Floyd, a former Thornwood star, is expected to serve as a fourth outfielder, giving left fielder Matt Murton and right fielder Jacque Jones regular rest.
So does this push Pie back in the depth chart? Or will the Cubs look to make a trade once Pie is ready to play?
Lee Panas combines four measures of range into one by treating them as four voting systems and averaging the ranks. We used to do this sort of combination when I worked in information retrieval and we wanted to combine the results from multiple search engines. In general, it's a good way to combine various opinions.
I'd like to explore positioning as part of the Probabilistic Model of Range. One thing that I believe would be easy to record is the direction and distance the fielder moved to get to a ball. The direction could be coded using the digits 1-9 as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Where 5 would be straight at the fielder, 8 would be in front, 4 to the fielder's right, etc. What I'd like to get opinions on is if the X and Y axis should be fixed for all fielders or float depending on the position. For centerfielder and pitchers, the X axis would be a line that went through home plate and second base, while the Y axis would go through third and first. But for a shortstop, the X axis could go through second and third base, with the Y axis perpendicular to that. In the case of a fixed axes through 2nd-home and 3rd-first, a ball in the hole that's fielded by the short stop would be coded a 7. In the second case, where we adjust the axes to the fielder, it would be a 4, since the fielder moved to his right. My feeling is the second way is superior. However, with so many shifts being employed now, which often put the shortstop on the second base side of the bag, the fixed axes approach might be more accurate. I'd like to hear your opinions on the matter.
Mike Lowell is the best defensive third baseman in baseball. He's extremely interesting to watch. He keeps his glove hand, his left hand, very relaxed, and he doesn't appear to anticipate the hop at all. What I am saying is. .. the announcers, the veteran baseball people will tell you that the key to making the plays is to get your body in the proper position to make the play. But in fact, if you actually watch the fielders, very often they can't handle a tough hop or a line drive at an awkward angle precisely because they're trying to play the ball with their whole body. They're relying on positioning their body to make the play, and when something happens that makes that impossible, they're just SOL. Lowell, if you watch him, seems to be saying "it is easier to react with my left arm than it is to re-position my whole body in anticipation of the play." He stays balanced, stays loose, reacts late and has extraordinary confidence in his ability to snag the ball with his glove at the last moment. I've never really seen anything like it before, but this looseness and unusual confidence, for example, gives him a remarkable ability to charge a ground ball. He can change a slow grounder top speed because he knows that, bad hop or good hop, in-between stride or on stride, he can slap at the ball with his glove and pick it out of the air.
It's time once again for you to be the scout and help Tangotiger judge defensive ability. I believe this is the third year Tom conducted this survey, using the knowledge of fans to rate the defensive ability of players. The more input he gets, the better his results. So if you watch baseball, go to his site and take part.
There is an enormous amount of untapped knowledge here. There are 70 million fans at MLB parks every year, and a whole lot more watching the games on television. When I was a teenager, I had no problem picking out Tim Wallach as a great fielding 3B, a few years before MLB coaches did so. And, judging by the quantity of non-stop standing ovations Wallach received, I wasn't the only one in Montreal whose eyes did not deceive him. Rondel White, Marquis Grissom, Larry Walker, Andre Dawson, Hubie Brooks, Ellis Valentine. We don't need stats to tell us which of these does not belong.
In the YES replays, you clearly see Jeter moving his mouth when the pop is in the air. It appears that he's saying "I got it!" a few times. In the same replays, you never see A-Rod open his mouth, at all.
Rodriguez was clearly planted under the ball. He was in perfect position to catch it. Jeter had to range to his right to get towards the ball. I would offer that Derek had to move around 10 feet, away from his position on the pitch, towards the foul line, to get to where the ball was going to land.
Jeter went behind A-Rod and their gloves bumped as they both reached up for the ball. That appeared to be the only serious contact between the two players. It seemed as if their gloves met just as the ball was going into the pocket of A-Rod's mitt - and that knocked the ball loose.
The rule on the Yankees should be that Jeter catches all pop ups, even the ones hit directly at another fielder, to make up for all the ground balls that go through the shortstop position. :-)
The Tigers are up 3-0 after three innings, but the bottom of the third ended with Dmitri Young thrown out at the plate by Nelson Cruz. Young was at second with two out when Pudge Rodriguez singled to right. Gene Lamont waved Young around third. Cruz fired home, and Gerald Laird waited a good two second before he needed to make the tag. It's not often you see someone thrown out at the play by 20 feet.
Correction: I had the wrong numbers this morning. A program I thought was computing GDPs was computing something else. Sorry for the confusion. This post is correct.
The Diamondbacks turned a club-record five double plays - three 5-4-3s, a 4-6-3 and a 1-4-3 - as Batista was able to pick up win No. 10 despite allowing the Giants to begin three innings with back-to-back singles.
Arizona ranks third in GDPs induced:
Defense
GDP
KC
115
COL
112
OAK
110
ARI
110
STL
107
HOU
105
FLA
104
LAD
103
PHI
102
TEX
101
ATL
100
PIT
100
BAL
99
CLE
99
BOS
94
SEA
94
NYA
93
TB
93
DET
92
CHA
85
MIL
84
SF
82
TOR
81
LAA
78
SD
77
MIN
76
NYN
75
CIN
74
CHN
71
WSH
67
In case you're wondering if it's all Orlando Hudson, the team ranked eighth in 2005 with 140.
In the third inning, it was Guiel's turn. With one out and runners again on the corners, Paul Konerko hit a liner to right field for what looked like a single. But Guiel fired a strike to Derek Jeter at second to get a rare 9-6 force-out on Jim Thome for the inning's second out. Though a run scored on the play, pulling the Chisox within 3-2, the play slammed the door on a possible big inning for Chicago.
"Once I saw Jim break back to first base, I knew (I had a shot)," Guiel said. "That ball was hit to me so hard I knew I had a play."
I don't hear many calls for Eric Wedge's head. It's seems to me, however, when a team doesn't have its head in the game, that's a good time to blame the manager. I'm interested in Cleveland fans take on Wedge as a manager of people, rather than the game.
Manny Ramirez drives a ball to the 399 foot mark in the left center at Yankee Stadium, and Melky Cabrera leaps and catches the ball, preventing Manny from tying the game. The more I see this youngster play, the more I like him. He's selective at the plate. In the outfield, he can run, catch and throw. His scoring on the wild pitch last night showed his base running ability. The more he plays, the less it looks like the Yankees will need Sheffield next year.
Cano, Wang, Phillips and Cabrera remind me of the production of the Yankees farm system in the mid 1990s.
Update: Rivera retires the side easily in the ninth, throwing just five pitches to get the side 1-2-3. The 2-1 victory puts the Yankees 1 1/2 games up in the AL East.
Melky Cabrera just scored from first on a wild pitch. With Giambi at the plate and one out, Beckett throws a wild pitch that doesn't get too far away from Varitek. Cabrera hesitates, then starts to second. Varitek tries to throw to Lowell who is covering second, and throws the ball into shallow right. Since no one is covering third, Cabrera runs for that base. As he approaches third, he sees Varitek running up the line to cover third. Melky decides to race Jason to the plate and easily wins to score the first run of the game. It's a wild pitch and an error on the throw by Varitek. The Yankees lead 1-0 after one.
That has a lot to do with positioning, and Counsell regularly passes along some insights to Hudson during innings. Hudson said that several times this season Counsell has all but predicted a ground ball going to second base.
"Before every pitch, he's got everything thought out," Hudson said.
The downside of breaking a record for double plays, of course, is that there are a lot of batters reaching base. But the double plays turned effectively reduced the OBA of the Diamondbacks opposition from .344 to .312. In Bill James book, The Managers, Bill notes that Casey Stengel always tried to put a good double play combination around second base. He didn't mind pitchers who walked a lot of batters, as long as they got ground balls that could be turned into double plays. It's quite possible Arizona adopted that philosophy.
Update: I didn't know if the book was still in print, but Amazon sells it (click on the link above). For some reason, it wasn't as popular as other James books, but I think it's his best job of combining the history and strategy of the game and should be read for the Stengel section if nothing else.
He couldn't stop while lumbering after a foul ball fly in the sixth inning, bonked into the wall, teeter-tottered over and landed upside-down in the stands. Two innings later he couldn't run down a lazy looper near the line and let it go. It was charitably ruled a triple.
Any other major league left fielder gets that ball. Heck, half the fans in the stands might have had a shot at it.
Up by nine runs, it wasn't a big deal. In close games, it's going to be a tougher call.
It strikes me that any ball hit to Bond's left can turn into a double. Hitters need to start thinking that if Bonds has to move at all, turning on the after burner can get you to second safely. Watching yesterday, Barry has a real problem transitioning from the grass to the rubberized warning track. Get a ball near there and a speedster might have an inside the park home run.
Barry Bonds just tumbled into the stands after going after a foul fly ball. He was running toward it when he hit the warning track and tried to slow down. The ball dropped, but Bonds couldn't stop, hit the wall and fell over. He limped back to left field.
As a commentor to the previous post pointed out, Bonds is playing more due to the injury to Alou leaving the team short-handed. But that play is a perfect example of why you want to get Bonds out of sure wins or losses early. A play in the field can easily take out his knees. He's due up in the bottom of the sixth.
The Royals managed to work around one misplay Sunday by center fielder Kerry Robinson. A second one, though, led to the winning run in a 3-2 loss to the Chicago White Sox at U.S. Cellular Field.
Mistake one:
Robinson's earlier misplay came in the fourth, when he misjudged a fly ball by Crede so badly that second-base umpire Gerry Davis initially signaled a homer.
It was a drive deep to the left of center. Robinson raced back and climbed the wall. Except the ball didn’t go that far. It hit the warning track and bounced over the wall.
Mistake two, the one that cost them the game:
The White Sox had two outs and none on in the eighth inning when Robinson, overshifted to right field against left-handed pull hitter Jim Thome, couldn't corral a high, slicing fly toward left center.
The ball fell for a double when Robinson made a lamentably late diving attempt after exchanging you-or-me looks with left fielder Emil Brown.
"It was a situation," Robinson said, "where he thought I said, 'I got it,' and I thought he said, 'I got it.' Then it was too late. I had to dive for a ball I really shouldn't have had to dive for.
"We both could have had it, but it’s my fault because I'm the center fielder."
He doesn't get on base, he doesn't hit for power, he doesn't catch the ball. Why is he in the majors?
Josh Bard allowed four passed balls tonight as he teamed up with Tim Wakefield in a 7-1 loss to Cleveland. That gives Bard 10 passed balls on the season, seven more than any other catcher in the league. Last year, Bengie Molina led the majors with 10. In this century, only Jason LaRue has as many as 20 in a season. No one's had over 30 since Gino Petralli in 1987. Bard's on a pace for 60.
Randy Winn just doubled up the gap in right center. Shawn Green managed to just cut off the ball, but he needed to backhand the roller and ended up turned toward the outfield wall. He then tried to flip the ball to Byrnes so Eric could throw it in, but Byrnes was ducking so he'd be out of the way of the throw. The ball goes over Byrnes' head, and Fassaro and Winn both come around to score. It's 4-0 Giants in the top of the second.
Manny Ramirez just grounded out to Yuniesky Betancourt. Every time I've seen Betancourt throw in this game, I thought he sent the ball sailing high. Then as the camera pans, I realize Richie Sexson is playing first, and Yuniesky is just throwing the ball chest high.
Friar Faithful looks at the pitching lines from yesterday's blowout in San Diego and finds the defense at fault, rather than the pitching:
How did we get the result we got then? Two factors: Awful fielding and bad luck. A lot of both, actually. We can only hope for a change in the latter, but the former we can expect to improve. Cameron's return from the DL will vastly improve the outfield. Dave Roberts cannot play a credible centerfield and I really can't say enough about how much I detest seeing Eric Young in the starting lineup. I won't wish injury on anyone, but we have a better chance of that taking playing time from undeserving veterans than we do of Bochy doing it.
Josh Bard and Tim Wakefield failed to connect tonight. The Rangers found Wakefield hittable, touching him for seven hits and seven runs. Adding to the problem was new catcher Josh Bard, charged with three passed balls.
Vicente Padilla benefits from all this, as he's throwing a two-hitter through five. It's 7-0 Rangers in the bottom of the fifth.
As much as I believe in most forms of objective sabermetric philosophy, such as the all important OBP and the shunning of “productive outs,” I have to disagree here. Yes, Jeter does not have great range, but he adds dimensions of worth to his team that defies quantitative analysis, and there ain’t no stat geek that can tell me otherwise. I can’t let statistical “objectivity” act as a blinding agent to what my eyes can clearly see. (That sound you hear is members of the saber community firing up their keyboards to take pithy shots at me.)
You remember that catch Jeter made against the Red Sox on that glorious first night of July in 2004, when he risked his body by crashing in the stands to save the game? That doesn’t count in sabermetric measurement because it was a foul ball. Remember “The Play” against Oakland in the 2001 playoffs that saved the series for the Yanks when Jeter intuitively ran to a spot where he had no business being and then made the perfect cut-off throw home? Aside from the assist, there is no quantitative measurement of such a play, nor are there useful measurements for his amazing skills as a cut-off man.
Jeter’s value is truly intangible, and he inspires teammates with his leadership. He belongs at shortstop on my team, but let the arguments rage on. The debates are fun.
If his value is intangible, then it doesn't exist. The most important thing a shortstop does is field ground balls. Jeter does that poorly. You know, when you can't find anything good to say about a catcher, you throw out that he's a great handler of pitchers. When you can't say anything good about Jeter's defense, you point to all the things that aren't measured well, as if being a great cutoff man or making a couple of great foul catches is going to make up for all the balls going through for hits.
Jeter is the Yankees shortstop because he ranks high among shortstops when you combine offense and defense. In other words, his offense is making up for his defensive shortcomings. At some point, that may not be true. But even then, the Yankees can't move him from the position. Like Gehrig before him, no one will be able to tell him he can't play. Jeter defines the Yankees of this era. His offense, his leadership, his desire to win makes him the icon of this team. When Jeter leaves shortstop, it will be his idea alone.
"I actually wanted it. I guess the fact that I was working so much at first base during spring training, I kind of (cut) back my hitting," Lopez said. "Sam Perlozzo came up to me and told me, 'It would be a good idea just to start you as a DH so you could get your timing back as a hitter.' I totally agree with it."
It looks like Millar and Conine will get more time in the field than expected.
Said Young: "I know I did my job well. I know myself, and I know how good I am and how good I can be. I know I'm not there yet.
"What the book says means absolutely nothing to me. It's easy to dismiss because there have been a lot of books and reports that said I wouldn't keep hitting .300."
It's good to see people are paying attention to this type of research.
The Royals understand their defense was horrible last year and are trying to take steps to correct that:
And so on. Defense is the theme here at spring training. And defense cuts to the baseball heart for Buddy Bell. He was a great defensive third baseman, a six-time Gold Glove winner. He knows the Royals need their own identity. They’re not fast or particularly strong. They will not win games by outslugging teams or by blowing them away with nine innings of overpowering fastballs.
So he wants the identity to be a team that will play great defense. He thinks that gets the Royals going back to where they need to go. And I agree with him.
“I’m not really into errors and all that stuff,” he says. “For me, it’s about range. Take away hits. Make the good plays. Turn the big double play. We’re going to have to do that this year. I think defense is unbelievably important for us, more than it is for a lot of other teams. I think we will be a lot better.
“And I’ll be honest with you: It won’t be enough for us just to make the routine plays. I mean, obviously, it starts there. We have to go beyond our limits every once in a while. We need to make the great plays to get out of tough situations. I don’t know if we can do that. But we have to. It’s that simple, really.”
I wonder how much the defense affected Zack Greinke? Maybe all those balls that should be outs just drove him over the edge. A better defensive team might bring him back.
Roch Kubatko is blogging for the Baltimore Sun. He likes Corey Patterson's defense in right. Nice to see his blog also allows comments, and he seems to interact with the fans.
In addition to his alert play in the fourth inning, he hauled in a foul pop, fielded successive hard grounders in the third and scooped up a roller while the top half of a broken bat was heading in his direction. He finished with 10 putouts, two assists and no errors.
"That breaks the ice. Now, next game I should feel a little more comfortable," Lopez said. "It's a hard position to play. You have to pay attention on every single play. But it's fun, I enjoyed it, and thank God I wasn't bad."
The theoretically awkward issue of Alfonso Soriano's presence in the Washington Nationals' spring training camp alongside veteran Jose Vidro, the Nationals' incumbent second baseman, became a practical one Friday. In the first full-squad workout of the spring, Vidro took grounders and performed drills with the rest of the starting infielders, while Soriano worked out with an infield group made up of mostly minor leaguers. Later, in the clubhouse, they sat three lockers apart, eating their lunches without interacting.
One solution that no one talks about is moving Soriano to shortstop. Yes, he'll likely be the worst defensive shortstop in the league. The Nationals can live with that. Neither Guzman nor Clayton is any great shakes at short, how much worse can Soriano do? He'll hit a lot better than either of those two players. The other advantage is, if he's moved to short, it will be seen as a defensive promotion, while the move to left is clearly a defensive demotion.
Soriano created 93 runs last year. Clayton created 55, Guzman 26. At worst, Soriano is going to be 10 runs worse that those two at shortstop. It's not a great solution, but it's one that probably improves the team overall.
"(Going to right field) was definitely a big transition," he said. "I don't care what anybody says, it's not easy. But I learned something playing there."
Cameron will be back in his comfort zone with the Padres, who acquired him in a Nov. 18 trade for Xavier Nady. To prepare his body for Petco's spacious outfield, the 33-year-old Cameron cut back on weightlifting and concentrated on core and leg exercises that emphasize speed and explosiveness.
"I feel lighter on my feet," said Cameron, who ran sprints with left fielder Dave Roberts after batting practice Monday. "Usually I feel sluggish this time of year."
Maybe Cameron recognizes in this park his legs are a more valuable asset. Mike was also asked about other centerfielders:
More than a great athlete, Cameron is an avid student of his position. Asked to name the best center fielder he has seen, he pondered the question before offering an unorthodox list that included Paul Blair, Devon White, Gary Pettis and Eric Davis.
"Baseball has been part of my life since I was 4 or 5 years old," he said. "I've always tried to model myself after certain players."
I don't quite see what's so unorthodox about that list. I'd probably include Andruw Jones, but all of those players could go get the ball.
Keith Woolner, the director of research for Baseball Prospectus, developed a more sophisticated Catcher E.R.A. several years ago to assuage those and other concerns. But he still found something remarkable: A catcher could indeed appear to have a major effect on his pitchers' E.R.A., but that effect often reversed itself the next year. Catcher E.R.A.'s bounced around as if at random. Although that doesn't prove the absence of true catching talent, it suggests that whatever exists does not manifest itself to a detectable degree.
"Something that's ability is relatively consistent, like home run power," Woolner said. "You can be pretty sure that if Adam Dunn hit more home runs than Juan Pierre last year, he will next year, too. But when you look at catchers who prevent runs well one year, they are not more likely to prevent runs well the next year. They're just as likely to be bad. It's really not what I expected to see.
"We're told that catchers have a real impact on the final score, but it doesn't show up. This is an exaggeration, but compared to the batters and the pitchers, the catcher is just a guy who makes sure the ball doesn't go to the backstop."
I'll need to look up Woolner's work on the subject. It strikes me that sample sizes in one season (especially for the backup) are responsible for the randomness. What's clear is that figuring out the catcher's contribution to ERA is a complicated, chaotic system. It has to do with the pitchers caught, the opponents, the overall defense that day. I'd be very wary of making this conclusion:
Perhaps some teams are sensing this. Bengie Molina, considered a fine defensive catcher for the Angels, received little attention in the free-agent marketplace and signed for only a year with the Blue Jays. And Mike Piazza, who was thought to be retiring a glove many considered as useful as Michael Jackson's, was signed by the Padres — to be their starting catcher.
"I think it's important that you and the catcher communicate in between innings and know what is going well for you out there and what's not," Johnson said. "I think it's important that the catcher realizes that even if you think something is going well, and it really isn't, but you are convinced it is, that he still try to get you through the game. A lot of times in the first half (of last season) things weren't going well for me. I tried getting through it and it was a struggle at times."
It sounds to me that Randy is looking for positive feed back, and maybe Jorge was offering negative comments last year. Saying negative things in a positive way is often tough to do, but it's a good skill to develop.
Soriano has said he won't change positions, and Vidro said he won't either.
Soriano "is a tremendous plus for the team. But I'm a bit confused about what can happen if he doesn't want to play left field," Vidro told the local daily, El Nuevo Dia for Tuesday's editions.
Maybe the Nationals can think outside the box to satisfy both players. Instead of the shortstop moving for a shift on a left-handed batter, just bring in Soriano from left. The team doesn't expect a lefty to go the other way if there's a shift on, and this will give Alfonso a chance to play the infield, especially against Barry Bonds. Of course, the winner of a Celebrity Death Match works too.
Cashman said he woke up yesterday morning and was "shocked" when he learned of the story. He said he immediately called Torre to ask about the quotes and was told by the manager that the story was "untrue."
"He said, 'I didn't say that,'" Cashman said. "He told me that he was asked by the reporter if A-Rod and Jeter could handle, athletically, playing center field and he answered that they certainly could. But he also said (to the reporter) that the best athlete on the team is probably Mariano (Rivera) and, along those lines, he'd probably be the best player to go out there. If you've ever watched him shagging (flies) during batting practice you can see that. But those comments didn't appear in the story.
"Either way," Cashman added, "it's not something that we've ever discussed."
So Cashman does his best Capt. Renault, implying that the reporter is a stooge:
The writer of the story, Larry Fine, said he taped the interview with Torre and had no doubts about the accuracy of his quotes. He said he believes he fairly represented Torre's statements and did not overstate the Yanks' interest in pursuing such a plan.
So, Mr. Fine can settle this whole thing by posting the audio tape. It doesn't have to be ones word against another. Just post the tape on the internet.
It's too bad the Yankees aren't seriously considering the move. I still think it's a good way to improve the team's defense.
Torre said he has considered the merits of converting either shortstop Jeter or AL MVP Rodriguez, who has been playing third base since joining the Yankees, but has not raised the subject with either of his star players.
"We've thought about it," Torre said. "We just haven't made a commitment to that. We haven't broached it with the shortstops."
They should have moved Jeter to center when they traded for A-Rod.
So how about this? The Yankees move Jeter to center (he's the best fly chaser), A-Rod back to short and sign Bill Mueller to play third? Whoever DHs or Robinson Cano would be the least productive hitter in the lineup.
Colorado Rockies coach Dave Collins was the man in charge when Matt Holliday made the conversion from a third baseman to a left fielder. He oversaw the move of Brad Hawpe from first base to right field.
Now he's working with Ryan Shealy in his attempt to learn to play right field in addition to first base.
Moves from first to any other position are rare. Usually you play first base because you can't play at any other spot in the field. If Collins can take two first basemen and turn them into outfielders, that's quite an accomplishment.
Still, Flaherty has caught all but one of Johnson's last 22 starts, beginning when the Big Unit tossed seven shutout innings against St. Louis on June11. Johnson has gone 12-2 with a 3.29 ERA in games caught by Flaherty this season, and 5-6 with a 4.55 ERA while working with Posada. That includes a 10-2 loss to Detroit on July 1, the last time the Yanks' longtime catcher has called signals for the veteran ace.
I had a discussion with a friend of mine about this the other day. He didn't see how you could start an offensive millstone like Flaherty in the playoffs. He also thought the sample sizes were too small to be able to discern an actual difference between the ability of the catchers to affect a pitcher.
I disagree. If you believe the difference is caused by Flaherty, then he's saved the Yankees over 25 earned runs in around 21 games. Posada isn't that great a hitter that he's going to produce that much offense over 25 games. Posada created 71 runs in 142 games played, or 1/2 a run per game. For all intents and purposes, we'll give John a 0 for runs created. That means the Yankees are losing 1/2 a run offensively, but gaining over a run defensively with Flaherty behind the plate. That seems like the right trade off to me.
It also explains why catchers are not known for their hitting. Catchers can have a huge defensive impact on the game, and that's often worth more than the best offense.
I'd also like to note that this is nothing new. Torre often started Girardi in the post season in 1998 and 1999, even though Posada was clearly the superior offensive player. I trust Torre's recognition of defensive talent behind the plate, and he made the right moves in each case.
A rare bad play by Aaron Rowand leads to the Indians tying the game in the 9th. With one out and a man on first, Victor Martinez hit a fly ball to center that fooled the White Sox speedster. He started in on the ball, then raced back but the shot was over his head for a double. Belliard grounded out to tie the game, and the Indians have a man on third with two out for Broussard.
Update: Jenks blows the save but not the game. The White Sox get a chance to win in the bottom of the inning, still tied at 6.
The Toronto Blue Jays are using the classic Giambi shift with a twist. Instead of moving everyone toward first base, the Blue Jays put the shortstop in short right between the first and second basemen. The announcers gave the reason for the manuver as shortstop Adams having more range than second baseman Menechino.
Sexson grounded into a double play, second baseman Kennedy to center fielder Izturis to first baseman Erstad, Ibanez out.
Mike Scioscia did some defensive maneuvering in the bottom of the ninth, and it almost worked. The Mariners put men on first and third with no one out and Richie Sexson up. Mike replaced Steve Finley with Maicer Izturis and brought him in as a fifth infielder. It's a brilliant move as they not only hold the runner at third, but turn the double play. Scioscia then walks Beltre to pitch to the light hitting Greg Dobbs, who singles in the winning run to prevent the Angels from extending their lead over the Athletics. Sometimes you do everything right and it just doesn't work out.
Barry Bonds gets the first two putouts in the 3rd. He ran in on a liner hit straight at him, then ranged to center to take a ball Winn could have handled. It looks like he has not problem getting to balls, but he takes a few steps to stop.
Staying with the theme of unusual Sox defense, the Red Sox hav turned four double plays through the sixth inning. They came into today dead last in the AL in double plays turned. I wonder how much having Olerud at first helps?
One thing the Red Sox are doing much better is not grounding into double plays. They are 8th in the AL this season. When I was going to Fenway in the 1980s, it seemed the Sox were close to setting a record for GDPs every season.
The Chicago White Sox used to be near the top of the AL in errors every year. Coming into today, they had the third fewest in the AL. That's why tonight's loss to the Rangers is so unusual. Tad Iguchi made three errors and Uribe added a fourth to let in three unearned runs as the White Sox lost to the Rangers 7-5. Without the unearned runs, they win the game.
The Marlins are not the only team usings a new third baseman in this game. Nomar gets a start at third and makes a throwing error on a bunt by Juan Pierre. With Vargas at first (he's batting .313), Pierre bunted (looks to me as if he were going for a base hit). The shortstop, Cedeno, went the wrong way, breaking for third. The second baseman, Perez, went to cover first. Nomar was going to throw to second to get the runner (the ball was bunted firmly) but no one was there! Nomar then slung the ball in the direction of first base, to the outfield side of Derrek Lee. Nomar got the error, but Cedeno made the bad play.
Update: The official scorer called it a Sacrifice and Error. I thought he was bunting for a hit, but the defense treated it like a sac.
Update: Vargas gets his 2nd hit of the game, making him six for seventeen on the season with two doubles.
Tony Graffanino just made what could be a game-saving catch for the Red Sox. The Sox lead 5-1 in the 9th, and Curt Schilling is in for his last relief appearance before he starts. With men on 2nd and 3rd, a fly is hit to no-man's land in right center. Graffanino ran back, fighting the sun, put his glove up, and the ball hit the heel. It rolled down his arm and Tony snatched it out of the air. Schilling gets a fly to center to finish the game and give the Red Sox the victory.
Tangotiger is once again calling for the baseball community to contribute to the 2005 Scouting Report.
What I would like to do now is tap that pool of talent. I want you to tell me what your eyes see. I want you to tell me how good or bad a fielder is. Go down, and start selecting the team(s) that you watch all the time. For any player that you've seen play in at least 10 games in 2005, I want you to judge his performance in 7 specific fielding categories.
I love this idea, using the great baseball knowledge of the public to turn subjective judgements into objective data. I hope everyone will participate.
The Royals just made a serious defensive blunder. D.J. Carrasco was pitching a great game, shutting out the Indians through six innings. But the Indians got the first two runners on in the 7th. Ronnie Belliard bunted to move the runners, and Carrasco threw to third on the signal by his catcher. The throw was late, and the Indians loaded the bases. When you're having a tough time winning, every out is precious. Jeff Liefer made Carrasco pay for the error, taking the next pitch over the right field fence for a grand slam. They Royals find themselves down 4-2 in the the 7th, and are now looking at their 13th loss in a row.
Update: The Indians make the 4-2 score hold up, and the Royals extend their losing streak to 13. The Indians pull within 2 1/2 games of the Angels in the wild card race.
The Nationals defense makes the game with the Astros close. With the bases loade and two outs, Cristian Guzman throws a groundout away, leading to two runs. Washington leads 6-5 in the seventh.
The Mets take a 3-2 lead in the top of the 11th on a very interesting play. With Beltran on second and Floyd on first, one out, Piazza singles to right. Guillen throws home trying to get Beltran, but the throw is not in time. Piazza tries to advance, and the catcher Schneider guns Piazza out at second. Floyd then tries to score from third, and Carroll guns him out at the plate. A 9-2-6-2 double play.
Update: Looper gets the save as the Mets win the game 3-2.
The Cincinnati Reds played embarassing defense in the 2nd inning against the Cardinals tonight. It seemed every time they touched the ball something went wrong. Jason Romano is playing center field. Reggie Sanders hit a ball to the warning track in center, and instead of getting under it, Romano tried to reach out from the side. He was totally fooled, and the ball bounced into the stands for a ground rule double. It's one of those hits that the rules don't call an error, but it really was poor defense.
Later in the inning, Felipe Lopez throws two balls away. Neither looked like a difficult play. The big difference I see between major league and minor league games is the fielding. Tonight, the Reds are fielding like minor leaguers.
Rafael Furcal just scored on a fly ball that any would have stopped most runners from even trying to tag up. Juan Pierre fielded the ball in shallow center field, about as shallow as you can go and still be in center field. He was behind the ball, had his momentum going toward the plate, but released a lollipop throw, and with Furcal's speed it wasn't even close. Juan should be embarassed about that play.
With two out in the 7th scored tied 1-1, the Yankees showed one of their great weaknesses, defense. Womack is playing center tonight and Chris Woodward hit a ball over his head that a good CF would have caught. It went for a double. A walk and a wild pitch put runners on 1st and 3rd. An error by the 2nd baseman Cano gave the Mets the lead. An infield hit and an error by Giambi allowed two more to score, and the Yankees are down 4-1 instead of being even with the Mets.
After a tough day in the outfield, when he misjudged and misplayed a few fly balls hit his way during Arizona's 3-2 loss to the Cleveland Indians at Jacobs Field, Cruz found an image of Darth Vader taped above his locker.
Blue highlighter was smeared on Vader's cheeks, a not-so-subtle reminder by someone on the team that Cruz could have used eye black - or something - to more deftly play his position.
Yes, Jose's misplays led to runs that cost the Diamondbacks the game. But he also hit a home run. Where was the rest of the Diamondbacks offense? They weren't exactly storm troopers out there yesterday. That's two days in a row where the opposition scored three runs and the DBacks lost. There is plenty of blame to go around.
Mom and coach Tracy Cooper sends this story about a great play made by her young son:
As I sat in the dugout waiting for our team to reach the final out of the inning, I kept thinking to myself, would I rather be in the stands cheering with the rest of the mothers and taking snapshots of memories or is this pressure really worth the results. The batter finally swings and it was like everything went into slow motion as the ball shot straight up in to the air. Now, I shouldn't be taking all this so seriously. These kids are only playing T-Ball and yet they are hitting off of the coaches pitches; rather fast I might add, because after all dads do take this game seriously. Some of them just completed kindergarten, like the catcher for example. I watched him raise up with strength and reach for his catchers mask with his right arm. I, and the other coaches stood up in our seats as well, pretending to mimic the catchers motions, as we knew what we wanted him to do, catch the ball. As he threw his mask to the ground, he looked straight up into the clouds and kept his eye on the ball never looking at the batter, never turning to the crowd and searching for mom or dad to see if they were watching. Oh, I was watching and I was praying and I was clinching my fists with anticipation. As the ball was dropping, ever so slowly, I saw the catcher kick his feet back up into the air and stretch his arm to the top point of home plate where he dove and met the ball with his glove. It was picture perfect. An instant snapshot that took forever to complete and yet I will remember it forever. Then I see this catcher, after the dust settled away, realizing that he had caught the ball. With the biggest smile he jumped up into the air shaking his glove with the ball still intact inside to share his excitement with the team and crowd. The coaches and parents began jumping up for joy and waving their arms in the air sharing this elated moment with the rest of the team.
Later that night, at home, while watching Baseball tonight on ESPN, my son looked over at me and said "Hey mom... Do you think my catch today at home plate was good enough to make it into the top ten web gem hall of fame?" Makes me wish I would've had my video camera.
David DeJesus starts off Buddy Bell's tenure by stealing an extra-base hit from Derek Jeter. Jeter hit a ball to the wall in deep left center, but DeJesus ran it down.
An interesting article in the Dallas Morning News on the Rangers defense. Hank Blalock's 53 game errorless streak ended Thursday, and the article concentrates on how flawless the Rangers are playing.
So, if the question is about him, Blalock can quickly turn the subject to how Mark Teixeira has played flawlessly at first base this season. Or how catcher Rod Barajas has thrown out almost everybody who has tried to steal. Or maybe he can interest you in a little talk about the outfield's infallibility. Or even the pitchers holding runners and fielding their position well.
"Everybody on defense has a lot of confidence in everybody else," Blalock said Thursday afternoon. "It's almost like when an offense starts taking walks because they know the next guy will get the job done. We have faith in one another to get the job done."
Showalter understands that defense is about more than errors.
Showalter agreed when the supposition was tossed in front of him that team defense has been the Rangers' most consistent asset this season.
"Winning is about two things: run production and run reduction," he said. "And there is a lot to run reduction that doesn't show up in statistics."
Showalter pointed to multiple examples, including the outfielders keeping runners from taking extra bases, then ending innings before they could score and pitchers quickening their moves to home plate to keep runners from stealing.
With all this praise for the Texas Rangers defense, their ability to turn a batted ball into an out must be called into question. The Hardball Times graphs fielding independent pitching vs. defensive efficiency, and according to that, Texas' defensive strength is the staff, not the fielders.
There is, however, one thing that leads me to believe that the chart may not be accurate. If you scroll down to the pitching table, you'll see that the Rangers pitcher's have allowed a high percentage of line drives. Since line drives often turn into hits, the defense may be better than the DER is telling us. When I get the data for the Probabilistic Model of Range, the Rangers will be the first team examined.
I have not seen the highlights, but Bob McManaman describes a catch by Jose Cruz, Jr. last night that can only be described as lucky. It reminds me of Lou Piniella sticking out his glove in the 1978 playoff game against the Red Sox to stop a hit from going for extra bases.
There was an unusual play in the Yankees-Mets game. In the 9th, with Womack on first, Sheffield hit a ball into the hole that ticked off Wright's glove and into Reyes mitt. Reyes made a strong throw, but it was too late to get Sheffield. Mientkiewicz, when he made the catch, turned to look at the umpire to see what the call was. While he's turning his head, Womack scooted to third, since Wright was out of position. It looked to me that if Mientkiewicz had come up throwing, it's possible he could have caught Womack at third. I was amazed that he bothered to look at the ump rather than paying attention to the runner.
A real strange play in the bottom of the first of the Cleveland-LAAOA game. With Sizemore on 1st, Victor Martinez hit a grounder to Erstad at first. Erstad bobbled the ball with his foot on the bag. As he reached for it, the umpire saw Erstad's foot come off the bag. Erstad picked up the ball and threw to second, thinking he had the force at first. The shortstop Cabrera took the throw, but his tag of Sizemore was late.
Scioscia came out to argue the play at first. The replay showed the play at first was very close; it wasn't clear to me that Erstad's foot came off the bag. The umpires confered, and decided that they would not overrule the call. However, given that the batter wasn't forced, they then called Sizemore out at 2nd, saying he was forced. However, the replays make it look like Cabrera's foot wasn't on the bag, however, the replay angles were not good. So the Angels ended up getting an out, and Colon got out of the inning.
A fine defensive play by Eric Byrnes to end the top of the 5th. The ball was hit in foul territory near the third base bullpen. Byrnes lept horizontally, got good air time, and made the catch parallel to the ground. Quite impressive, but he looks like he hurt his face on the landing.
The Oakland Athletics defense did a good job of bailing out Kirk Saarloos today. Saarloos walked 5 today, but four double plays by the Oakland infield helped erase most of those runners. Street induced the last of those DPs when he entered in relief.
Freddy Garcia has also just allowed 1 run so far. He's doing it the old fashioned way, having only allowed four hits and two walks through 7 innings.
Mark Buehrle is getting some defensive help tonight. The White Sox have turned a double play in each of the first three innings. Harden has allowed 1 run, which is probably enough for him to lose tonight. :-)
Update: The Oakland Athletics scoreless innings streak ends at 26. Kotsay drove in Ginter to make the score 3-1 White Sox in the bottom of the fifth.
If you have a chance, catch the double play in the top of the first of the Braves-Mets game. With men on first and third, one out, LaRoche grounded back to the pitcher. The ball hit Heilman in the leg and bounded over to the third baseman. Wright didn't have a chance to get the runner at the plate, so he threw to first to get LaRoche. Wright, however, left third base open, so Jordan (who had moved to 2nd) took off for third. Reyes ran with him, and Woodward threw a perfect strike to a moving Reyes so to get the tag play on Jordan. Appropriately, it looked like a football play.
The Athletics can't hit their way out of a bag this season, but they're backing up their pitchers with great defense. I've seen two fantastic catches in the outfield tonight and good work by the infielders on double plays. The game is scoreless after six innings.
Update: Steve Finley puts one where no defener can get it, giving the Angels a 1-0 lead in the 7th. Blanton has now given up three home runs, all solo shots.
If you are going to hit .140 as a shortstop, you better be the best defensive player at your position. Guzman was not today. He made an error that allowed two runs to score in the 9th inning, handing the Braves an unearned victory. It was the worst possible time to boot a ball. Maybe the Nationals will get lucky like the Cubs have have Cristian injure his groin.
Upate: I'm told it wasn't a booted ball, it was a throwing error. Still, the post holds. He should be making an error in that situation. I just watched the play on Tivo. He did a good job getting to the ball in the hole on a very wet infield. He rushed his throw, however. It would have been a very close play if he had taken his time and set himself, but even if he didn't get the batter, it would have been a tie game at that point.
Also, Nick Johnson tried to hold the bag and reach for the ball. If he had come off the bag, he might have stopped the throw from going by and saved a run.
I just saw an unusual play by Steve Finley. Nick Swisher hit a ball deep in the right-center power alley. Finley ran for the ball, and ended up over running it as he was near the wall and the ball fell behind him. He seemed to have a tough time tracking the ball, but it was a play he should have made. He had plenty of time to get there.
Pedro Martinez threw three wild pitches today, and the three were directly responsible for his two runs allowed. As I listened to the game on the radio driving around this afternoon, I wondered how much having Piazza behind the plate caused them. The third one was off Piazza's body, and from the play by play description it seems a better catcher would have had it. Watching the first two on Tivo, Piazza never tries to get his body in front of the ball. He's set up outside, and when the pitch comes low and inside, all Mike does is try to backhand the ball with his glove. There's no attempt to move to block the pitch.
If this keeps up, Pedro won't have any confidence throwing pitches in the dirt. Lots of batters will swing at those, but you need the catcher to stop the ball to record the out.
With men on second and third and two outs, Lowe gets the grounder to Valentin. Jose boots the ball and throws late and wide to first for the error. Alou gets the RBI to give the Giants the lead and put Schmidt in line for the win.
I'm sure DePodesta will take a beating over that error. It should have been an easy out.
I was just going to note that Jeter hasn't had a difficult play tonight, when he nearly throws the ball away on a slow grounder. Giambi make a nice stretch to left, falls over, but catches the ball and holds the bag for the out. Yankees lead 4-1 in the middle of the 5th.
Giambi makes the first error of the season. He dove for a instead of getting in front of it. But Renteria grounds into a double play to negate the miscue.
Kevin Millar gives the ball a ride, but Hideki Matsui makes the first great play of 2005, bring the ball back into the park in front of the Canon sign in left field. It's 0-0 instead of 2-0.
With the introduction of a graphical representation of the Probabilistic Model of Range for players, I've had a couple of requests for entire infields, specifically the Angels and the Yankees. I'm presenting the charts for groundballs in two ways:
All fielders combined into a line.
Each position broken out separately so you can see which positions are strong or weak in each vector.
Note that I don't break it out by individual players; it's all shortstops for a team or all third basemen for a team.
Without further ado, here are the charts for the Angels and Yankees. (Click on graph for a clearer view.)
One example of how to use these charts is to look at the hole between third and short for the Angels, vector 1. The Angels as a whole are above average here, but it's due to the third basemen being way above average, while the shortstops as a whole are below average.
The other thing these graphs are telling me is that I don't have park effects right. The expected curves for the two teams mostly look as they should; They have four humps representing the straight-away position of the fielders, the places where you would expect the most outs. But the Angels have a big hump down the right field line; the Yankees have a smaller hump up the middle.
There's no reason for me to believe that a ground ball down the line is easier to field in Anaheim than anywhere else in the majors. Even though the data is smoothed (1/2 without park effects, 1/2 with) it's obviously not enough. I'll be persuing other ways of dealing with park effects in the near future.
"My favorite part is knowing that they're comfortable, knowing that, no matter what, they can count on me," Posada said. "What I really enjoy most about catching is the relationship with a pitcher. The most important thing is they can relax when I'm back there and know that I did my job, I did some homework on hitters."
He has to adjust to each personality on the mound:
The hard part, Posada said, is that every pitcher is different. Roger Clemens wanted constant feedback. Orlando Hernández needed Posada to challenge him. Mike Mussina directs his own game, with little interference. Posada adjusts daily, depending on the pitcher.
And the pitchers depend on him for clues to how to work the batters:
Pavano peppers his catcher with questions between innings, asking if he saw the same thing Pavano did from a hitter. Wright, who said he was easy to catch because he throws mostly fastballs, also relies on the catcher to read a batter's clues.
"He's sitting right next to the hitter, so he can see a lot of things I can't necessarily see," Wright said. "And also, being a hitter, he might have a better idea what it means when a guy's moving his feet or his hips."
The piece does a nice job of illustrating a subtlety of the game that's difficult to quantify. It also shows why there's more to a catcher's defense than throwing out base stealers.
The Easter Bunny arrived a day early for me, and instead of colorful eggs I received colorful charts representing each fielder's probabilistic model of range. For each player, there's a se of graphs with a black line for actual outs, a yellow line for predicted out, a red line for the difference between the two, and blue lines representing the best and worst values for those data points by qualifying players.
I want to thank and congratulate Dave Stasiuk for his hard work and excellent programming skills in creating these web pages. Thanks to to Studes for many mock ups and helpful suggestions. I'm having a great time looking at these graphs, and I hope you do also.
Go here to see a list of players. Then click on the name, and you'll get complete charts for every position played by that fielder, one for each batted ball type. Enjoy!
Please feel free to use the comments to suggest any improvements.
Update (7:00 AM EST March 27, 2005): David Stasiuk explains the blue lines:
It's +/- 1 standard deviation from the average AO/BIP for each vector by position by BIP type, as weighted by the number of balls in play for each player...so, for example, a shortstop who played one game, and had one ball hit to him and made it for 1.0 AO/BIP would only have one record at 1.0 in calculating the standard deviation, whereas a shortstop who played every game and had 0.93 AO/BIP in 200 BIP to the same vector over the course of the season would have 200 records at 0.93 in calculating the standard deviation.
This gave me a solid +/- for every position for every vector...it isn't a min/max so much as it is a standard range of performance. Basically, if a regular player is either over or under that range endpoint, you know that they're either really good or really bad for that particular BIP type and vector.
I want to clear up a misconception that about my thoughts on defense that's running through this Sons of Sam Horn thread. Unfortunately, I can't respond there because I'm not a member.
Johnny Damon was hands down the best outfielder in the AL last year, but keep your eye on Mark Kotsay.
On the SoSH thread, I see this (typo corrected):
As noted in the other Pinto thread, the charts seem to contradict a) his comments in the RSN interview and b)conventional wisdom about many things including Beltran & Damon as defensive studs
As many seem to believe Pinto's ratings are among the best out there, I thought this deserved a thread after having been buried/ignored in the other Pinto thread.
My comments on Damon were based on his defensive win shares. Defensive win shares take into account a number of different elements of defense, including outfielder's arms. PMR is only concerned with turning batted balls into outs.
Secondly, my system is still in development. I'm not convinced I have the correct weighting of parameters yet, especially when win shares says one thing and PMR disagrees on a major aspect of the calculation.
What's clear is the Damon got to more balls than any other AL center fielder. My calculations say he should have gotten to even more, but given that Bill James spent years on the problem and I've spent a couple of months, I'm willing to give win shares the edge when rating the overall defense of a player.
I thought another interesting study using the charts for the Probabilistic Model of Range would be to look at Mike Cameron and Carlos Beltran as centerfielders. First, let's look at their overall 2004 performance catching fly balls. Here's Cameron (click on graphs for a larger view):
And here's Beltran:
They look very similar. Cameron has a dip at the top of the curve which I'll come back to. Since these graphs don't tell us much, I though it would be interesting to break them down by batted ball velocity as well. Baseball Info Solutions records three types of velocity -- soft, medium and hard. Let's start with the medium fly balls.
These should be the routine plays. Cameron looks a hair better, but both do a good job of catching what they should catch. Let's move to the hard hit balls, the ones that should be over their heads:
There's a lot of noise in Cameron's data, but Beltran looks like he does well on balls hit deep. Finally, let's look at soft fly balls:
Smaller samples mean more noise, but Cameron appears to have the edge here. My guess is that Beltran plays deeper to be able to get to the deep fly balls, while Cameron takes advantage of his speed to play closer in. Which is better? Those hard hit balls are probably more likely to go for extra bases. We'll need further study to evaluate the tradeoff.
Back to Cameron's dip. Cameron doesn't do as well with balls hit to straight away center as one might expect, especially on soft fly balls. Cameron's tracks flys very differently from most outfielders. I wonder if this causes him to have trouble with balls hit right at him? Does he jump back, then fail to come in? I'd love to hear from Mets fans about this.
Update: There's an excellent post in the comments on the physics of a ball hit directly at a center fielder.
Here's Guzman on ground balls. He fits the prediction almost exactly (click on charts for a large image).
Here's Cristian on fly balls:
He really shines on line drives, however.
Some commentors have pointed out that Eckstein is short for a ball player. I see him listed as 68 inches. Guzman is listed at 72 inches, so that may make a difference. However, I took at look at the relationship of height to PMR on line drives, and didn't find anything indicating that it really mattered.
Over the last few days I've been chatting with Robert Saunders about presenting data graphically. He pointed me to this post on Edward Tufte's web site, where's he trying to present charts that are the size of words. I'm not there yet, but Robert did get me thinking about presenting the Probabilistic Model of Range graphically. I thought I'd give it a try with David Eckstein, since there were some arguments over whether the data properly reflected his abilities.
What I've done is broken the data down by ball in play type (grounders, flys and liners). Each chart below has the direction of the ball on the X-Axis. The Y-Axis represents the probability of turning those balls into outs. Eckstein's actual probability is compared to the predicted probability. For reference, a vector of -4 (minus 4) represents the thirdbase line, and 8 represents straight away centerfield. Here's Eckstein on grounders in 2004 (click on graphs for a larger image):
As you can see, David is great when the ball is hit right at straight away short. But once he starts moving left or right, he becomes a below average fielder. Nothing terrible, just below average.
Now let's look at fly balls.
I really love the information this chart conveys. It shows that fly balls are usually caught by shortstops around the normal position, they go down around third base, but pick up again in foul territory. And this shows why David does so poorly. He does not catch pop ups in foul territory. With the Cardinals, he has a great fielding third baseman in Rolen, so Scott will have to go after balls the shortstop usually gets.
Finally, the line drive chart.
He's just way below average to his left. Even at balls hit right at the position, he doesn't do well. Does he not react quickly?
I'll be doing a few more of these. I hope you find them as informative as I do.
Update: Fixed a left-right problem. I said that Eck was below average to his right. I meant left. Thanks, Studes.
Dodger Thoughts points out an article where the reporter gets two different versions of how to measure defense from Jeff Kent (can't be done) and Paul DePodesta (who's still working on it). I get the feeling Kent doesn't like trying to measure defense because he doesn't do well.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Smoothed Shortstops Permalink
Earlier in the year I presented a Probabilistic Model of Range. One problem I had with the way I was calculating the numbers had to do with park effects. By including park as one of the six parameters, I made the sample size of each combination very small. I also made the data very dependent on the regular fielder for the home team.
One way of fixing this problem is through smoothing. I'm now looking at two probabilistic models; one using six parameters including park, and the other using five parameters excluding park. I then take a weighted average of the two models to come up with the smoothed model. In this case, I'm using equal weights (I'm more than happy to entertain arguments for other weights).
Because samples sizes based on parks are small, the probabilities calculated are going to have a high variance. By averaging in the model based on the entire major leagues, we're reducing that variance. Here's the list of shortstops, based on the new model (original here):
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Pokey Reese
1532
206
199.47
0.134
0.130
0.00426
Adam Everett
2356
315
306.33
0.134
0.130
0.00368
Cristian Guzman
3950
499
489.89
0.126
0.124
0.00231
Julio Lugo
3874
495
488.28
0.128
0.126
0.00173
Alex Gonzalez
3996
482
481.08
0.121
0.120
0.00023
Rich Aurilia
2070
243
244.96
0.117
0.118
-0.00095
Jose C Lopez
1533
164
165.48
0.107
0.108
-0.00097
Neifi Perez
1729
202
203.82
0.117
0.118
-0.00105
Bobby Crosby
4132
557
564.67
0.135
0.137
-0.00186
Cesar Izturis
4119
495
502.78
0.120
0.122
-0.00189
Carlos Guillen
3597
490
497.14
0.136
0.138
-0.00198
Jimmy Rollins
4187
473
483.08
0.113
0.115
-0.00241
Chris Woodward
1625
194
198.34
0.119
0.122
-0.00267
Wilson Delgado
1053
145
148.07
0.138
0.141
-0.00291
Chris Gomez
1992
230
236.76
0.115
0.119
-0.00339
Orlando Cabrera
4090
497
511.49
0.122
0.125
-0.00354
Craig Counsell
3432
403
415.49
0.117
0.121
-0.00364
Jose Valentin
3141
412
423.60
0.131
0.135
-0.00369
Jack Wilson
4096
532
550.36
0.130
0.134
-0.00448
Miguel Tejada
4340
573
598.79
0.132
0.138
-0.00594
Ramon E Martinez
1507
193
201.99
0.128
0.134
-0.00597
Jose Vizcaino
1399
171
181.28
0.122
0.130
-0.00735
Kazuo Matsui
3004
370
392.64
0.123
0.131
-0.00754
Edgar Renteria
3921
459
491.41
0.117
0.125
-0.00826
Barry Larkin
2179
260
279.27
0.119
0.128
-0.00884
Royce Clayton
3971
452
489.47
0.114
0.123
-0.00944
Khalil Greene
3634
428
462.31
0.118
0.127
-0.00944
Omar Vizquel
3833
437
473.44
0.114
0.124
-0.00951
Alex Cintron
3320
407
439.17
0.123
0.132
-0.00969
Michael Young
4382
483
526.93
0.110
0.120
-0.01003
Derek Jeter
4178
493
534.95
0.118
0.128
-0.01004
Angel Berroa
3745
442
481.73
0.118
0.129
-0.01061
Deivi Cruz
2430
296
322.05
0.122
0.133
-0.01072
Alex S Gonzalez
1906
199
219.91
0.104
0.115
-0.01097
Rafael Furcal
3501
420
463.65
0.120
0.132
-0.01247
Nomar Garciaparra
2019
204
230.96
0.101
0.114
-0.01335
David Eckstein
3562
356
404.55
0.100
0.114
-0.01363
Felipe Lopez
1264
143
165.27
0.113
0.131
-0.01762
At first look, the two lists rank about the same. I did notice, however, that two players moved up quite a bit; Barry Larkin and Miguel Tegada. I curious to know which list matches your expectations better.
"He was telling me he's not trying to step on any toes," Bradley told the Los Angeles Times. "We are in agreement that we want what's best for the team. We want everybody to fulfill his potential.
"I'm more comfortable in center field; he doesn't want me to be uncomfortable. If he can play right field without aggravating his knee, that would be great. But if his knee is acting up, he'll let me know and he can shift over for a couple of weeks."
A good compromise. I don't quite understand, however, why playing center field would be less taxing on Drew's knee than playing right. I would think that in right field you would be involved in many fewer plays. Does anyone understand the different pressure on the knee in right?
I'm sorry I haven't linked to this sooner. Michael Humphreys Defenisve Regression Analysis has been published as a single article at The Harball Times. It's well worth the read.
Minaya figures first base is undervalued in the market place and in the minds of the average fan. "People take the position for granted," he said. He looks at a guy like J.T. Snow of the Giants, a smooth, graceful glove who "saves the Giants 10 games a year," and he anticipates something similar for his club with Mientkiewicz.
When I hear something like that, my first reaction is that first basemen are just not that involved defensively that they could save the number of runs needed to make a ten game difference. To do that, a first sacker would need to save 100 runs. That's a lot of doubles stopped from going down the line, and a lot of possible throwing errors scooped. Given that Helton earned 4.1 win shares with his glove (the best in the NL in 2004), and that equals about 1.4 wins, first basemen can't do that just with the glove.
However, it's possible that Omar isn't talking about overall performace, but actual clutch fielding performance. In other words, Omar is saying that Snow makes 10 plays a year that prevent wins from becoming losses. Is that possible? Do first basemen get enough balls hit to them in game situations that they can save 10 games? Do they catch enough errant throws in those situations to save 10 games? Can this actually be measured?
I decided to see if the Probabilistic Model of Range (PMR) can help. I envisioned a clutch situation where the first baseman turning a ball into an out might make a difference.
The score has to be real close, with the fielding team tied or leading by 1.
It has to be late in the game, otherwise other factors have time to work to determine the outcome of the game. I chose the 8th inning or later.
It has to be a difficult ball to field, but it also has to have some probability of being fielded by the first baseman. So I chose balls with a probability of being turned into an out by the first baseman greater than 0.0 but less than 0.5.
So, how did firstbasemen do in this siutation? The person with the most tough balls in play against him was Lyle Overbay with 14. His expected outs on those balls was 2.05. He turned 2 of them into outs. Nice work, Lyle! Jim Thome did very well. He had 7 tough balls put into play against him in those situations and turned three into outs, as did Shea Hillenbrand. Thome's were tougher to handle, however, as we expected only 0.93 outs for Jim, 1.55 for Shea.
What about Snow? He had 5 such tough balls in play, and turned none of them into outs (expected 0.64). And Doug Mientkiewicz? Like Snow, he had 5 in play, 0 outs (expected 0.93).
Yes, maybe they turned 10 bad throws into outs in those situations. Maybe not. But no one is coming close to turning really tough plays into outs at the rate of ten games a year, and few are even getting the opportunity.
Although range is probably the least important aspect of a catcher's job, we can measure it with this system as well. So for the sake of completeness, here's the rankings for catchers.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Catchers, 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Doug Mirabelli
1165
26
17.02
0.022
0.015
0.00771
Sandy Alomar Jr.
1149
15
9.50
0.013
0.008
0.00478
Brandon Inge
1003
14
9.56
0.014
0.010
0.00443
Jason LaRue
2955
47
38.04
0.016
0.013
0.00303
John Flaherty
1018
16
13.41
0.016
0.013
0.00254
Todd Greene
1398
18
14.51
0.013
0.010
0.00250
Gerald Laird
1235
17
14.15
0.014
0.011
0.00231
Robby Hammock
1102
12
9.52
0.011
0.009
0.00225
Benito Santiago
1389
15
12.01
0.011
0.009
0.00216
Miguel Ojeda
1060
18
16.05
0.017
0.015
0.00184
Gary Bennett
1939
26
22.47
0.013
0.012
0.00182
Vance Wilson
1246
15
13.01
0.012
0.010
0.00160
Gregg Zaun
2486
33
29.52
0.013
0.012
0.00140
Juan Brito
1376
16
14.09
0.012
0.010
0.00139
Brook Fordyce
1273
12
10.57
0.009
0.008
0.00113
Jason Varitek
3177
32
28.45
0.010
0.009
0.00112
Paul Lo Duca
3233
46
42.55
0.014
0.013
0.00107
A.J. Pierzynski
3218
37
34.61
0.011
0.011
0.00074
Ivan Rodriguez
3279
34
31.64
0.010
0.010
0.00072
Eddie Perez
1274
15
14.23
0.012
0.011
0.00061
Dan Wilson
2545
32
30.58
0.013
0.012
0.00056
Henry Blanco
2673
24
22.84
0.009
0.009
0.00043
Kevin Cash
1461
18
17.38
0.012
0.012
0.00043
Jason Kendall
3814
49
47.42
0.013
0.012
0.00042
Victor Martinez
3384
43
41.76
0.013
0.012
0.00037
Raul Chavez
1194
14
13.62
0.012
0.011
0.00032
Mike Lieberthal
3364
46
45.26
0.014
0.013
0.00022
Mike Redmond
1825
25
24.80
0.014
0.014
0.00011
Brian Schneider
3358
34
33.66
0.010
0.010
0.00010
Ramon Hernandez
2818
32
31.75
0.011
0.011
0.00009
Brad Ausmus
2949
38
37.91
0.013
0.013
0.00003
Ben Davis
1490
16
15.99
0.011
0.011
0.00000
Brent Mayne
1605
17
17.21
0.011
0.011
-0.00013
Charles Johnson
2375
27
27.38
0.011
0.012
-0.00016
Johnny Estrada
3214
24
24.99
0.007
0.008
-0.00031
Javy Lopez
3342
33
34.19
0.010
0.010
-0.00036
Jose Molina
1535
19
19.60
0.012
0.013
-0.00039
Jorge Posada
3434
48
49.78
0.014
0.014
-0.00052
Damian Miller
2939
32
34.12
0.011
0.012
-0.00072
Yadier B Molina
1041
11
11.81
0.011
0.011
-0.00078
Yorvit Torrealba
1319
18
19.05
0.014
0.014
-0.00079
Einar Diaz
1056
8
9.02
0.008
0.009
-0.00097
Jason Phillips
2003
38
40.09
0.019
0.020
-0.00104
Mike Piazza
1223
19
20.57
0.016
0.017
-0.00128
Javier Valentin
1305
18
19.72
0.014
0.015
-0.00132
Mike Matheny
2920
34
37.90
0.012
0.013
-0.00133
Toby Hall
3169
30
34.25
0.009
0.011
-0.00134
Paul Bako
1080
12
13.44
0.011
0.012
-0.00134
John R Buck
1891
20
22.73
0.011
0.012
-0.00144
Todd Pratt
1004
7
8.87
0.007
0.009
-0.00187
Chad Moeller
2369
23
27.45
0.010
0.012
-0.00188
Rod Barajas
2879
25
30.43
0.009
0.011
-0.00189
Miguel Olivo
2385
27
32.42
0.011
0.014
-0.00227
Ben Molina
2299
20
25.29
0.009
0.011
-0.00230
Michael Barrett
3019
31
39.22
0.010
0.013
-0.00272
Dave Ross
1355
13
16.85
0.010
0.012
-0.00284
Adam Melhuse
1541
14
18.46
0.009
0.012
-0.00289
The main problem using this data to seriously measure catchers is the foul pop data. Foul balls that are not caught and not errors are not recorded. So the probability of catching a foul pop is bascially the probability of not making an error on the play.
Not too many people have tried to measure the range of pitchers. One nice thing about this model is that it builds in the handedness of the pitcher. So the model should automatically account for the fact that righties fall off the mound in one direction and lefties in the other. Since pitchers are not in the field as much as other position players, I've lowered the minimum to 500 balls in play.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Pitchers, 2004, 500 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Livan Hernandez
745
59
40.85
0.079
0.055
0.02436
Greg Maddux
642
58
43.74
0.090
0.068
0.02220
Kenny Rogers
707
44
29.42
0.062
0.042
0.02063
Freddy Garcia
600
38
25.63
0.063
0.043
0.02062
Mike Mussina
501
32
22.04
0.064
0.044
0.01989
Kirk Rueter
694
53
41.26
0.076
0.059
0.01691
Jon Garland
694
43
31.63
0.062
0.046
0.01639
Cory Lidle
687
48
37.72
0.070
0.055
0.01496
Mark Buehrle
758
47
35.97
0.062
0.047
0.01455
Jake Westbrook
694
49
39.21
0.071
0.056
0.01411
Javier Vazquez
595
35
26.90
0.059
0.045
0.01361
Tom Glavine
705
48
39.00
0.068
0.055
0.01277
Russ Ortiz
615
41
33.29
0.067
0.054
0.01253
Woody Williams
599
34
26.58
0.057
0.044
0.01239
Esteban Loaiza
595
31
24.29
0.052
0.041
0.01128
Mike Hampton
592
40
34.23
0.068
0.058
0.00975
Josh Fogg
597
36
30.27
0.060
0.051
0.00960
Miguel Batista
641
32
26.32
0.050
0.041
0.00886
Brett Tomko
634
26
20.71
0.041
0.033
0.00835
Chris Carpenter
521
35
31.06
0.067
0.060
0.00756
Mark Mulder
689
42
36.80
0.061
0.053
0.00755
Steve Trachsel
651
38
33.45
0.058
0.051
0.00699
Bartolo Colon
627
32
27.85
0.051
0.044
0.00662
Mark Hendrickson
638
26
21.84
0.041
0.034
0.00652
Brian Anderson
588
21
17.51
0.036
0.030
0.00593
Brian Lawrence
659
39
35.36
0.059
0.054
0.00552
Brandon Webb
619
37
33.83
0.060
0.055
0.00512
Kelvim Escobar
583
22
19.25
0.038
0.033
0.00472
Johan Santana
529
24
21.84
0.045
0.041
0.00409
Jeff Suppan
603
30
28.29
0.050
0.047
0.00284
Doug Davis
614
27
25.44
0.044
0.041
0.00253
Roy Oswalt
686
35
33.43
0.051
0.049
0.00229
Dontrelle Willis
618
33
31.65
0.053
0.051
0.00219
Jose Lima
540
27
25.88
0.050
0.048
0.00208
Paul Wilson
584
26
24.88
0.045
0.043
0.00192
Curt Schilling
641
15
13.79
0.023
0.022
0.00188
Eric Milton
577
24
23.22
0.042
0.040
0.00135
Jamie Moyer
643
27
26.29
0.042
0.041
0.00111
Odalis Perez
585
40
39.38
0.068
0.067
0.00106
Jason Marquis
628
34
33.48
0.054
0.053
0.00083
Tim Wakefield
606
23
22.50
0.038
0.037
0.00082
Mike Maroth
728
33
33.25
0.045
0.046
-0.00034
Adam Eaton
604
27
27.22
0.045
0.045
-0.00036
Barry Zito
642
25
25.85
0.039
0.040
-0.00133
Al Leiter
508
21
21.72
0.041
0.043
-0.00142
Kazuhisa Ishii
525
14
14.78
0.027
0.028
-0.00149
Jaret Wright
537
28
28.86
0.052
0.054
-0.00160
Carl Pavano
693
31
32.46
0.045
0.047
-0.00211
Kyle Lohse
660
21
22.53
0.032
0.034
-0.00231
Matt Morris
621
31
32.77
0.050
0.053
-0.00285
Brad Radke
702
24
26.39
0.034
0.038
-0.00341
Jeff Weaver
680
32
34.71
0.047
0.051
-0.00398
Carlos Silva
730
25
27.92
0.034
0.038
-0.00400
Derek Lowe
640
40
42.61
0.063
0.067
-0.00407
Ben Sheets
611
22
24.55
0.036
0.040
-0.00418
Roger Clemens
559
23
25.37
0.041
0.045
-0.00425
Bronson Arroyo
538
16
18.34
0.030
0.034
-0.00435
John Thomson
623
28
30.94
0.045
0.050
-0.00472
Pedro Martinez
574
18
20.81
0.031
0.036
-0.00490
Ryan Drese
713
34
37.50
0.048
0.053
-0.00491
Ismael Valdez
600
17
19.98
0.028
0.033
-0.00496
Ted Lilly
556
14
16.94
0.025
0.030
-0.00529
Jason Schmidt
557
22
25.17
0.039
0.045
-0.00568
Rodrigo Lopez
514
20
22.93
0.039
0.045
-0.00571
Jose Acevedo
505
18
20.95
0.036
0.041
-0.00585
Nate Robertson
597
26
29.62
0.044
0.050
-0.00607
Kris Benson
632
26
29.92
0.041
0.047
-0.00621
C.C. Sabathia
547
16
19.46
0.029
0.036
-0.00633
Brett Myers
563
24
27.86
0.043
0.049
-0.00685
Sidney Ponson
737
29
34.05
0.039
0.046
-0.00685
David Wells
657
35
39.77
0.053
0.061
-0.00726
Randy Johnson
601
21
25.69
0.035
0.043
-0.00781
Jason Jennings
654
27
32.38
0.041
0.050
-0.00822
John Lackey
620
22
27.36
0.035
0.044
-0.00864
Shawn Estes
641
25
30.89
0.039
0.048
-0.00919
Mark Redman
627
18
24.15
0.029
0.039
-0.00981
Carlos Zambrano
584
29
35.15
0.050
0.060
-0.01053
Jimmy Gobble
519
10
15.67
0.019
0.030
-0.01093
Ryan Franklin
659
15
22.30
0.023
0.034
-0.01107
Darrell May
616
8
15.30
0.013
0.025
-0.01186
Jeremy Bonderman
516
16
22.62
0.031
0.044
-0.01282
Cliff Lee
516
8
15.65
0.016
0.030
-0.01482
Tim Hudson
624
27
36.86
0.043
0.059
-0.01580
Jon Lieber
605
19
28.72
0.031
0.047
-0.01606
Rich Harden
536
16
24.84
0.030
0.046
-0.01648
Jason Johnson
647
17
27.92
0.026
0.043
-0.01687
Other than Greg Maddux having won many gold gloves, I don't know enough about the fielding reputation of pitchers to know if these numbers look good. If there are any experts in the field, please let me know.
Obviously, fielding ability should not weigh very much in evaluating a pitcher. Still, it's nice to see who is a cat around the mound.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Leftfielders Permalink
Without further ado, the range rankings for leftfielders.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Leftfielders 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Aaron Guiel
1012
83
73.18
0.082
0.072
0.00971
Carl Crawford
3170
273
246.74
0.086
0.078
0.00828
Charles W Thomas
1710
133
119.60
0.078
0.070
0.00783
Reed Johnson
1412
98
92.77
0.069
0.066
0.00371
David Dellucci
2077
152
144.33
0.073
0.069
0.00369
Terrmel Sledge
1767
133
126.73
0.075
0.072
0.00355
Kevin Mench
1120
73
69.64
0.065
0.062
0.00300
Carlos Lee
3902
283
273.04
0.073
0.070
0.00255
Eric Byrnes
2676
172
166.39
0.064
0.062
0.00209
Craig Monroe
1369
102
99.95
0.075
0.073
0.00150
Jayson Werth
1592
115
112.70
0.072
0.071
0.00144
Hideki Matsui
4326
303
302.47
0.070
0.070
0.00012
Brad Wilkerson
1300
94
94.05
0.072
0.072
-0.00004
Jay Bay
2930
206
206.55
0.070
0.070
-0.00019
Dave Roberts
1298
87
87.57
0.067
0.067
-0.00044
Barry Bonds
3498
214
215.76
0.061
0.062
-0.00050
Moises Alou
3746
239
241.33
0.064
0.064
-0.00062
Jose Guillen
3464
264
266.40
0.076
0.077
-0.00069
Luis Gonzalez
2748
162
163.92
0.059
0.060
-0.00070
Dee Brown
1413
93
94.28
0.066
0.067
-0.00091
Ray Lankford
1175
82
83.16
0.070
0.071
-0.00099
Cliff Floyd
2759
164
167.47
0.059
0.061
-0.00126
Raul Ibanez
2920
227
230.68
0.078
0.079
-0.00126
Larry Bigbie
2793
214
217.89
0.077
0.078
-0.00139
Manny Ramirez
3293
198
204.49
0.060
0.062
-0.00197
Miguel Cabrera
1464
92
95.01
0.063
0.065
-0.00206
Jeff Conine
2139
175
180.21
0.082
0.084
-0.00244
Geoff Jenkins
4131
261
273.14
0.063
0.066
-0.00294
Lew Ford
2074
149
156.19
0.072
0.075
-0.00347
Matt Lawton
3291
231
242.50
0.070
0.074
-0.00350
Adam Dunn
4196
250
266.18
0.060
0.063
-0.00386
Bobby Kielty
1105
71
75.62
0.064
0.068
-0.00418
Pat Burrell
3261
216
231.22
0.066
0.071
-0.00467
Rondell White
1917
126
136.17
0.066
0.071
-0.00530
Lance Berkman
1741
93
102.23
0.053
0.059
-0.00530
Eric Young
1019
58
63.55
0.057
0.062
-0.00545
Craig Biggio
1902
116
126.52
0.061
0.067
-0.00553
Matt T Holliday
2963
176
193.05
0.059
0.065
-0.00575
Eli Marrero
1157
80
87.90
0.069
0.076
-0.00682
Shannon Stewart
1937
103
119.94
0.053
0.062
-0.00874
Ryan Klesko
2237
134
155.40
0.060
0.069
-0.00957
Our eyes often deceive us when it comes to defense, but not in the case of Ryan Klesko. He's just as brutal as he looks. It's also interesting to note that some of the older players (Bonds, Alou, Luis Gonzalez) are right where they should be, getting the balls at the expected rate. Sig Mejdal wrote the injury prediction section of The Bill James Handbook 2005 and one thing he's looking at is how aging and experience effect skills in the game. For example, he's found that the physical process of aging hurts HR production, but experience helps HR production. I'm wondering if that is going on here; these left fielders have so much experience in the outfield that they can make up for their old legs with positioning.
In the previous post, I noticed a big difference in range between Doug Mientkiewicz and Kevin Millar at first base. Millar did much better, which was a surprise. The first thing I wanted to see was the difference in batted ball types. If the difference is in pop-ups, that might be the answer right there. (Remember, this is full year data, not just with the Red Sox.)
Doug Mientkiewicz at First Base, 2004, by Batted Ball Type
Batted Ball Type
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Bunt Fly
7
4
4.00
0.571
0.571
0.00000
Bunt Grounder
60
5
5.23
0.083
0.087
-0.00389
Fly
1012
50
46.16
0.049
0.046
0.00379
Grounder
1284
149
147.47
0.116
0.115
0.00119
Liner
556
15
12.89
0.027
0.023
0.00380
Kevin Millar at First Base, 2004, by Batted Ball Type
Batted Ball Type
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Bunt Fly
2
0
0.00
0.000
0.000
0.00000
Bunt Grounder
20
4
4.00
0.200
0.200
0.00000
Fly
517
23
17.44
0.044
0.034
0.01075
Grounder
691
87
72.21
0.126
0.105
0.02140
Liner
274
10
3.48
0.036
0.013
0.02380
It's not popups. Kevin is outperforming Doug on grounders and line drives. Now, Millar is getting a big boost from the liners; that can be great positioning or pure luck. But he's also doing very well on the grounders. Let's break the grounders down by direction for both fielders.
Doug Mientkiewicz at First Base, 2004, Groundballs by Direction
Direction
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
11
58
0
0.13
0.000
0.002
-0.00233
12
86
1
0.34
0.012
0.004
0.00772
13
94
2
5.04
0.021
0.054
-0.03232
14
81
12
15.12
0.148
0.187
-0.03847
15
75
39
29.83
0.520
0.398
0.12225
16
45
24
27.22
0.533
0.605
-0.07155
17
40
31
30.95
0.775
0.774
0.00136
18
20
17
16.60
0.850
0.830
0.02023
19
13
11
9.62
0.846
0.740
0.10648
20
14
10
8.71
0.714
0.622
0.09246
21
5
2
3.14
0.400
0.627
-0.22727
22
2
0
0.17
0.000
0.083
-0.08333
23
1
0
0.50
0.000
0.500
-0.50000
Kevin Millar at First Base, 2004, Groundballs by Direction
Direction
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
12
62
0
0.16
0.000
0.003
-0.00261
13
51
5
2.18
0.098
0.043
0.05530
14
43
10
8.83
0.233
0.205
0.02722
15
37
18
14.78
0.486
0.400
0.08697
16
32
27
19.34
0.844
0.604
0.23943
17
14
12
9.98
0.857
0.713
0.14453
18
9
8
7.72
0.889
0.858
0.03098
19
8
4
5.52
0.500
0.690
-0.18977
20
5
2
2.87
0.400
0.574
-0.17371
21
1
1
0.64
1.000
0.636
0.36364
It looks like Millar is doing a better job than Mientkiewicz at fielding balls hit right at the normal first base position. I'm stumped for an explanation. Maybe the Red Sox make such good use of batted ball data that they positioned Kevin perfectly. Maybe, for some reason, the model does not value the balls hit at Millar as highly as the balls hit at Mientkiewicz. If either were true, then moving Doug to the Red Sox should have helped his range. In fact, it did. With the Red Sox, Mientkiewicz recorded 73 outs on 62.44 expected outs, a DER difference of 0.01278, a big improvement in his overall number of 0.00248. Given that the Red Sox are very carefully studying ball in play data, I bet the positioning has a lot to do with it.
Probabilistic Model of Range, First Basemen Permalink
I would normally run left fielders here, being the next position in the defensive spectrum, but I've fallen behind and have a request for first basemen.
Probabilistic Model of Range, First Basemen 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Jeff Conine
1431
141
105.62
0.099
0.074
0.02472
Kevin Millar
1504
124
97.13
0.082
0.065
0.01787
Darin Erstad
3159
252
213.80
0.080
0.068
0.01209
Todd Zeile
1103
87
74.69
0.079
0.068
0.01116
Nick Johnson
1830
143
123.10
0.078
0.067
0.01087
Ben Broussard
3119
198
176.50
0.063
0.057
0.00689
Tino Martinez
2978
226
206.94
0.076
0.069
0.00640
Brad Wilkerson
2169
185
171.80
0.085
0.079
0.00609
J.T. Snow
2565
178
162.93
0.069
0.064
0.00588
Hee Seop Choi
2572
184
170.90
0.072
0.066
0.00509
Albert Pujols
4025
322
302.41
0.080
0.075
0.00487
Pedro Feliz
1573
115
109.18
0.073
0.069
0.00370
Mark Teixeira
3881
336
321.79
0.087
0.083
0.00366
Todd Helton
4250
312
296.65
0.073
0.070
0.00361
Tony Clark
1917
141
134.49
0.074
0.070
0.00339
Derrek Lee
4025
302
290.34
0.075
0.072
0.00290
Carlos Delgado
3257
266
257.25
0.082
0.079
0.00269
Jason Giambi
1187
75
71.83
0.063
0.061
0.00267
Julio Franco
1957
131
126.03
0.067
0.064
0.00254
Doug Mientkiewicz
2919
223
215.75
0.076
0.074
0.00248
Randall Simon
1016
72
69.67
0.071
0.069
0.00229
Jim Thome
3580
239
230.93
0.067
0.065
0.00225
John Olerud
3197
215
208.68
0.067
0.065
0.00198
Daryle Ward
1740
104
100.62
0.060
0.058
0.00194
Craig A Wilson
1450
86
83.21
0.059
0.057
0.00193
Shea Hillenbrand
3352
241
234.94
0.072
0.070
0.00181
Adam LaRoche
2198
132
128.07
0.060
0.058
0.00179
Carlos Pena
3632
217
210.61
0.060
0.058
0.00176
Lyle Overbay
4158
304
301.39
0.073
0.072
0.00063
Paul Konerko
3634
223
221.40
0.061
0.061
0.00044
Ken Harvey
2045
132
131.89
0.065
0.064
0.00005
Mike Sweeney
1572
105
105.75
0.067
0.067
-0.00048
Jeff Bagwell
3798
282
285.44
0.074
0.075
-0.00091
Phil Nevin
3675
251
254.42
0.068
0.069
-0.00093
Sean Casey
3974
257
263.71
0.065
0.066
-0.00169
Justin Morneau
1619
97
100.13
0.060
0.062
-0.00193
Scott Hatteberg
3874
257
266.21
0.066
0.069
-0.00238
Rafael Palmeiro
3497
227
237.20
0.065
0.068
-0.00292
Shawn Green
2794
175
185.88
0.063
0.067
-0.00389
Mike Piazza
1636
87
96.28
0.053
0.059
-0.00567
I'm not surprised that a good centerfielder also fields well at first base, although my gut feeling is the Angels needed his glove in center more than at first. Other converts didn't work out so well as Green and Piazza finished at the bottom of the list. Green also did poorly when he was in right field. If you're going to have poor range, better at first than in right.
A big surprise on the list will be the relative positions of Kevin Millar and Doug Mientkiewicz. It's worth breaking those two down further. I'll do that in the next post.
I'm feeling better today and was able to think through the problem a little more clearly. Thanks for all the comments on the last post.
I did a simple calculation using the latest Bill James runs created formula for teams, found in The Bill James Handbook 2005. I first imagined a team that had 6000 plate appearances and got 1500 singles as a result (no walks, extra-base hits, etc). The RC formula would estimate that the team would score 422 runs. I then added 44 singles, giving the new team 6044 plate appearances. The run estimate for this team was 444 runs, or 22 more. So estimates from 18 to 30 do appear to be in the correct range.
I would offer one caveat, however. Because Eckstein is getting 44 fewer outs doesn't mean those outs aren't being picked up by other fielders. Some have pointed out that there is noise in the popup data; pretty much every popup is caught by a fielder. There is noise in the groundball data as well. There are going to grounders where both the third baseman and the shortstop have non-zero probabilities of fielding the ball. If the third baseman, due to superior range, cuts in front of the shortstop often he'll take outs away from the middleman. In most cases these should even out, but in some situations the shortstop will appear not to get to balls that indeed are outs.
re the cost of dave eckstein’s poor range, a poster calling him/herself "anolis" asks an intelligent question:
"If I read this correctly, Eckstein made 44 less outs than might have been expected, and the analysis suggests that this translated into allowing 33 more runs that expected. Can this be correct? Since the outs that Eckstein missed almost surely turned into singles, is the expected value of turning an out into a single 3/4 of a run? Seems high to me."
That seems real high to me, also. Unfortunately, I can't think too well right now (as I write this I find I wish I hadn't started, it's very difficult to concentrate). But 44 outs means that Eckstein is adding less than two extra games of offense to his opponents. If the opponents score about 4.5 runs per game, than Eckstein should cost his team 4.5*(44/27) runs, or a little over 7 runs.
Bill James showed over 20 years ago that the difference between the best and worst fielding shortstops couldn't be more than 25 runs a season. So I don't think David's fielding cost his team anywhere near 33 runs.
Yesterday's Probabilistic Model of Range post on rightfielders showed Sammy Sosa doing better than Ichiro Suzuki. I wanted to investigate further why that might be true. The next two tables show the two outfielders broken down by the direction the ball was hit. Lower numbers are toward the third base lines, higher numbers are are toward the first base line. Seven and eight make up straight-away center field.
Sammy Sosa, 2004, PMR by Direction
Direction
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
8
138
0
0.10
0.000
0.001
-0.00069
9
124
1
0.05
0.008
0.000
0.00770
10
112
0
0.21
0.000
0.002
-0.00188
11
119
3
3.32
0.025
0.028
-0.00266
12
156
12
15.79
0.077
0.101
-0.02430
13
193
35
27.71
0.181
0.144
0.03775
14
182
47
45.77
0.258
0.251
0.00674
15
164
59
53.47
0.360
0.326
0.03372
16
147
37
37.91
0.252
0.258
-0.00618
17
88
21
18.51
0.239
0.210
0.02825
18
57
11
9.56
0.193
0.168
0.02521
19
32
9
5.08
0.281
0.159
0.12265
20
13
1
1.00
0.077
0.077
0.00000
21
4
2
1.30
0.500
0.325
0.17500
22
5
0
0.50
0.000
0.100
-0.10000
23
4
0
0.20
0.000
0.050
-0.05000
24
3
0
0.14
0.000
0.048
-0.04762
Ichiro Suzuki, 2004, PMR by Direction
Direction
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
8
181
0
0.02
0.000
0.000
-0.00011
10
170
3
1.02
0.018
0.006
0.01165
11
139
16
9.75
0.115
0.070
0.04495
12
209
33
35.72
0.158
0.171
-0.01300
13
237
49
42.59
0.207
0.180
0.02704
14
250
79
79.39
0.316
0.318
-0.00158
15
231
81
84.38
0.351
0.365
-0.01465
16
166
62
60.54
0.373
0.365
0.00878
17
106
24
26.28
0.226
0.248
-0.02146
18
73
10
12.89
0.137
0.177
-0.03965
19
36
4
5.87
0.111
0.163
-0.05195
20
28
7
5.81
0.250
0.207
0.04268
21
12
1
1.00
0.083
0.083
0.00000
22
10
3
3.63
0.300
0.363
-0.06250
23
6
2
0.92
0.333
0.153
0.18056
25
7
1
0.67
0.143
0.095
0.04762
We have an interesting paradox here. If you define range as the ability to cover more ground, Suzuki is clearly your man. But I'm defining range as the ability to turn a batted ball into an out, and Sosa wins on that count. Why? My speculation from the data is that Sosa stays in one place. There's a reason outfielders are positioned a certain way; that's where most of the balls are hit. Sosa, by staying in straight-away right, gets to all the easy balls. My guess is that Ichrio (due to his great speed), cheats toward center or the line when he thinks a batter might go that way. So he gets to more balls in the alleys and down the line, but he loses a few easy balls straight away.
This is where incorporating a weighting by type of hit will improve this model. A commentor on the original post stated:
Interestingly, Tom Ruane at Diamond Mind has written in his "Gold Glove" review for 2001-03 that Ichiro is noticeably good at keeping doubles to singles.
What we may have here is an OBA vs. Slugging argument in reverse. Ichiro is catching balls that would be doubles or triples. He's lowering the opposition's slugging percentage. Sosa is making all the easy plays. He's lowering the opposition's on-base average. More research will be needed to ascertain if the trade-off is worth while.
Sosa is past his prime as a baserunner, is in serious decline as a fielder, and is losing it as a hitter.
The other thing I find very troubling about this list is the position of Ichiro Suzuki. If I could name one right fielder who I would think had extraordinary range, it would be Ichiro.
The model I'm presenting is very simple, and I'm aware of it's flaws and limitations. All of your comments have been very helpful in that regard. I'm going to push forward with the model as is for the rest of the postions before I start trying to improve the calculation, however. This way, we'll have a good baseline for comparison.
Of course, it could be that Sosa isn't as bad as we believe and Ichiro is positioning himself to make great plays at the expense of easy ones. I'll probably present a more detailed breakdown of the two shortly.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Third Basemen Permalink
For your perusal, the 2004 third basemen.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Third Basemen, 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Pedro Feliz
1096
112
95.35
0.102
0.087
0.01519
Kevin Youkilis
1556
150
127.43
0.096
0.082
0.01450
Russell Branyan
1117
117
101.69
0.105
0.091
0.01371
Chone Figgins
2031
178
150.47
0.088
0.074
0.01356
Scott Rolen
3671
391
342.41
0.107
0.093
0.01324
Ryan Freel
1253
142
125.75
0.113
0.100
0.01297
Adrian Beltre
3998
416
364.53
0.104
0.091
0.01287
Chipper Jones
2435
224
193.35
0.092
0.079
0.01259
Eric Chavez
3437
357
324.13
0.104
0.094
0.00956
Joe Randa
3343
306
274.41
0.092
0.082
0.00945
Melvin Mora
3697
351
319.72
0.095
0.086
0.00846
Alex Rodriguez
4213
329
293.99
0.078
0.070
0.00831
Bill Mueller
2448
216
196.31
0.088
0.080
0.00805
Mike Lamb
1366
135
124.49
0.099
0.091
0.00770
David A Wright
1870
158
145.59
0.084
0.078
0.00663
Corey Koskie
3031
262
242.37
0.086
0.080
0.00648
Vinny Castilla
4121
405
379.12
0.098
0.092
0.00628
Casey Blake
4116
369
343.77
0.090
0.084
0.00613
Todd Zeile
1107
103
96.33
0.093
0.087
0.00602
David Bell
3805
377
355.71
0.099
0.093
0.00559
Juan Castro
1224
101
94.90
0.083
0.078
0.00499
Rob Mackowiak
1289
117
111.23
0.091
0.086
0.00448
Sean Burroughs
3286
279
264.57
0.085
0.081
0.00439
Edgardo Alfonzo
3326
307
292.39
0.092
0.088
0.00439
Mark DeRosa
1748
138
130.35
0.079
0.075
0.00438
Chad A Tracy
3136
320
307.39
0.102
0.098
0.00402
Ty Wigginton
2875
256
244.78
0.089
0.085
0.00390
Hank Blalock
4358
362
345.35
0.083
0.079
0.00382
Mike Lowell
3921
357
342.36
0.091
0.087
0.00373
Morgan Ensberg
2564
222
213.08
0.087
0.083
0.00348
Scott Spiezio
1787
170
163.79
0.095
0.092
0.00347
Geoff Blum
1233
105
100.79
0.085
0.082
0.00342
Aramis Ramirez
3464
291
284.46
0.084
0.082
0.00189
Tony Batista
4042
367
364.15
0.091
0.090
0.00071
Aubrey Huff
2214
182
181.20
0.082
0.082
0.00036
Brandon Inge
1690
162
161.45
0.096
0.096
0.00033
Chris Stynes
1187
106
105.75
0.089
0.089
0.00021
Eric Munson
2298
208
207.88
0.091
0.090
0.00005
Joe Crede
3800
299
303.50
0.079
0.080
-0.00118
Keith Ginter
1152
103
104.47
0.089
0.091
-0.00128
Eric Hinske
4121
321
333.49
0.078
0.081
-0.00303
Desi Relaford
1036
94
98.16
0.091
0.095
-0.00402
Wes Helms
1696
141
152.49
0.083
0.090
-0.00677
Mike Cuddyer
1057
76
86.95
0.072
0.082
-0.01036
The Greek God of Walks might also be "death to flying things" at third base. Kevin Youkilis did a great job filling in at third base for the Red Sox this season. I'm not surprised to see Scott Rolen as the top everyday third baseman, but I am surprised to see Chipper Jones rate that highly. And A-Rod aquitted himself well in the move to a new position.
Overall, you'll notice that the third basmen are as positive as the shortstops are negative. I wonder if shifts have become so prevalent that third basemen are picking up a lot of balls that shortstops usually field. I've certainly scored games this season where the third baseman caught the ball at the bag at 2nd base. If the shift was being use a lot more than in 2002 and 2003, that might account for us seeing third basemen positive and shortstops negative.
UZR (and regular ZR) only counts ground balls for infielders, but I think PMR includes all BIP. Is it possible (and easy for you) to separate them out? I'm on record as believing it's very hard to determine whether infielder putouts (even for fly ball BIP) reflect skill, as so many of them are discretionary plays that could be made by one or more other fielders. For this reason, Tom Duane at Diamond Mind takes this approach as well.
There has also been discussion about UZR showing David Eckstein doing well and while my system shows him doing badly. Let's break Eckstein down by ball in play type:
David Eckstein as SS, 2004, by Ball in Play Type
Type of Ball
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Fly
1346
62
82.34
0.046
0.061
-0.01511
Liner
635
17
24.41
0.027
0.038
-0.01168
Grounder
1514
277
293.51
0.183
0.194
-0.01090
Bunt Grounder
61
0
0.00
0.000
0.000
0.00000
As you can see, fly balls and liners are hurting Eckstein. He's not great on grounders, but his inability to chase down pop ups is hurting him. This makes me wonder if catching pops is helping Jeter, since we all remember his great dive into the stands from last season.
Derek Jeter as SS, 2004, By Ball in Play Type
Type of Ball
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Fly
1510
115
104.27
0.076
0.069
0.00711
Liner
759
27
28.77
0.036
0.038
-0.00234
Grounder
1845
351
388.52
0.190
0.211
-0.02034
Bunt Grounder
63
0
0.00
0.000
0.000
0.00000
Jeter is much better at balls in the air than balls on the ground. (Maybe the Yankees should move Jeter to centerfield and find a shortstop who can field grounders.) In fact, if you want a shortstop who fields grounders, you'd pick Eckstein over Jeter. Let's just finish this up with a high ranking shortstop in PMR, Cristian Guzman.
Cristian Guzman as SS, 2004, By Ball in Play Type
Type of Ball
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Fly
1358
85
84.66
0.063
0.062
0.00025
Liner
718
37
26.16
0.052
0.036
0.01510
Grounder
1786
377
381.53
0.211
0.214
-0.00254
Bunt Grounder
80
0
0.00
0.000
0.000
0.00000
It's clear that Guzman's high ranking comes from his catching line drives in 2004, although he's also better than both Jeter and Eckstein at fielding grounders. But these examples bring me back to the title of this post, "What is Range?"
We like to think of range as the ability of a fielder to cover ground. That's really difficult to measure, since as far as I know, no one is keeping track of where each fielder is located on a pitch, or how far the fielder moved to catch a ball. What we can measure is the ability of a fielder to turn a batted ball into an out. Fielders can turn balls into outs because:
They can move quickly to where the ball is hit.
They position themselves well so they start near where the ball is hit.
They have soft hands and accurate arms.
I'm sure readers can suggest other things. But basically, if you move well, your positioning becomes less important. Guzman appears to be positioned well, since he's often in the way of line drives. Jeter appears to move well when the ball is in the air, not so much on the ground. I'd guess Jeter's position is poor, also. There's no evidence that Eckstein moves well, but I bet he's positioned better than Derek. Remember, this is me hypothesizing, I don't have any facts to back this up.
But should we really just look at ground balls for shortstops as the measure of ability at the position? There's a reason that shortstops and second basemen field a lot of popups, especially behind first and third; they're easier plays for the middle infielders. They have a better angle to the ball. And if one of those popups falls in, a speedy runner will turn it into a double. It's a weakness for Eckstein, and should be noted as such. It's a strength for Jeter, and should be noted as such.
As for Guzman's positioning, I'll have to look at multiple years fo data. It easily could be dumb luck. It could be that the Twins staff told him where to go, and it won't carry over to Washington. But it could also be that Guzman can read the batter, and knowing the pitch can make a very good guess at where the ball will go. That would be a strength that should be reflected in the numbers.
So to me, range is the ability to get an out on a ball, and good range comes from getting more of these than expected. I don't care how you get to them; the model adjusts for that.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Centerfielders Permalink
Here is the table lising 2004 centerfielders on the field for 1000 balls in play.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Centerfielders, 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Wily Mo Pena
1211
144
135.42
0.119
0.112
0.00708
Corey Patterson
3830
324
301.71
0.085
0.079
0.00582
Andruw Jones
4164
389
374.85
0.093
0.090
0.00340
Jay Payton
3144
333
322.31
0.106
0.103
0.00340
Grady Sizemore
1033
105
102.31
0.102
0.099
0.00261
Luis Terrero
1443
111
107.44
0.077
0.074
0.00247
Lew Ford
1028
101
99.32
0.098
0.097
0.00163
Vernon Wells
3510
327
321.70
0.093
0.092
0.00151
Mark Kotsay
3809
345
340.13
0.091
0.089
0.00128
Luis Matos
2403
221
218.19
0.092
0.091
0.00117
Tike Redman
3643
340
340.24
0.093
0.093
-0.00006
Preston Wilson
1432
118
118.13
0.082
0.082
-0.00009
Jim Edmonds
3738
314
314.49
0.084
0.084
-0.00013
Endy Chavez
3304
301
301.54
0.091
0.091
-0.00016
Marquis Grissom
3799
342
342.66
0.090
0.090
-0.00017
Mike Cameron
3772
354
355.96
0.094
0.094
-0.00052
Torii Hunter
3346
312
313.81
0.093
0.094
-0.00054
Nook P Logan
1179
117
119.19
0.099
0.101
-0.00185
Laynce Nix
2752
222
227.64
0.081
0.083
-0.00205
Milton Bradley
2349
230
234.97
0.098
0.100
-0.00212
Scott Podsednik
4168
392
400.93
0.094
0.096
-0.00214
Coco Crisp
2472
206
211.47
0.083
0.086
-0.00221
Rocco Baldelli
3278
342
349.51
0.104
0.107
-0.00229
Juan Pierre
4257
365
378.59
0.086
0.089
-0.00319
Kenny Lofton
1657
162
168.29
0.098
0.102
-0.00379
Marlon Byrd
2268
196
205.04
0.086
0.090
-0.00398
Craig Biggio
1636
134
140.68
0.082
0.086
-0.00408
Carlos Beltran
4235
397
415.38
0.094
0.098
-0.00434
Steve Finley
4148
359
377.62
0.087
0.091
-0.00449
Johnny Damon
3792
349
366.12
0.092
0.097
-0.00452
Aaron Rowand
3117
291
306.32
0.093
0.098
-0.00492
Jason Michaels
1000
96
102.67
0.096
0.103
-0.00667
Jeromy Burnitz
1622
114
126.52
0.070
0.078
-0.00772
David DeJesus
2361
231
252.60
0.098
0.107
-0.00915
Randy Winn
3304
341
372.91
0.103
0.113
-0.00966
Alex Sanchez
2082
178
200.73
0.085
0.096
-0.01092
Ken Griffey Jr.
2077
173
199.64
0.083
0.096
-0.01283
Chone Figgins
1035
92
105.30
0.089
0.102
-0.01285
Garret Anderson
2393
211
243.09
0.088
0.102
-0.01341
Bernie Williams
2616
214
255.18
0.082
0.098
-0.01574
The first thing I notice is that Andruw Jones is very good and Bernie Williams is very bad. So in this case the system appears to be getting the end points right. The thing that really surprises me is the equality of Biggio and Beltran. Here's a table comparing them just with the Astros:
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Carlos Beltran
2242
200
203.15
0.089
0.091
-0.00140
Craig Biggio
1636
134
140.68
0.082
0.086
-0.00408
Jason Lane
125
8
8.54
0.064
0.068
-0.00436
Beltran was much better with the Astros than Biggio; his poor fielding was a result of his time with Kansas City last year.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Ruben Mateo
133
12
9.62
0.090
0.072
0.01789
Carlos Beltran
1993
197
212.23
0.099
0.106
-0.00764
David DeJesus
2361
231
252.60
0.098
0.107
-0.00915
So the question for the Mets is, which Beltran will show up in centerfield next season? Neither is better than Cameron, and one is a lot worse.
I think it's important to realize that I'm not measuring total defense here, I'm simply trying to measure range. So turning double plays is important, but I'm not trying to measure that here.
As for differences between my system and UZR, the two are not exactly alike. The idea is the same, to look at the probability of fielding a certain ball, but I know MGL adjusts for parks differently and his zones are very different from my slices. And for all I know he's using a different set of data as well.
This is only a start. There's a long way to go before we feel comfortable with these numbers but I do believe we're going down the right path. All your comments are very helpful.
To me, your data only confirms the veracity to Theo's reasoning that defense was the reason for the trade.
As others have pointed out, Epstein didn't have the luxury of hoping that Nomar was just "rusty."
Indeed, isn't that the whole point of using stats to make decisions, i.e, to remove the "gut feeling" aspect of evaluating players?
It's great that the numbers show Nomar got better after the trade and may in fact have been "rusty." But it's even better to have a GM that saw a problem and did something about it.
Meanwhile, you have absolutely nothing but pure supposition to support your argument "that defense was an excuse to move a player the Red Sox no longer wanted."
That's kind of weird for a stats guy isn't it?
I'm willing to admit that Edward has a point. So I'm going to step back from my earlier statement and look at the numbers again.
There are two things I look at as a stat guy. One is the number, the second is the context. A month and a half is a short time frame for an evaluation. Anything can happen in 100 or so AB (look at Jeter's April hitting numbers). And anything can happen on 100 ground balls or so. Nomar came back rusty. You can see it in his June hitting numbers. But by July he had recovered his swing. Why wouldn't his fielding numbers come back also? He did show range improvement in July, but his numbers were still poor. What was the context for believing the small sample size of poor fielding numbers were valid?
And I will admit that I haven't looked at context either. One is the context of his injury. I don't know how well the injury healed. It was good enough that he could hit well, but not good enough that he could play everyday. Obviously, the Cubs thought the injury healed well enough that they were willing to take Nomar in trade. It's possible that the Red Sox thought that Nomar's poor range would not improve due to the tenderness of his foot. That proved to be incorrect.
The other is the long term context of Nomar's fielding. Were his poor fielding numbers the continuation of a trend? This one I can research. Yes, it was the continuation of a trend. In both 2002 and 2003, Nomar ranked near the bottom of the pack in PMR for shortstops on the field for 1000 balls in play. In 2002, he ranked 31 out of 36. In 2003, he ranked 28 of 38. Was his range costing the Red Sox outs? Yes.
Nomar's offense, however, was making up for his defense. He did earn 52 win shares over 2002-2003. So, with Nomar's offense fine, did Theo really believe that Nomar's defense was costing them that much? Remember, the difference between a really great defensive shortstop and a really bad defensive shortstop over a full full season is 2 or 3 wins. And while Cabrera was good, he wasn't great. So you're talking about maybe 1 win defensively with Cabrera playing instead of Garciaparra. That doesn't seem to me to justify a trade on defense, especially when it's not a long term solution.
As it turns out, Nomar earned 1.7 defensive win shares with the Cubs, and Cabrera earned 1.7 with the Red Sox. Overall, Nomar had 6 win shares with the Cubs, Cabrera 5 with the Red Sox. The tangible evidence says the Red Sox would have done about the same with Nomar or Cabrera at short. The tangible evidence says defense wasn't that important. The tangible evidence says the Red Sox drew the wrong conclusion from 1 1/2 months of fielding data.
The intangible evidence says it was a great trade. Theo trades, runs allowed per game go down, runs scored per game go up and the Red Sox win the World Series. And every once in a while, Soriano swings at a low outside pitch and hits a home run. It's about process. Maybe this trade was about changing the personality of the team. That's fine, but I'd like to be told that rather than some fluff about defense. Maybe it was just that the Red Sox didn't want Nomar long term and tried to get what they could for him. There's nothing wrong with any of that, but they would have been rid of Garciaparra by the end of the year anyway.
Here's what I believe. Theo didn't go to ownership and say, "We have to trade Nomar because he's killing us defensively." I believe ownership came to Theo and said, "Get what you can for Nomar, and find a way to justify it." And yes, that's pure speculation. But I know Theo is a very smart guy and knows about sample sizes. I know he has a very good handle on the value of defense vs. offense. And knowing that, the explanation for the deal does not make sense to me.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Second Basemen Permalink
Here's the table for major league second basemen in 2004. Again, fielders are included if they were on the field for 1000 balls in play.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Second Basemen 2004, 1000 balls in play.
In Play
Actual Outs
Expected Outs
DER
Expected DER
Difference
Chase Utley
1180
150
141.26
0.127
0.120
0.00740
Nick Green
1786
232
224.57
0.130
0.126
0.00416
Willie Harris
2041
253
246.58
0.124
0.121
0.00315
Bill Hall
1253
133
129.21
0.106
0.103
0.00302
Orlando Hudson
3567
499
488.80
0.140
0.137
0.00286
Mark Loretta
4090
504
499.61
0.123
0.122
0.00107
Placido Polanco
2918
345
344.39
0.118
0.118
0.00021
Tony Graffanino
2090
245
244.69
0.117
0.117
0.00015
Luis Rivas
2637
343
343.31
0.130
0.130
-0.00012
Aaron Miles
3351
399
402.28
0.119
0.120
-0.00098
Rey Sanchez
2177
250
252.33
0.115
0.116
-0.00107
Jeff Kent
3449
394
398.93
0.114
0.116
-0.00143
Juan Uribe
1935
228
230.88
0.118
0.119
-0.00149
Mark Grudzielanek
1609
214
217.31
0.133
0.135
-0.00205
Keith Ginter
1413
151
155.05
0.107
0.110
-0.00286
Junior Spivey
1597
194
199.30
0.121
0.125
-0.00332
D'Angelo Jimenez
4031
453
468.32
0.112
0.116
-0.00380
Luis Castillo
3777
449
465.50
0.119
0.123
-0.00437
Omar Infante
2710
305
319.00
0.113
0.118
-0.00517
Alex Cora
3232
359
377.91
0.111
0.117
-0.00585
Bret Boone
4032
430
454.63
0.107
0.113
-0.00611
Alfonso Soriano
3923
459
483.92
0.117
0.123
-0.00635
Adam Kennedy
3665
452
475.33
0.123
0.130
-0.00637
Tony Womack
3328
421
442.27
0.127
0.133
-0.00639
Brian Roberts
4057
456
482.41
0.112
0.119
-0.00651
Mark McLemore
1127
128
135.49
0.114
0.120
-0.00664
Jose Castillo
2860
318
338.13
0.111
0.118
-0.00704
Ronnie Belliard
4041
467
496.11
0.116
0.123
-0.00720
Marcus Giles
2421
289
307.41
0.119
0.127
-0.00760
Danny Garcia
1091
115
123.43
0.105
0.113
-0.00773
Ray Durham
3076
344
375.95
0.112
0.122
-0.01039
Todd Walker
2094
254
276.35
0.121
0.132
-0.01067
Jose Hernandez
1024
120
131.04
0.117
0.128
-0.01079
Marco Scutaro
2971
332
366.85
0.112
0.123
-0.01173
Scott A Hairston
2157
220
245.38
0.102
0.114
-0.01177
Jamey Carroll
1044
103
115.80
0.099
0.111
-0.01226
Geoff Blum
1127
111
125.46
0.098
0.111
-0.01283
Ruben A Gotay
1155
112
127.71
0.097
0.111
-0.01360
Jose Reyes
1107
122
138.80
0.110
0.125
-0.01518
Jose Vidro
2674
266
308.07
0.099
0.115
-0.01573
Mark Bellhorn
3112
367
417.22
0.118
0.134
-0.01614
Miguel Cairo
2619
331
375.45
0.126
0.143
-0.01697
Enrique Wilson
1798
214
254.66
0.119
0.142
-0.02261
Like the shortstops it wasn't a good fielding season for the second basemen overall. This table does give some credence to the idea that Jeff Kent is a better fielder than conventional wisdom says. I hope someday to improve this program to a point where it's similar to whatever DePodesta uses.
This list should also make Phillies fans happy. They appear to have two of best in Utley and Polanco. And while Nick Green didn't add much to the Atlanta offense, he ate up balls at 2nd last season.
At the other end of the scale, the Yankees look like they actually upgraded their range at second replacing Cairo with Womack. And if defense is so important to the Red Sox, I wonder how long Mark Bellhorn will last at 2nd.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Shortstops Permalink
It's time to start looking at individual players. We'll start with the position to get the most opportunities, the shortstops. As the following table shows, it wasn't a great season for these middle infielders.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Shortstops 2004, 1000 balls in play.
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Pokey Reese
1532
206
200.75
0.134
0.131
0.00343
Adam Everett
2356
315
309.60
0.134
0.131
0.00229
Cristian Guzman
3950
499
492.35
0.126
0.125
0.00168
Julio Lugo
3874
495
492.12
0.128
0.127
0.00074
Rich Aurilia
2070
243
242.28
0.117
0.117
0.00035
Bobby Crosby
4132
557
557.61
0.135
0.135
-0.00015
Jose C Lopez
1533
164
165.00
0.107
0.108
-0.00066
Jimmy Rollins
4187
473
476.56
0.113
0.114
-0.00085
Alex Gonzalez
3996
482
485.71
0.121
0.122
-0.00093
Neifi Perez
1729
202
203.81
0.117
0.118
-0.00105
Cesar Izturis
4119
495
500.91
0.120
0.122
-0.00144
Chris Woodward
1625
194
196.74
0.119
0.121
-0.00169
Carlos Guillen
3597
490
496.37
0.136
0.138
-0.00177
Chris Gomez
1992
230
233.60
0.115
0.117
-0.00181
Wilson Delgado
1053
145
149.37
0.138
0.142
-0.00415
Orlando Cabrera
4090
497
514.77
0.122
0.126
-0.00434
Khalil Greene
3634
428
444.56
0.118
0.122
-0.00456
Craig Counsell
3432
403
419.30
0.117
0.122
-0.00475
Jose Valentin
3141
412
427.57
0.131
0.136
-0.00496
Jack Wilson
4096
532
555.52
0.130
0.136
-0.00574
Ramon E Martinez
1507
193
201.93
0.128
0.134
-0.00593
Edgar Renteria
3921
459
484.36
0.117
0.124
-0.00647
Derek Jeter
4178
493
521.56
0.118
0.125
-0.00684
Jose Vizcaino
1399
171
181.51
0.122
0.130
-0.00751
Miguel Tejada
4340
573
608.49
0.132
0.140
-0.00818
Royce Clayton
3971
452
485.18
0.114
0.122
-0.00836
Michael Young
4382
483
520.15
0.110
0.119
-0.00848
Kazuo Matsui
3004
370
395.82
0.123
0.132
-0.00860
Deivi Cruz
2430
296
318.30
0.122
0.131
-0.00918
Omar Vizquel
3833
437
473.87
0.114
0.124
-0.00962
Alex Cintron
3320
407
438.92
0.123
0.132
-0.00962
Angel Berroa
3745
442
480.58
0.118
0.128
-0.01030
Alex S Gonzalez
1906
199
219.12
0.104
0.115
-0.01056
Barry Larkin
2179
260
284.27
0.119
0.130
-0.01114
Rafael Furcal
3501
420
461.64
0.120
0.132
-0.01189
David Eckstein
3562
356
400.26
0.100
0.112
-0.01243
Nomar Garciaparra
2019
204
230.57
0.101
0.114
-0.01316
Felipe Lopez
1264
143
165.30
0.113
0.131
-0.01764
One hypothesis for the overall poor play by shortstops in 2004 is the aging of the big players. Vizquel, Jeter, Garciaparra and Tejada are not youngsters anymore. A-Rod moving out of the position hurt also. All of these players will be a year older in 2005; it will be interesting to see if there is further decline in the position as a whole.
It looks like the Nationals got a decent vacuum cleaner at short with their signing of Christian Guzman. With all the talk about Rich Aurilia being old and broken down, he did a very good job fielding. It also appears that the Angels got a nice upgrade replacing Eckstein with Cabrera. If Eck fields like that for the Cardinals, don't expect that team to be number one in defense again next season.
Pokey Reese, who was supposed to spend most of his time at 2nd base before the Nomar Garciaparra injury, had the best range at shortstop in the majors in 2004. Nomar was down near the bottom. This gives us a chance to evaluate the Red Sox shortstops.
Boston Red Sox Shortstops, 2004 (Minimum 10 balls in play)
Player
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Cesar Crespo
288
36
32.83
0.125
0.114
0.01101
Pokey Reese
1532
206
200.75
0.134
0.131
0.00343
Orlando Cabrera
1465
174
180.47
0.119
0.123
-0.00442
Ricky Gutierrez
106
13
13.89
0.123
0.131
-0.00838
Nomar Garciaparra
964
85
110.10
0.088
0.114
-0.02604
Mark Bellhorn
32
3
4.23
0.094
0.132
-0.03840
So if we go back to the Garciaparra/Cabrera trade, we can now see it in it's full light. It wasn't that the Red Sox defense had been bad all year; it's that it was bad with Nomar at shortstop. With Reese injured, Boston figured they needed another fielder at the position. However, Boston may have jumped the gun. There's some evidence that Nomar was just rusty. Compare Nomar with Cabrera after the trade:
SS Range, 2004
Nomar with Cubs
Cabrera with Red Sox
In Play
1055
1465
Actual Outs
119
174
Predicted Outs
120.47
180.47
DER
.113
.119
Predicted DER
.114
.123
Difference
-0.00139
-0.00442
So after the trade, Garciaparra had better range than Cabrera. Yes, Cabrera was able to play more. The uncertainty of Nomar's future health was certainly a factor in the deal. But given Nomar's play the rest of the way, Boston could have done without the trade and been just as good on defense, with Crespo or Reese (once he got off the DL) spelling Nomar occasionally. I felt at the time that defense was an excuse to move a player the Red Sox no longer wanted. This data does nothing to change my mind on the matter.
I've been working on the software for this during the week, and have acquired updated ball in play data as well. I'm now ready to go full bore with the study.
First, however, an update of a couple of tables shown previously. The good people at Baseball Info Solutions have been busy recording batted ball information this winter to complete the database, and that new data is included in the following table. This should replace the table found here.
2004 Probabilistic Model of Range, Totals for Teams
Team
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Cardinals
4378
3106
3092.01
0.709
0.706
0.00320
Cubs
4119
2869
2855.86
0.697
0.693
0.00319
Red Sox
4387
3040
3027.90
0.693
0.690
0.00276
White Sox
4370
3034
3025.58
0.694
0.692
0.00193
Phillies
4440
3120
3118.53
0.703
0.702
0.00033
Devil Rays
4459
3119
3121.25
0.699
0.700
-0.00050
Dodgers
4324
3084
3086.19
0.713
0.714
-0.00051
Marlins
4257
2987
2991.48
0.702
0.703
-0.00105
Giants
4541
3149
3156.63
0.693
0.695
-0.00168
Mets
4552
3165
3174.40
0.695
0.697
-0.00206
Blue Jays
4471
3091
3100.88
0.691
0.694
-0.00221
Padres
4396
3044
3058.60
0.692
0.696
-0.00332
Braves
4488
3087
3102.55
0.688
0.691
-0.00346
Rangers
4549
3124
3141.88
0.687
0.691
-0.00393
Diamondbacks
4315
2941
2961.05
0.682
0.686
-0.00465
Astros
4148
2842
2863.53
0.685
0.690
-0.00519
Indians
4486
3065
3090.32
0.683
0.689
-0.00564
Athletics
4489
3123
3150.72
0.696
0.702
-0.00618
Expos
4414
3061
3095.05
0.693
0.701
-0.00771
Rockies
4614
3136
3176.20
0.680
0.688
-0.00871
Brewers
4410
3045
3087.09
0.690
0.700
-0.00954
Mariners
4488
3140
3187.45
0.700
0.710
-0.01057
Twins
4486
3082
3135.59
0.687
0.699
-0.01195
Reds
4584
3151
3213.64
0.687
0.701
-0.01367
Pirates
4317
2956
3017.18
0.685
0.699
-0.01417
Orioles
4451
3055
3124.15
0.686
0.702
-0.01554
Yankees
4492
3085
3164.12
0.687
0.704
-0.01761
Tigers
4521
3090
3172.22
0.683
0.702
-0.01819
Royals
4647
3131
3227.78
0.674
0.695
-0.02083
Angels
4359
2990
3081.10
0.686
0.707
-0.02090
The order of team changes a bit, but not much. It still looks like a poor defensive season overall.
The other chart to update had to do with performance behind pitchers, and that's updated in the extended entry.
Update: I have improved data for the models, so I've updated the tables in a new post. They are in the extended entry. The order changes a little, but not enough to make a big difference.
Something easy for me to do with the software I'm developing is to look at the defense behind particular pitchers with the Probabilistic Model of Range. The following chart lists every pitcher with at least 300 balls in play against him for a particular team.
Defense Behind Pitchers, 2004, ranked by difference between expected outs and actual outs.
Pitcher
Team
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Curt Schilling
Red Sox
642
455
426.88
0.709
0.665
0.04380
Scott Elarton
Indians
347
258
248.64
0.744
0.717
0.02697
Al Leiter
Mets
509
377
363.47
0.741
0.714
0.02659
Zach Day
Expos
373
267
257.87
0.716
0.691
0.02447
Rob Bell
Devil Rays
410
295
285.19
0.720
0.696
0.02394
C.C. Sabathia
Indians
549
390
377.24
0.710
0.687
0.02323
Zack Z Greinke
Royals
438
317
307.30
0.724
0.702
0.02215
Brett Tomko
Giants
634
446
432.18
0.703
0.682
0.02179
Greg Maddux
Cubs
643
456
442.04
0.709
0.687
0.02171
Glendon Rusch
Cubs
407
282
273.34
0.693
0.672
0.02127
Jerome Williams
Giants
404
290
282.65
0.718
0.700
0.01820
Randy Johnson
Diamondbacks
602
431
420.22
0.716
0.698
0.01791
A.J. Burnett
Marlins
326
231
225.40
0.709
0.691
0.01717
Carl Pavano
Marlins
694
491
479.15
0.707
0.690
0.01708
Kevin Brown
Yankees
416
295
287.94
0.709
0.692
0.01696
Jake Westbrook
Indians
694
491
479.59
0.707
0.691
0.01644
Randy Wolf
Phillies
434
305
298.08
0.703
0.687
0.01594
Jason Schmidt
Giants
556
406
397.23
0.730
0.714
0.01577
Mark Buehrle
White Sox
759
521
510.05
0.686
0.672
0.01443
Ted Lilly
Blue Jays
556
406
398.14
0.730
0.716
0.01414
Jeff Suppan
Cardinals
603
426
418.13
0.706
0.693
0.01305
Kazuhisa Ishii
Dodgers
527
389
382.15
0.738
0.725
0.01301
Jae Seo
Mets
389
269
263.95
0.692
0.679
0.01299
Tom Glavine
Mets
704
501
491.89
0.712
0.699
0.01294
Kenny Rogers
Rangers
708
472
462.89
0.667
0.654
0.01286
Jeremy Bonderman
Tigers
516
367
360.63
0.711
0.699
0.01235
Jon Garland
White Sox
696
499
490.75
0.717
0.705
0.01185
Roger Clemens
Astros
560
400
394.19
0.714
0.704
0.01038
Mark Mulder
Athletics
691
478
471.02
0.692
0.682
0.01010
Victor Zambrano
Devil Rays
354
254
250.58
0.718
0.708
0.00967
Jose Lima
Dodgers
540
389
383.87
0.720
0.711
0.00950
Ryan Vogelsong
Pirates
419
290
286.09
0.692
0.683
0.00933
Mike Wood
Royals
328
229
225.98
0.698
0.689
0.00921
Odalis Perez
Dodgers
586
429
423.97
0.732
0.723
0.00859
Chris Carpenter
Cardinals
524
370
365.58
0.706
0.698
0.00844
David T Bush
Blue Jays
306
219
216.51
0.716
0.708
0.00814
Claudio Vargas
Expos
344
247
244.36
0.718
0.710
0.00767
Livan Hernandez
Expos
747
531
525.55
0.711
0.704
0.00730
Brian Lawrence
Padres
660
452
447.32
0.685
0.678
0.00710
Jimmy Gobble
Royals
518
376
372.53
0.726
0.719
0.00669
Matt Clement
Cubs
473
332
329.05
0.702
0.696
0.00625
John Halama
Devil Rays
400
278
275.51
0.695
0.689
0.00623
Miguel Batista
Blue Jays
642
446
442.02
0.695
0.689
0.00620
Wes Obermueller
Brewers
410
284
281.50
0.693
0.687
0.00609
Barry Zito
Athletics
645
450
446.30
0.698
0.692
0.00574
Roy Oswalt
Astros
687
466
462.08
0.678
0.673
0.00571
Carlos Zambrano
Cubs
584
415
411.91
0.711
0.705
0.00528
Mike Mussina
Yankees
501
339
336.45
0.677
0.672
0.00508
Brett Myers
Phillies
563
391
388.33
0.694
0.690
0.00474
Eric Milton
Phillies
581
425
422.69
0.731
0.728
0.00398
Sun-Woo Kim
Expos
431
295
293.52
0.684
0.681
0.00344
Jeff Weaver
Dodgers
681
478
475.74
0.702
0.699
0.00332
Jason Jennings
Rockies
657
440
437.99
0.670
0.667
0.00306
Steve Trachsel
Mets
651
461
459.19
0.708
0.705
0.00278
Pedro Martinez
Red Sox
574
403
401.44
0.702
0.699
0.00272
Russ Ortiz
Braves
615
435
433.49
0.707
0.705
0.00245
Ryan Drese
Rangers
714
490
488.49
0.686
0.684
0.00212
Doug Davis
Brewers
614
424
422.86
0.691
0.689
0.00185
David Wells
Padres
658
466
465.05
0.708
0.707
0.00144
Steve W Sparks
Diamondbacks
419
287
286.78
0.685
0.684
0.00053
Brian Anderson
Royals
588
393
392.74
0.668
0.668
0.00044
Javier Vazquez
Yankees
595
425
424.76
0.714
0.714
0.00041
Johan Santana
Twins
529
392
391.84
0.741
0.741
0.00031
Ryan Franklin
Mariners
662
465
464.90
0.702
0.702
0.00015
Josh Beckett
Marlins
426
297
297.17
0.697
0.698
-0.00040
Ron Villone
Mariners
349
249
249.22
0.713
0.714
-0.00064
Freddy Garcia
Mariners
321
229
229.24
0.713
0.714
-0.00076
Bartolo Colon
Angels
626
438
438.68
0.700
0.701
-0.00109
Brad Radke
Twins
703
489
489.82
0.696
0.697
-0.00116
Adam Eaton
Padres
605
418
418.71
0.691
0.692
-0.00118
Mark Hendrickson
Devil Rays
641
438
439.18
0.683
0.685
-0.00183
Mike Hampton
Braves
592
397
398.14
0.671
0.673
-0.00193
Daniel A Cabrera
Orioles
480
344
344.98
0.717
0.719
-0.00205
John Thomson
Braves
623
423
424.51
0.679
0.681
-0.00242
Matt Morris
Cardinals
622
439
440.57
0.706
0.708
-0.00253
Gary Knotts
Tigers
436
307
308.18
0.704
0.707
-0.00272
Kelvim Escobar
Angels
583
407
408.66
0.698
0.701
-0.00285
Scott Schoeneweis
White Sox
362
246
247.24
0.680
0.683
-0.00343
Jaret Wright
Braves
538
372
374.02
0.691
0.695
-0.00376
Kirk Rueter
Giants
695
479
482.29
0.689
0.694
-0.00474
Bronson Arroyo
Red Sox
538
372
374.60
0.691
0.696
-0.00483
Jason Marquis
Cardinals
630
432
435.37
0.686
0.691
-0.00535
Jake Peavy
Padres
444
304
306.84
0.685
0.691
-0.00640
Dustin Hermanson
Giants
398
277
279.68
0.696
0.703
-0.00673
Kerry Wood
Cubs
373
256
258.70
0.686
0.694
-0.00723
Rodrigo Lopez
Orioles
515
367
370.73
0.713
0.720
-0.00724
Shawn Estes
Rockies
641
440
444.66
0.686
0.694
-0.00726
Josh Fogg
Pirates
597
414
418.38
0.693
0.701
-0.00733
Ramon Ortiz
Angels
401
275
277.99
0.686
0.693
-0.00746
Joel Pineiro
Mariners
417
289
292.21
0.693
0.701
-0.00770
Jeff Fassero
Rockies
388
257
260.08
0.662
0.670
-0.00793
Tim Hudson
Athletics
625
428
433.09
0.685
0.693
-0.00815
Cliff Lee
Indians
519
355
360.26
0.684
0.694
-0.01014
Ben Sheets
Brewers
612
427
433.46
0.698
0.708
-0.01055
Paul Wilson
Reds
584
414
420.20
0.709
0.720
-0.01062
Wilson Alvarez
Dodgers
349
249
253.02
0.713
0.725
-0.01151
Kevin Millwood
Phillies
430
286
291.48
0.665
0.678
-0.01274
Kip Wells
Pirates
418
278
283.43
0.665
0.678
-0.01299
Tim Wakefield
Red Sox
607
430
438.09
0.708
0.722
-0.01333
Joe Kennedy
Rockies
496
342
348.77
0.690
0.703
-0.01365
Jarrod Washburn
Angels
490
338
344.70
0.690
0.703
-0.01367
Jason Johnson
Tigers
647
435
444.05
0.672
0.686
-0.01399
Brad Penny
Marlins
388
270
275.45
0.696
0.710
-0.01404
Vicente Padilla
Phillies
359
250
255.15
0.696
0.711
-0.01434
Esteban Loaiza
White Sox
452
313
319.52
0.692
0.707
-0.01444
Jamie Moyer
Mariners
644
463
472.34
0.719
0.733
-0.01450
Josh Towers
Blue Jays
416
277
283.47
0.666
0.681
-0.01554
Paul Byrd
Braves
364
252
257.85
0.692
0.708
-0.01606
Cory Lidle
Reds
490
334
341.92
0.682
0.698
-0.01617
Rich Harden
Athletics
536
372
380.66
0.694
0.710
-0.01617
Gil Meche
Mariners
393
269
275.72
0.684
0.702
-0.01709
Aaron Harang
Reds
500
342
350.77
0.684
0.702
-0.01754
Aaron Cook
Rockies
340
233
239.32
0.685
0.704
-0.01858
Casey Fossum
Diamondbacks
431
286
294.21
0.664
0.683
-0.01904
Woody Williams
Cardinals
599
419
430.49
0.699
0.719
-0.01919
Kris Benson
Pirates
424
288
296.26
0.679
0.699
-0.01949
Nate Robertson
Tigers
596
399
410.66
0.669
0.689
-0.01957
Carlos Silva
Twins
730
492
507.23
0.674
0.695
-0.02087
Ismael Valdez
Padres
418
291
300.00
0.696
0.718
-0.02154
Oliver Perez
Pirates
452
325
334.81
0.719
0.741
-0.02171
Mark Redman
Athletics
627
428
441.82
0.683
0.705
-0.02205
Kyle Lohse
Twins
660
438
453.31
0.664
0.687
-0.02320
Pete Munro
Astros
335
223
230.84
0.666
0.689
-0.02342
Mike Maroth
Tigers
729
495
512.31
0.679
0.703
-0.02375
Roy Halladay
Blue Jays
413
280
290.16
0.678
0.703
-0.02460
Joaquin Benoit
Rangers
302
205
212.71
0.679
0.704
-0.02552
Tim Redding
Astros
346
227
236.00
0.656
0.682
-0.02600
Terry Mulholland
Twins
434
283
294.44
0.652
0.678
-0.02636
Mark Prior
Cubs
306
205
213.20
0.670
0.697
-0.02679
Dontrelle Willis
Marlins
619
421
437.97
0.680
0.708
-0.02741
Jose Acevedo
Reds
507
342
356.32
0.675
0.703
-0.02825
Brandon Webb
Diamondbacks
622
420
437.90
0.675
0.704
-0.02878
Sidney Ponson
Orioles
739
487
509.03
0.659
0.689
-0.02981
Dewon Brazelton
Devil Rays
394
280
291.80
0.711
0.741
-0.02994
Victor Santos
Brewers
487
327
341.94
0.671
0.702
-0.03068
Dennys Reyes
Royals
327
214
224.24
0.654
0.686
-0.03131
R.A. Dickey
Rangers
368
239
252.42
0.649
0.686
-0.03648
Todd Van Poppel
Reds
371
253
266.85
0.682
0.719
-0.03734
Erik Bedard
Orioles
421
278
293.99
0.660
0.698
-0.03799
John Lackey
Angels
621
423
447.24
0.681
0.720
-0.03903
Derek Lowe
Red Sox
640
410
435.55
0.641
0.681
-0.03992
Aaron Sele
Angels
470
317
336.88
0.674
0.717
-0.04229
Jon Lieber
Yankees
603
396
422.01
0.657
0.700
-0.04314
Darrell May
Royals
615
407
434.05
0.662
0.706
-0.04399
Paul Quantrill
Yankees
358
236
253.04
0.659
0.707
-0.04759
Jason Davis
Indians
400
257
276.04
0.642
0.690
-0.04760
The thing that struck me when I looked at this table was Curt Schilling at the top and Derek Lowe very close to the bottom. On the same team, with pretty much the same defense, Schilling received 28 more outs that expected (that's a whole nine innings worth of outs) and Lowe missed almost as many, -25. So what's going on? Here's a closer look at the pitchers on the Red Sox.
2004 Red Sox Pitchers, minimum 100 balls in play against.
Pitcher
Team
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Curt Schilling
Red Sox
642
455
426.88
0.709
0.665
0.04380
Alan Embree
Red Sox
161
114
107.24
0.708
0.666
0.04198
Mike Timlin
Red Sox
232
160
151.18
0.690
0.652
0.03800
Keith Foulke
Red Sox
225
166
160.98
0.738
0.715
0.02230
Pedro Martinez
Red Sox
574
403
401.44
0.702
0.699
0.00272
Bronson Arroyo
Red Sox
538
372
374.60
0.691
0.696
-0.00483
Tim Wakefield
Red Sox
607
430
438.09
0.708
0.722
-0.01333
Derek Lowe
Red Sox
640
410
435.55
0.641
0.681
-0.03992
If there's a pattern here, I'm not sure what it is, except that Wakefield and Lowe had the lowest K per 9 in this group. What we really could be seeing is how pitchers effect the balls in play. It could simply be that the balls put into play against Schilling are easier to field than the balls put into play against Lowe! Voros McCracken's theory is that a pitcher has little to do with a ball in play being turned into an out. Tom Tippet found that that's not really the case, although the effect by the pitcher is small. (Links to both found here.) Maybe we've found a way to quantify that contribution.
Of course, it could be all luck. Lowe had a very positive number last year. Schilling was on the plus side, but only by about 6 outs in 2003. Looks like a whole new line of study is opening.
I know we discussed this last year, but I forget the answer: is this data adjusted for ballpark?
Ballparks are a parameter of the calculation. The adjustment is built in, rather than added later.
For those of us interested in tracking stats and info but unable to wrap their brains around the math and the various acronyms, is there a way to turn the results into something simpler?
The simplest way to look at it is to just concentrate on the last column. A negative number means the team performed below expectations. A positive number means they exceeded expectations.
Thanks for running your system. I'm confused about the team out totals. It seems that if you add all the teams up, they collectively fielded close to 900 fewer balls than they should have.
Shouldn't this be centered by league average? Or maybe it's centered by the *three*-year average, which would imply that fielding was below average in 2004 across the major leagues.
It's possible that I'm 900 balls short. There can be two reasons for this:
There's a bug in my program.
The version of the database I'm using is incomplete. Baseball Info Solutions relies on video tapes to input batted ball information. The version of the database I'm working with is from early October, and not all games had been viewed on tape yet. Also, during a season, batted balls get missed on broadcasts for various reasons.
I've run checks and my code looks correct. Given that there were over 120,000 balls in play last season, 900 should not make a big difference in terms of the team averages.
This is centered on the three-year average, which is why teams look like they were below average in 2004.
Update: I have improved data for the models, so I've updated the table in a new post. The order changes a little, but not enough to make a big difference.
Sorry, I hit the save instead of the preview button for this post. An explanation will be added shortly.
2004 Probabilistic Model of Range, Totals for Teams
Team
InPlay
Actual Outs
Predicted Outs
DER
Predicted DER
Difference
Angels
4360
2990
3080.32
0.686
0.706
-0.02072
Royals
4643
3127
3211.12
0.673
0.692
-0.01812
Yankees
4488
3081
3158.71
0.686
0.704
-0.01732
Tigers
4524
3091
3169.20
0.683
0.701
-0.01729
Orioles
4458
3058
3125.39
0.686
0.701
-0.01512
Pirates
4326
2959
3023.71
0.684
0.699
-0.01496
Reds
4590
3155
3220.04
0.687
0.702
-0.01417
Twins
4491
3083
3140.70
0.686
0.699
-0.01285
Mariners
4490
3140
3183.09
0.699
0.709
-0.00960
Brewers
4416
3049
3086.30
0.690
0.699
-0.00845
Rockies
4620
3138
3174.15
0.679
0.687
-0.00782
Expos
4421
3067
3100.04
0.694
0.701
-0.00747
Astros
4151
2843
2866.27
0.685
0.691
-0.00561
Indians
4490
3069
3093.60
0.684
0.689
-0.00548
Rangers
4551
3124
3148.34
0.686
0.692
-0.00535
Athletics
4499
3127
3148.70
0.695
0.700
-0.00482
Diamondbacks
4320
2939
2955.30
0.680
0.684
-0.00377
Braves
4489
3088
3102.32
0.688
0.691
-0.00319
Blue Jays
4478
3097
3108.56
0.692
0.694
-0.00258
Padres
4393
3040
3050.63
0.692
0.694
-0.00242
Giants
4541
3148
3157.22
0.693
0.695
-0.00203
Devil Rays
4471
3127
3135.05
0.699
0.701
-0.00180
Marlins
4263
2991
2995.97
0.702
0.703
-0.00117
Mets
4557
3166
3170.73
0.695
0.696
-0.00104
Phillies
4452
3127
3129.24
0.702
0.703
-0.00050
Dodgers
4333
3089
3089.39
0.713
0.713
-0.00009
White Sox
4375
3038
3028.95
0.694
0.692
0.00207
Cubs
4124
2873
2861.76
0.697
0.694
0.00273
Red Sox
4391
3041
3028.85
0.693
0.690
0.00277
Cardinals
4387
3112
3097.10
0.709
0.706
0.00340
Explanation: Last year, I worked on a way of measuring range which I called a Probabilistic Model of Range (see the defense archives). I was basically repeating work done by Mitchel Lichtman which he named the Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR). Since Mitchel's work was more mature than mine, and since I had to write new software because the source of my data changed, I did not puruse these ranking for the 2004 season. However, I just learned that Mr. Lichtman is working for the Cardinals (congratulations, Mike!) and won't be publishing his results anymore. There's a niche to fill, so here it goes.
I calculate the probability of a ball being turned into an out based on six parameters:
Direction of hit (a vector).
The type of hit (Fly, ground, line drive, bunt).
How hard the ball was hit (slow, medium, hard).
The park.
The handedness of the pitcher.
The handedness of the batter.
For each ball in play, the program sums the probability of that ball being turned into an out, and that gives us the expected outs. Dividing that by balls in play yields expected defensive efficiency rating (DER). That is compared to the team's actual DER. A good defensive team should have a better DER than it's expected DER.
There are differences between this year's and last year's calculation. I'm now using three years of data instead of just one. Also, Baseball Info Solution charts balls differently that STATS, Inc. so there are many more vectors that in the previous system. I believe that actually improves the calculation. Finally, the numbers above are approximate; my database is from early October, and BIS had not input every ball in play yet. Still, it should be enough to get a feel for how good teams were on defense in 2004.
The first thing to notice from the table is that it was a poor defensive season overall. Only four teams had a better DER than predicted by the model. The Cardinals and Red Sox were 1-2, and ended up the World Series. The Angels were last, but also made the playoffs. The Yankees continued their abysmal defense, while the Mets high ranking should help explain why so many of their pitchers had better ERAs than DIPS ERAs.
The next step is to use this method to evaluate individual fielders. Watch for that in upcoming posts.
Update: Just in case I wasn't clear on this, the model is built on three years data, but the chart above is just for 2004.
Correction: Corrected the spelling of Mitchel Lichtman's name.
Cameron, whose reservations about moving to right field had made him the subject of trade discussions, announced last night that he is now preparing to switch to right after all, a revelation that should keep the two-time Gold Glover in New York.
"That's the plan right now and [we'll] see what happens," Cameron said on a conference call.
Later he added:
"I had reservations about it for the simple reason of I've never done it before," said Cameron, who did not exactly sound thrilled about his new position last night. "The one thing we came to terms with [yesterday] was I'm here to do what's in the best interests of the ballclub and try to put this team back on the map."
This appeared to be very important to the Mets, as a management contingent visited the former CF.
On their way down to their Dominican Republic baseball facility, Jeff Wilpon, Omar Minaya, Jim Duquette, Tony Bernazard and Willie Randolph stopped to visit Cameron at his Atlanta home. Cameron said the meeting was critical and answered a multitude of questions he had about moving. The Mets thought it necessary, too, especially to let Cameron know, in Minaya's words, "We don't take a change like [switching positions] for granted."
"It was important to meet with him because we think that Mike Cameron is that special player that we have to do those kind of things," Minaya said.
I'd like to expand on a couple of ideas that are floating through the comments on the Beltre signing and the Randy Johnson trade. The first is that the Beltre's career is inconsistent with his 2004 season. While that's true, as I said in this post,
His jump in statistics at age 25 is more likely to be real than someone who puts their first great year at 29 or 30.
But more telling, I believe, is that DePodesta offered six years guaranteed, although at a lower yearly rate (how much lower isn't clear). That DePodesta made that kind of offer tells me Paul believes there's a lot of future value in Beltre.
<-- Increasing need for defense
P C SS 2B CF 3B RF LF 1B DH
Increasing need for offense -->
A good offensive player who is blocked at third has plenty of room to move right on this spectrum. And a great defensive third baseman can actually move left to 2nd or even short. Remember Cal Ripken? I don't know enough about Duncan to say where he could be moved, but the idea that he couldn't play on the Yankees because of A-Rod is incorrect.
Lost in the Cardinals ineptitude this series is the fine defensive play by Larry Walker. He's made good catches, and at least three times he's held hard hit balls over his head to singles. He just cut off a Nixon double in the outfield with a terrific slide and scoop to prevent a triple.
Jim Edmonds just made one of the finest catches you'll ever see. Watching games, one gets a good feel for when players are going to make a catch or not. I didn't think he had a chance at this one. But Edmonds turned on the after burners, dove, and made a spectacular catch going toward the wall. He saved two runs for the Cardinals.
The Astros are getting the ball in the air against Suppan. He tends to get ground balls, so that's not a good sign for Jeff.
With Pujols and Rolen on first and second, Edmonds hits a fly ball to left. It was deep, but it wasn't to the warning track. Pujols and Edmonds both tagged up and Biggio's throw to third wasn't close. Renteria comes through with his 2nd hit of the game to drive both in. A great example of exploiting a weakness.
Update: And it chases Munro. Harville is on to try to put out the fire.
Update: Harville gives up a double to Sanders. St. Louis is finally showing some offensive depth in the series.
Update: Harville comes back to strike out the M&M battery. It's 4-2 after three. Slugfest, anyone?
Lance Berkman looked like he got his foot caught on a Larry Walker line drive, and Larry winds up on third. The Cards power doesn't need any help from the opposition defense.
Update: Yep. Pujols follows with his own 2-run homer to tie the game with 1 out in the first.
Some teams are trying to quantify defensive statistics. "It's not a pure science yet, but we're trying to get to what were the great unknowns -- defense and baserunning," says one club official. "How Theo does it and how we do it entails very different methodology," says Beane. "But we usually come out at the same conclusions."
Last winter, Oakland and Boston agreed that the two best defensive center fielders were Mike Cameron and Mark Kotsay. They agreed the best third basemen were Scott Rolen and Eric Chavez. They agreed that by any method used Jose Valentin came out a much better shortstop than the guy that most people suggest should be made into a super utilityman. The Mets utilized defensive numbers in targeting Cameron.
Since teams have studied the creation of runs and the use of outs offensively, it should be no surprise that teams are trying to quantify outs defensively. No team currently will say exactly how it does its defensive ratings. As Beane said, the A's use a different system than the Red Sox. "We've come to believe that our numbers give us a pretty accurate read," he says.
The Red Sox have their own service that charts games, including how hard balls are hit. "It goes beyond zone ratings," says Epstein. "We try to measure players by what the average defensive player at that position would get to."
The Marlins just scored three runs on a bases loaded single. It was a medium seeing eye hit that trickled through the infield. Hidalgo tried to throw out the runner trying to score from 2nd (2 outs), but the throw got by the catcher, and Seo wasn't backing up, allowing the third run to score. The Mets announcers are ripping Seo for not being in position.
When the ball was hit, Seo started for first base, because the ball was not hit hard and he thought he would have to cover. But when the ball went through for a hit, Seo stopped in his tracks and threw his head down as if he were cursing. Only too late did he start for the plate.
From the talk of the announcers, it doesn't sound like the first time a Mets pitcher has been out of position on a play like this. To me, that's bad coaching. My feeling is that managers have two main functions in regards to the game; making sure the players are prepared (well coached), and putting individuals into situations where their is a high probability of success. It looks like the Mets coaching staff is failing in the preparedness arena.
The Red Sox are starting Doug Mientkiewicz at second base tonight, due to injuries. He played in one game there for the Twins in 2003, but did not get a chance to make a play. In the first inning tonight, with a man on 1st and 1 out, Wells hit a ball up the middle. Doug made a nice play to glove the ball, step on 2nd for the force, then an off-balance throw to get Wells at first and complete the DP. Not bad for a first baseman. He certainly hits more like a 2nd baseman. Maybe this is the start of a new career. :-)
Nice play by Carlos Lee to start off the Twins-White Sox game. Stewart hits the ball between the third baseman and the line. It looks like a sure double, but Lee gets over quickly, barehands the ball and fires a strike to get Shannon at second.
Sammy Sosa had a tough first couple of balls. Ichiro and Pudge each sent low fly balls to the fence in the right field corner, and Sosa couldn't come up with either. The double and triple end Roger Clemens streak of not allowing a base runner as a starter in the All-Star game.
The AL may hit for the cycle this inning. Manny just hit a 1-out, 2-run homer.
Update: After Giambi reaches on a Kent error, Jeter singles for the cycle. According to Fox, it was the first time a double, triple and HR had been hit in the same inning in the All-Star game, so it's also the first time a cycle has been hit in the inning.
Soriano follows up with a three-run HR, and the AL leads 6-0. Mulder gets to bat before he gets to pitch.
Update: Mulder strikes out to end the inning. Six runs, three earned for Clemens in the first.
Ramon Martinez, shortstop for the Cubs, just made a neat catch. Jenkins popped one up into the outfield between third and short. Instead of getting under the ball, Martinez made an underhand/backhand catch to the side of his body, and he did it so nonchalantly that it looked like he did it all the time. That made 3-4 hitters 0 for 3 in the game so far, as Davis got Sosa and Alou in the first.
I complain about Derek Jeter's defense a lot, but he just made one of those plays that makes it easy to forgive him for his limited range on ground balls. Men on 2nd and 3rd in the top of the 12th, two outs, Nixon hits a flair down the left field line. Jeter went all out, caught the ball in fair territory, and then his momentum carried him head first into the stands. He came out bloodied, but he held on to the ball. He played it like it was the 7th game of the world series. Giambi will bat for him in the bottom of the 12th after a Cairo triple leading off the inning.
Update: Millar comes in from the outfield to be a fifth infielder. Big shift on Giambi, but Millar is playing as if he's at third.
Update: Giambi strikes out. He looks thin after his illness.
Update: They put a shift on for Sheffield, moving Millar to first this time, but Leskanic hits Sheffield. 1st and 3rd with one out for A-Rod, and Millar moves back to the outfield.
Update: A-Rod is walked to load the bases. Millar is coming back into the infield to play first and McCarty is moved between 2nd and 1st again. Bubba Crosby batting.
Update: Crosby grounds to Reese, who gets the force at the plate. It's up to Bernie Williams, who is 0 for 5 today, defense back to normal.
Update:Williams strikes out, and looked bad doing so. To the 13th. This is one of the best Yankees-Red Sox game I've seen in a long time. Both teams have had plenty of chances, but great plays and great pitching in tough situations have prevailed so far.
Craig Biggio popped up the first pitch from Matt Clement, but Aramis Ramirez lost the ball in the sun and let it drop in foul territory. Biggo took the next pitch into the stands for a HR. Ramirez was not given an error on the dropped fly, so it will be an earned run against Clement.
I saw one of the worst defensive plays I've ever seen today in the Mets-Yankees game. In the top of the fourth, with runners on 1st and third, Reyes tries to steal 2nd. Halsey, however, has Reyes picked off. Giambi takes the ball, and instead of turning and throwing to 2nd, looks at the runner at third, Phillips, who is going nowhere. Giambi misses his chance to get Reyes, never even throwing to 2nd for what should have been an easy out. Kaz Matsui then singles in both runners, chasing Halsey from the game.
Halsey did not have his control today, walking five. So you can't blame his early departure on Giambi. But Jason, although not charged with an error, cost the young lefty a run.
Al Leiter gets only his third win in 12 starts, despite a 2.34 ERA. He struggled at times, but shutdown A-Rod and Giambi, who were batting with plenty of men on base today.
An injured right hamstring forced Chipper Jones to the bench, and he still can't run well enough to cover the outfield. He had been taking grounders at first in the past few weeks and was expected to play there; instead, the 1999 NL MVP replaced Mark DeRosa at third.
Chipper Jones declined to speak with reporters after the game. Earlier in the day, he appeared to relish the opportunity to return to the infield, even though he bumped one of his best friends out of the lineup.
"Third is my natural position, I feel comfortable there," Jones said. "I've never played an inning at first. It just seemed like the natural thing to do."
The question for me is, what are the Braves going to do long term. Chipper was moved to left field, after all, because he's not a good third baseman. So do the Braves look for a hitter who can play left field (not that hard to find) or a glove man who can play third base and hit enough so as not to be a liability (harder to find)?
The sports section of my local paper, The Republican, had this column by Garry Brown entitled "Pokey's the (Glove) Man." In it, Brown argues that Youkilis should be benched, Bellhorn should be playing third and Reese should be the everyday second baseman.
Before a national television audience Sunday night, Pokey Reese's performance made one thing perfectly clear: He should be the everyday second baseman for the Boston Red Sox.
Reese drew a standing ovation for his defense, but that's not his only game. He also delivered a two-run double. He's batting .264 with 24 RBIs, nice production for the last man in the lineup.
Red Sox manager Terry Francona has indicated that he wants to use a "rotation" in order to give playing time to deserving infielders. Mainly, that rotation would involve Reese and Mark Bellhorn at second base, Bellhorn and rookie Kevin Youkilis at third. Under the Francona plan, Reese also would get some time at shortstop if and when Nomar Garciaparra needs a day off.
After Sunday's game, though, it seemed obvious that Francona had his best available infield on the diamond as the Red Sox defeated the Los Angeles Dodgers 4-1. The key move was using Bellhorn at third and sending Youkilis to the bench. The kid called "You" has done an excellent job since being recalled from Triple A to replaced the disabled Bill Mueller, but the Sox likely would be better served by having both Reese and Bellhorn on the field every day.
Is that indeed the best combination for the Red Sox? Let's look at the win shares, shall we?
Through June 10
Bellhorn
Youkilis
Reese
Games
55
21
55
Batting Win Shares
6.4
2.9
1.4
Fielding Win Shares
1.9
0.6
2.0
Total Win Shares
8
3
3
The two things I see from this data is that Youkilis is generating wins at twice the rate of Pokey Reese. When you're in second, 3 1/2 games back, generating wins is the most important thing to do! The second thing I see is that Reese and Bellhorn are about even in defense. Reese should be ahead due to the fact that he's been playing short most of the year, which gives you a bonus in win shares. So the fact that they're that close tells me that Bellhorn has been doing a good job at 2nd base.
Right now, the lineup that will give the Red Sox the best chance of winning has Youkilis at third and Bellhorn at 2nd. Use Pokey when Lowe pitches or as a late inning defensive replacement. But don't start him everyday just because he makes a spectacular play once in a while.
Fielding win shares have a bias toward the more difficult defensive positions. So you would expect catchers, shortstops and 2nd basemen to accumulate the most defensive win shares. So it's impressive that Johnny Damon is leading the AL in this category. I'm also impressed to see Marco Scutaro as the best middle infielder in the league.
Matt Treanor, a 28 year-old catcher, is making his major league debut for the Marlins today, answering the question about who would be the solution to the Fish's backstop problems.
The Marlins are a bit short behind the plate tonight. With Mike Redmond injured, Ramon Castro went down in the 2nd. Mike Mordecai has taken over behind the plate, the 2nd time he's been called upon to catch in his major league career. He's done a good job; as the announcers observed, they haven't had to comment on the job he's doing, so Mike's getting it done. There have been a couple of stolen bases against him, but the one I saw, the throw from Mike was real close. The real question, what are the Marlins going to do long term if both Redmond and Castro are injured?
I complain about Derek Jeter's defense enough, but I just saw him make a very nice play. He ranged past 2nd base to take a hit away from Michael Young and throw him out at first. Jeter appears to be moving faster in the field this year.
With darkening clouds drifting over Turner Field at dusk, fly balls were virtually impossible to spot. Finley said he was able to guess correctly with communication from Gonzalez and Cintron.
"You can see it come off the bat, and then you try to pick a spot where you think it's going to land within about 10 or 15 feet," Finley said. "They aren't easy here, though. It's tough to pick up fly balls in this park."
It should be noted that Johnson striking out nearly half the batters meant that the defense didn't have as much to do. Nonetheless, they performed flawlessly as well.
Posada at 2nd, two out, top of the 9th. Bernie Williams lines a single into right. It's not hit that hard, so Posada tries to score, but Vlad throws a perfect strike to Jose Molina at catcher to nab Posada at the plate. It's the third baserunning blunder of the game for the Yankees. What I want to know is, why didn't they pinch run for Posada? Is there no one on the bench faster than him?
Also, it looks like on the replay that the ball beat Posada, but not the tag. He sure looked safe in slow motion.
Update: The Angels make their own baserunning blunder. Guillen leads off the ninth with a single, and is pinch run for with Amezaga. Amezaga then gets himself picked off. This game will make a good lesson on how not to run the bases.
Steve Bonner writes to me that the Yankees defense has improved, and he gives a humorous explanation why. However, he doesn't list DER, so gave a look to the graphs at The Hardball Times (scroll down to the pitching and fielding graph). It shows the Yankees with an above average DER! I, for one, am shocked. Let's start with my favorite whipping boy, Derek Jeter. Jeter is above average in range factor this year, for the first time in his career. Now, there are a lot of problems with range factor; it's highly influenced by a team's pitching staff. And while Kevin Brown may be getting more ground balls to the infield, the lack of lefties in the Yankees rotation means they are seeing fewer right-handed batters. (A quick check confirms this. Last year 56.8% of opposition AB were by right handers, this year, 55%.) So Jeter is doing something to make more plays. Maybe A-Rod is saying, "I would have had that," everytime a ball goes under Jeter's glove. Or maybe Jeter took all the Rodriguez should play short arguments to heart and actually did something about his defense. Either way, it's working.
I suspect Bernie Williams move mostly out of centerfield has a made a big difference too. Kenny Lofton is still an above average CF, while Bernie just can't chase down fly balls anymore.
The defense looks stronger at two positions that have been weak over the last few years. That's a very good sign for Yankees fans.
The Braves just turned a 5-4-3 triple play. Kerry Robinson was the batter, who hit a hard grounder to third where Hessman stepped on the bag, then fired around the horn to end the inning.
But several pitchers disagreed, and questioned Pierzynski's work ethic. The latest incident occurred before Wednesday's game, when two players confirmed Pierzynski ignored starting pitcher Brett Tomko's request to go over opposing hitters. Instead, the players said, Pierzynski resumed playing cards for another 20 minutes.
"I've never in all my years seen a catcher who didn't watch video before games," one pitcher said. "He doesn't watch hitters - other than the Twins games when they're on TV."
Does anyone know if this went on when he was with the Twins? That's pretty poor form, not to go over hitters with the starter before the game. Mike is wondering if this is why the Giants pitchers are doing so poorly. I don't know, but it's a good place to start laying blame.
Jason Schmidt allowed a leadoff triple to Terrance Long in the 2nd. He got a groundout and a strikeout to keep Long at third and face the opposing pitcher. But Peavy hit the ball to the hole side of shortstop, and Perez couldn't backhand it and wound up with an error. Since Neifi's main job is to play defense, it would be nice for him to come up with the tough plays.
Bonds strikes out to start the 2nd for the Giants.
A nice win by the Expos tonight. They threw out two Mets at the plate to preserve a 2-1 victory. Glavine pitched well enough to win, but Livan Hernandez pitched better tonight.
The Red Sox have an interesting problem shaping up at 2nd base, albeit a good one to have. With both Bellhorn and Reese playing, Mark is showing that he's a supreior offensive player to Pokey. Bellhorn's OBA is almost twice as high as Reese's. When Garciaparra comes back from his injury, the Red Sox will need to decide if they want Reese's defense or Bellhorn's ability to get on base in the lineup everyday.
Michael Young just made consecutive throwing errors. The threw wide to first, then on a double play ball, threw past Soriano. You might say he "Chucked" them.
Update: Adam Kennedy makes the errors very costly as he hits a three-run HR to give the Angels a 3-1 lead. Young gets his arm back to throw out Eckstein for the 2nd out.
I was scoring the Mets-Braves game last night for work. One of the things I love about scoring is that it really makes you pay attention to what is going on. I told my wife the score (18-10), and she asked if that was a slugfest. I said yes, but after sleeping on it, I'm not sure that was correct. It seems to me it was an example of the deadly combination of having a pitching staff that doesn't strike out batters combined with a porous defense. The Braves had 19 hits, but 13 were singles, and only one was a HR. There were any number of balls hit that better fielders would have at least kept on the infield. Wigginton looked particularly bad to me; I kept seeing balls go by him that good third basemen would have dove. Ty seemed frozen on his feet.
I was also more impressed with Kaz Matsui's offense than his defense. He was selective at the plate and looks like a very good hitter. But I expected him to be a wizard with the glove, and last night he looked more like Derek Jeter than Ozzie Smith.
Scoring ten runs was great, but they are going to need to do that quite often if they are going to win regularly with that defense.
The DRays have loaded the bases against Rivera in the 9th with 1 out. The Yankees are playing the infield back, except for Clark at first. Sort of the opposite of the end of the 2001 World Series, where the Yankees brought the infield in and Luis Gonzalez popped one over Jeter. Torre makes the right decision this time as Fordyce grounds into a 5-3 double play to end the game.
Soriano just got a hold of one, and Mark Kotsay made an amazing grab. Kelty had lost the ball, and Mark came out of nowhere to make a one-handed grab at the 362 mark in left-center.
Miguel Tejada has really impressed me with his defense tonight. He's smooth, he fields cleanly, has a rifle of an arm, and isn't afraid to stay in on the double play. The Orioles fans are in for a real treat this year.
Johnny Damon hits a slow roller down the first base line. Ponson alertly hits Damon in the back with the ball, because he was running inside the baseline. Nice heads up play by Ponson.
Mazilli send Bigbie up to bunt with no out and runners on 1st and 2nd. Bigbie quickly gets two strikes, but nubs one back to the mound. Pedro's only play is at first, but he looks at second, then throws wildly, allowing a run to score and men on 2nd and 3rd.
Pedro has not been sharp. He hit Segui, he's leaving pitches over the plate, and his control is not there. Matos just got a hit and an RBI. This is not what Red Sox fans want to see.
Mora gets thrown out at third to end the 1st, then with one out makes the Orioles first error of the year, allowing Gabe Kapler to reach first. Not a great way to start the season.
I've seen A-Rod have three chances at third, and he's looked very good to me so far. He just stopped a ball from going down the line, but failed to get the runner at 2nd (Sanchez was running on the play). I did get a flashback of Nettles watching that play, and I didn't expect to get that from Alex.
Gabe Kapler just made a great play at third base. He's filling in for the injured Bill Mueller, but on that play you'd think he was the regular third baseman. He charged a slow roller, fielded the ball with his glove hand waist high and made a perfect throw to first to catch the runner by a step. Got a great cheer from the crowd, too.
I'm watching the Padres-Cubs game, and the Padres have started Ryan Klesko in left field. It's been pretty ugly out there. He missed a short pop. Balls are ricocheting around him. And finally, a long fly was hit to the wall. Klesko went back, but had no idea where the ball would come down. Kingsdale, the centerfielder, came all the way over to left to jump and save a HR. If Klesko is going to be a regular in left, the CF is going to have to do a lot of work to take some pressure off Ryan.
Reggie Sanders just did a header into one of the ads covering the chain link fence at the St. Louis spring ballpark. It looked bad on the replay, but he got up and is still in left field, no worse for wear.
I'm seeing the potential problems Kevin Brown is going to have this summer. Balls are being hit on the ground, and they are not being handled cleanly. The Phillies have four hits, only one on a line drive. Two outfield assists have kept the Phillies off the scoreboard, but you can't depend on your opponents making baserunning blunders during the regular season. Yankees infielders should be taking a couple of hours of ground balls each every day this spring.
The first ball in play is hit to A-Rod at third. He didn't look too smooth, backing up and taking the ball on an in-between hop, but he made the play.
Update: With Rollins on first, Michaels hit a shot past A-Rod at third, but Matsui threw out Rollins trying to take an extra base. Jeter makes a high throw, but in plenty of time, to end the inning. Brown faced four batters in the inning, got four ground balls but the defense was less than stellar.
TangoTiger has a neat project at BaseballStuff.com. He wants fans to evaluate different attributes of players defense based on what you've seen at the ballpark and on television. I think this is a great idea. Collections of humans can act like a giant multi-processor computer, where each processor is doing the same task in a slightly different way. The aggregate of these opinions is usually the right answer. (That's why football point spreads are so good. They are set by the betting of an enormous group of experts.) If you've seen players enough that you have an opinion about their defense, stop by and fill out the survey. I can't wait to see the results, and how they might compare to other statistical measures of defense.
As a safety on the LaGrange football team, Cameron could watch a quarterback wind up to throw and guess within about a 5-yard radius where the ball would land.
Coming up in the White Sox organization, he played alongside Michael Jordan, and tested better in almost every category. But Cameron failed to reach some flies because he was trying to watch the ball while in full stride.
Cameron has since learned to trust his football instincts. When the ball leaves the bat, he immediately estimates where it may end up. Then he puts his head down and takes full advantage of his speed. Cameron appears faster on the field than on the basepaths because, unlike many center fielders, he hardly worries about tracking the ball when it's in flight.
"I just know where it's going to be," he said. "I have developed a sense of the trajectory of the baseball. The sound of the bat can sometimes be a mirage, but the trajectory gives you an exact sense of where the ball is headed."
The interesting thing is, that's not how it's done normally. There was a very interesting study done that was published in Science in 1995 showing how players follow fly balls. (I believe they attached cameras to the fielders heads.) The summary of the article is here. Cameron appears to be able to figure out this trajectory without looking, which would be a great advantage.
With or without an award, there's little doubt the Tigers will be better defensively this year. They should be better behind the plate (although Brandon Inge wasn't bad last year), and much better in the middle of the infield, with Vina and new shortstop Carlos Guillen.
"That's big, very big, especially for me," pitching coach Bob Cluck said. "Because I'm a good-glove pitching coach. Our whole philosophy is to put the ball in play early, and put it on the ground.
"Last year, we had range problems."
What he means is, the Tigers' worst-in-the-AL .978 fielding percentage didn't tell the whole story, because it didn't count the number of balls that went past infielders for hits. Many of those same balls figure to be outs this year.
According to the Probabilistic Model of Range, the Tigers had the 2nd worst range in the majors last year. Guillen was above average at shortstop last year, while Vina was below average (I don't know how much his injury contributed to that). So they should be improved up the middle this year.
However, given what we now know about pitchers being rather unable to control what happens when the ball is put into play, maybe Bob Cluck should rethink his philosophy and try to get his staff to strike out more batters.
The Yankees' newest outfielder offered his infield services to GM Brian Cashman, even though he hasn't played third in 11 years. Cashman wouldn't rule out the possibility - "you never know with this team," he said - but added that, at this point, it's not a realistic scenario.
Still, Cashman marveled at Sheffield's willingness to help his team.
"This is a man I don't know very well at all," Cashman said. "But this showed me something. Let's put it this way: (The offer) will go a long way."
Sheffield has a reputation as a bit of a selfish player. I especially remember his time in Milwaukee, where it seemed to me he was not playing up to his potential because he didn't want to play there. This seems like a pretty selfless move, but it could also be low risk. Gary may realize that there's little chance of the Yankees making this switch, so he'll come out looking like the good guy. Still, I'm willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and say, "Bravo."
It also just goes to show how hard it is to find a good thirdbaseman. Compared to shortstops for example, how many really great third basemen are out there? Rolen, Chavez, maybe Glaus and who? Blalock is still young. Koskie's pretty good, but doesn't get a lot of publicity. After those, however, there's not much. It will be interesting to see how creative (or uncreative) the Yankees get in solving the problem.
Dom Cento points out in the comments to this post on Boone that Gary Sheffield used to be a third baseman. Why not move him to third and have three center fielders in the outfield? It'll be a really bad defensive infield, but you don't have to out and buy anymore players.
I haven't posted much today, because I've been working on making my probabilistic range tables sortable. This has been fun for me, as I've learned how to write scripts in Python, which will open up lots of chances for me to do interactive projects on this web site. As a sample of what I'm trying to do, click for the chart of probabilistic range for right fieders. Click on any column heading to sort by that column.
Here are the center fielders, minimum 200 balls in play while they are in center field.
Center Fielders
CF
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Jody Gerut
23.9
0.070
29.0
0.085
0.01473
Tim Raines Jr.
30.1
0.111
34.0
0.125
0.01430
Gabe Kapler
19.6
0.082
23.0
0.096
0.01426
Jeff DaVanon
72.3
0.110
80.0
0.122
0.01167
Ryan Freel
45.1
0.085
50.0
0.095
0.00926
Laynce Nix
50.7
0.109
55.0
0.118
0.00920
Willie Harris
76.4
0.098
83.0
0.107
0.00848
Carl Crawford
31.4
0.096
34.0
0.104
0.00788
Aaron Rowand
93.2
0.083
101.0
0.090
0.00692
Jeff Duncan
128.0
0.110
136.0
0.117
0.00688
Andruw Jones
362.1
0.088
390.0
0.095
0.00678
Wilkin Ruan
20.3
0.073
22.0
0.079
0.00608
Mark Kotsay
307.0
0.097
324.0
0.102
0.00535
Carlos Beltran
351.5
0.096
371.0
0.101
0.00531
Brian Jordan
29.7
0.123
31.0
0.129
0.00530
Milton Bradley
233.6
0.088
245.0
0.092
0.00427
Mike Cameron
467.5
0.120
484.0
0.125
0.00424
Raul Gonzalez
36.7
0.107
38.0
0.111
0.00386
Tike Redman
122.3
0.088
127.0
0.091
0.00341
Darin Erstad
184.3
0.107
190.0
0.110
0.00329
Torii Hunter
412.0
0.101
425.0
0.104
0.00319
Quinton McCracken
18.2
0.066
19.0
0.069
0.00306
Randy Winn
58.7
0.133
60.0
0.136
0.00291
Brian Giles
38.8
0.094
40.0
0.097
0.00290
Alex Sanchez
369.6
0.099
378.0
0.101
0.00225
Dave Roberts
196.8
0.083
202.0
0.085
0.00218
Gary Matthews Jr.
161.3
0.086
165.0
0.088
0.00195
Scott Podsednik
309.6
0.091
316.0
0.093
0.00188
Jim Edmonds
329.1
0.102
334.0
0.104
0.00154
Chone Figgins
106.3
0.096
108.0
0.098
0.00153
Johnny Damon
357.3
0.092
363.0
0.093
0.00147
Ryan Christenson
132.1
0.097
134.0
0.099
0.00140
Hideki Matsui
108.3
0.087
110.0
0.088
0.00136
Joe Borchard
31.8
0.081
32.0
0.082
0.00055
Chris Singleton
175.0
0.078
176.0
0.079
0.00044
Tsuyoshi Shinjo
89.7
0.110
90.0
0.110
0.00042
Gene Kingsale
51.8
0.084
52.0
0.084
0.00037
Preston Wilson
330.0
0.076
330.0
0.076
-0.00001
Luis Matos
299.9
0.102
299.0
0.102
-0.00031
Endy Chavez
279.1
0.089
278.0
0.088
-0.00036
Juan Pierre
403.6
0.094
402.0
0.094
-0.00037
Kenny Lofton
316.5
0.090
315.0
0.090
-0.00042
Eric Byrnes
164.1
0.081
163.0
0.080
-0.00052
Doug Glanville
145.1
0.093
144.0
0.093
-0.00069
Vernon Wells
386.4
0.086
383.0
0.085
-0.00076
Eric Owens
100.7
0.109
100.0
0.108
-0.00078
Craig Biggio
330.8
0.086
327.0
0.085
-0.00098
Corey Patterson
154.4
0.079
152.0
0.078
-0.00121
Austin Kearns
104.3
0.099
103.0
0.098
-0.00123
Roger Cedeno
31.6
0.078
31.0
0.076
-0.00144
Carl Everett
163.8
0.094
161.0
0.092
-0.00161
Wily Mo Pena
58.1
0.090
57.0
0.089
-0.00171
Marlon Byrd
302.0
0.089
295.0
0.087
-0.00206
Shane Victorino
22.7
0.076
22.0
0.074
-0.00232
Rocco Baldelli
446.8
0.107
437.0
0.105
-0.00234
Marquis Grissom
353.3
0.095
343.0
0.092
-0.00277
Ricky Ledee
66.7
0.073
64.0
0.070
-0.00294
Timo Perez
101.2
0.096
98.0
0.093
-0.00303
Ruben Mateo
27.1
0.084
26.0
0.080
-0.00341
Brian L. Hunter
11.7
0.054
11.0
0.050
-0.00343
Reggie Taylor
86.3
0.096
83.0
0.092
-0.00369
Andres Torres
83.4
0.094
80.0
0.090
-0.00381
Steve Finley
270.9
0.081
258.0
0.077
-0.00388
Jeromy Burnitz
63.1
0.081
60.0
0.077
-0.00398
Adam Hyzdu
33.6
0.095
32.0
0.090
-0.00442
Ruben Rivera
29.0
0.129
28.0
0.124
-0.00460
Tom Goodwin
35.7
0.078
33.0
0.072
-0.00603
Ben Petrick
29.3
0.080
27.0
0.074
-0.00624
Danny Bautista
33.6
0.083
31.0
0.076
-0.00646
Ken Griffey Jr.
96.7
0.083
89.0
0.077
-0.00660
Bernie Williams
311.5
0.101
291.0
0.094
-0.00661
Jeffrey Hammonds
28.2
0.089
26.0
0.082
-0.00690
Brad Wilkerson
78.2
0.079
71.0
0.072
-0.00730
Michael Tucker
65.6
0.088
60.0
0.080
-0.00745
J.D. Drew
56.6
0.095
52.0
0.087
-0.00765
Coco Crisp
136.0
0.096
125.0
0.089
-0.00776
Damian Jackson
24.4
0.080
22.0
0.072
-0.00778
Ramon Nivar
76.3
0.114
70.0
0.105
-0.00938
Jolbert Cabrera
54.1
0.077
47.0
0.067
-0.01013
Kerry Robinson
21.4
0.092
19.0
0.082
-0.01027
Melvin Mora
25.7
0.099
23.0
0.088
-0.01042
Armando Rios
44.1
0.097
39.0
0.086
-0.01134
Karim Garcia
24.5
0.111
22.0
0.100
-0.01144
Darren Bragg
27.7
0.077
23.0
0.064
-0.01307
Donnie Sadler
37.6
0.107
33.0
0.094
-0.01319
Jose Macias
31.4
0.122
27.0
0.105
-0.01686
Dustan Mohr
25.6
0.123
22.0
0.106
-0.01711
Lew Ford
23.3
0.091
18.0
0.071
-0.02090
Orlando Palmeiro
30.9
0.101
24.0
0.078
-0.02246
This list looks right to me. Andruw Jones first among regulars, Bernie Williams last. It also confirms that the Yankees should move Matsui to centerfield, and not try to pick up Kenny Lofton.
Not surprising, the young speedster Carl Crawford does very well among regulars. A bit more surprising is that the old man, Barry Bonds, does very well also. I also don't think it's much of a surprise that Manny Ramirez is near the bottom of the pack.
Here's the chart for all major league 2nd basemen who were on the field for 200 balls in play:
Second Basemen
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Nick Punto
32.9
0.126
38.0
0.146
0.01938
Mike Bordick
44.3
0.147
49.0
0.163
0.01555
Aaron Boone
60.8
0.107
68.0
0.120
0.01262
Willie Harris
26.6
0.126
29.0
0.137
0.01125
Brian Roberts
329.0
0.112
358.0
0.122
0.00987
Matt Kata
142.5
0.120
154.0
0.130
0.00970
Joe McEwing
119.3
0.108
129.0
0.117
0.00873
Mark Ellis
525.4
0.133
556.0
0.141
0.00778
Brent Butler
53.2
0.108
57.0
0.116
0.00771
Pablo Ozuna
32.2
0.139
34.0
0.147
0.00767
Shane Halter
71.8
0.112
76.0
0.119
0.00663
Jolbert Cabrera
108.8
0.115
115.0
0.122
0.00656
Adam Kennedy
435.4
0.126
457.0
0.132
0.00627
Brandon Phillips
328.1
0.112
346.0
0.118
0.00612
Henry Mateo
80.0
0.119
84.0
0.125
0.00597
Zach Sorensen
21.7
0.100
23.0
0.106
0.00574
Mark Bellhorn
46.8
0.119
49.0
0.125
0.00570
Pokey Reese
124.2
0.147
129.0
0.153
0.00565
Damian Jackson
58.5
0.131
61.0
0.136
0.00563
Abraham O. Nunez
203.1
0.122
212.0
0.127
0.00535
Ray Olmedo
39.2
0.101
41.0
0.105
0.00463
Jeff Reboulet
202.5
0.111
211.0
0.115
0.00462
Marcus Giles
499.9
0.132
515.0
0.136
0.00400
Luis Castillo
460.8
0.118
476.0
0.121
0.00387
Brent Abernathy
34.1
0.134
35.0
0.137
0.00370
Jose Vizcaino
50.5
0.125
52.0
0.128
0.00359
Orlando Hudson
507.6
0.139
520.0
0.142
0.00339
Neifi Perez
135.4
0.120
139.0
0.123
0.00320
Mark Grudzielanek
332.8
0.120
341.0
0.123
0.00298
Placido Polanco
328.4
0.125
336.0
0.128
0.00289
Geoff Blum
55.7
0.116
57.0
0.118
0.00272
Miguel Cairo
104.5
0.112
107.0
0.115
0.00270
Juan Castro
156.4
0.115
160.0
0.118
0.00268
Dave Berg
64.6
0.122
66.0
0.125
0.00267
Rob Mackowiak
33.3
0.123
34.0
0.126
0.00251
Warren Morris
282.5
0.112
288.0
0.114
0.00219
Mark Loretta
447.9
0.118
455.0
0.120
0.00187
Desi Relaford
269.6
0.114
273.0
0.116
0.00144
Chris Gomez
56.4
0.112
57.0
0.114
0.00128
Frank Menechino
41.6
0.106
42.0
0.107
0.00102
Mendy Lopez
22.8
0.088
23.0
0.089
0.00087
Benji Gil
69.7
0.130
70.0
0.130
0.00061
Bo Hart
232.2
0.123
233.0
0.124
0.00042
Juan Uribe
44.9
0.151
45.0
0.152
0.00022
Tony Graffanino
81.1
0.140
81.0
0.139
-0.00010
Tony Womack
45.1
0.114
45.0
0.114
-0.00025
Junior Spivey
291.9
0.125
291.0
0.125
-0.00038
Mark DeRosa
85.5
0.121
85.0
0.121
-0.00076
Keith Ginter
138.1
0.099
137.0
0.099
-0.00078
Alfonso Soriano
508.7
0.119
505.0
0.119
-0.00086
Tomas Perez
67.6
0.130
67.0
0.129
-0.00118
Jerry Hairston Jr.
151.6
0.115
150.0
0.114
-0.00123
Michael Young
503.5
0.114
496.0
0.113
-0.00169
Alex Cora
378.8
0.124
373.0
0.122
-0.00192
Marlon Anderson
376.5
0.114
370.0
0.112
-0.00195
Enrique Wilson
24.5
0.104
24.0
0.102
-0.00196
Bill Hall
54.9
0.127
54.0
0.125
-0.00203
Eric Young
355.3
0.116
349.0
0.114
-0.00204
John McDonald
98.7
0.118
97.0
0.116
-0.00205
Ray Durham
345.2
0.132
339.0
0.130
-0.00236
Jeff Kent
391.8
0.122
384.0
0.119
-0.00241
D'Angelo Jimenez
422.7
0.112
413.0
0.109
-0.00255
Jose Vidro
424.6
0.119
415.0
0.117
-0.00271
Carlos Febles
185.8
0.115
181.0
0.112
-0.00297
Chase Utley
109.0
0.118
106.0
0.115
-0.00329
Terry Shumpert
30.9
0.115
30.0
0.112
-0.00344
Bret Boone
469.2
0.113
454.0
0.110
-0.00367
Ryan Freel
23.0
0.095
22.0
0.091
-0.00398
Todd Walker
454.8
0.125
439.0
0.121
-0.00435
Luis Rivas
400.4
0.111
382.0
0.106
-0.00512
Carlos Baerga
42.7
0.134
41.0
0.129
-0.00540
Angel Santos
70.3
0.122
67.0
0.116
-0.00575
Fernando Vina
184.2
0.113
174.0
0.106
-0.00623
Antonio Perez
73.3
0.093
68.0
0.087
-0.00679
Roberto Alomar
399.2
0.113
374.0
0.106
-0.00713
Denny Hocking
51.2
0.116
48.0
0.109
-0.00735
Ramon Santiago
180.0
0.121
169.0
0.114
-0.00742
Julius Matos
21.6
0.103
20.0
0.095
-0.00756
Ronnie Belliard
353.0
0.118
326.0
0.109
-0.00906
Chone Figgins
35.4
0.111
32.0
0.100
-0.01051
Marco Scutaro
65.6
0.110
59.0
0.099
-0.01100
Keith Lockhart
44.2
0.117
40.0
0.106
-0.01108
Danny Garcia
51.1
0.118
46.0
0.106
-0.01172
Bill Mueller
24.3
0.090
21.0
0.078
-0.01221
Ramon Martinez
98.6
0.115
88.0
0.102
-0.01232
Jay Bell
29.0
0.102
25.0
0.088
-0.01403
Andy Fox
29.2
0.103
25.0
0.088
-0.01480
Rey Sanchez
22.6
0.100
19.0
0.084
-0.01608
Looks like the Orioles have great defense at 2nd base in Brian Roberts, and Mark Ellis appears to be making up for some of the defensive shortcomings of Scott Hatteberg.
I'm not surprised to see Roberto Alomar near the bottom. For years, zone ratings at STATS showed him very low, despite the how good he looked in the field. It also looks like Bret Boone's gold glove wasn't really deserved.
Here's the chart for shortstops in 2003 (minimum 200 balls in play):
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Denny Hocking
36.6
0.095
49.0
0.128
0.03232
Mark DeRosa
39.3
0.124
49.0
0.154
0.03048
Neifi Perez
133.4
0.141
146.0
0.154
0.01332
Craig Counsell
66.0
0.133
72.0
0.145
0.01220
Jorge Velandia
71.8
0.128
76.0
0.136
0.00757
Juan Uribe
265.0
0.134
279.0
0.141
0.00705
Julio Lugo
447.0
0.120
472.0
0.126
0.00671
Adam Everett
399.1
0.137
416.0
0.143
0.00580
Lou Merloni
55.5
0.129
58.0
0.135
0.00577
Angel Berroa
523.7
0.117
548.0
0.122
0.00540
Orlando Cabrera
497.4
0.117
517.0
0.121
0.00458
Omar Infante
222.5
0.130
230.0
0.134
0.00436
Omar Vizquel
229.7
0.130
237.0
0.135
0.00412
Jose Valentin
425.5
0.119
440.0
0.123
0.00407
Willie Bloomquist
46.5
0.115
48.0
0.119
0.00375
Chris Woodward
320.7
0.116
331.0
0.120
0.00373
Mike Bordick
201.9
0.113
208.0
0.117
0.00342
Ray Olmedo
138.4
0.113
142.0
0.116
0.00295
Rafael Furcal
500.6
0.120
511.0
0.122
0.00250
Carlos Guillen
199.6
0.108
204.0
0.111
0.00241
David Eckstein
352.0
0.115
359.0
0.117
0.00229
Rey Sanchez
266.0
0.119
271.0
0.121
0.00223
Enrique Wilson
59.3
0.112
60.0
0.114
0.00123
Alex Gonzalez
475.2
0.121
480.0
0.122
0.00122
Royce Clayton
446.3
0.116
450.0
0.117
0.00095
Alex S. Gonzalez
444.8
0.131
448.0
0.132
0.00094
Khalil Greene
53.6
0.115
54.0
0.116
0.00092
Jimmy Rollins
507.4
0.123
511.0
0.124
0.00087
Joe McEwing
112.3
0.139
113.0
0.140
0.00086
Barry Larkin
182.8
0.122
184.0
0.123
0.00083
Nomar Garciaparra
488.1
0.116
491.0
0.117
0.00070
Ramon Martinez
60.8
0.129
61.0
0.130
0.00044
Shane Halter
70.2
0.126
70.0
0.126
-0.00029
Melvin Mora
34.1
0.114
34.0
0.114
-0.00038
Wilson Delgado
43.2
0.119
43.0
0.118
-0.00050
Edgar Renteria
495.8
0.115
493.0
0.115
-0.00064
Cesar Izturis
511.9
0.136
509.0
0.135
-0.00077
Alex Rodriguez
484.0
0.111
480.0
0.111
-0.00092
Cristian Guzman
430.9
0.111
425.0
0.110
-0.00153
Alex Cintron
261.5
0.116
258.0
0.114
-0.00156
Jack Wilson
502.5
0.121
496.0
0.119
-0.00157
Tony Graffanino
89.5
0.126
88.0
0.124
-0.00208
Felipe Lopez
155.7
0.121
153.0
0.119
-0.00213
Rey Ordonez
103.3
0.105
101.0
0.102
-0.00235
Jose Reyes
258.1
0.137
253.0
0.134
-0.00268
Miguel Tejada
564.7
0.131
550.0
0.128
-0.00342
Benji Gil
38.3
0.105
37.0
0.101
-0.00348
Deivi Cruz
457.1
0.114
442.0
0.110
-0.00375
Derek Jeter
352.5
0.109
340.0
0.105
-0.00386
Ramon Santiago
283.3
0.115
272.0
0.110
-0.00459
Juan Castro
52.5
0.104
50.0
0.099
-0.00488
Rich Aurilia
366.8
0.114
351.0
0.109
-0.00490
Mark McLemore
101.6
0.110
97.0
0.105
-0.00501
Ramon Vazquez
320.0
0.117
306.0
0.112
-0.00512
Enrique Cruz
25.2
0.123
24.0
0.117
-0.00576
John McDonald
63.6
0.102
60.0
0.096
-0.00580
Felix Escalona
23.2
0.113
22.0
0.107
-0.00584
Tony Womack
186.8
0.112
177.0
0.106
-0.00587
Alfredo Amezaga
67.1
0.113
63.0
0.106
-0.00682
Jhonny Peralta
262.5
0.138
249.0
0.131
-0.00709
Jose Hernandez
231.5
0.119
215.0
0.110
-0.00847
Jose Vizcaino
52.5
0.113
48.0
0.103
-0.00972
Donaldo Mendez
84.1
0.121
77.0
0.111
-0.01027
Ricky Gutierrez
28.5
0.117
26.0
0.107
-0.01041
Clint Barmes
34.8
0.133
32.0
0.123
-0.01076
Jose Morban
14.4
0.068
12.0
0.057
-0.01117
Abraham O. Nunez
52.4
0.113
47.0
0.101
-0.01159
Erick Almonte
91.0
0.120
80.0
0.106
-0.01456
Bill Hall
60.2
0.123
53.0
0.108
-0.01461
Chris Gomez
34.7
0.102
28.0
0.082
-0.01983
Damian Jackson
29.5
0.120
24.0
0.098
-0.02252
Mike Mordecai
32.1
0.114
25.0
0.089
-0.02510
Looking at this, why would Tampa Bay ever go back to Rey Ordonez at SS. Not only is Lugo a good fielder, he can hit better.
I'm somewhat surprised that Jeter isn't the worst regular shortstop in the majors, and Tejada isn't much better. Aurilia is rated lower than both of them, yet win shares (according to STATS, Inc.) gives Jeter 1.3 defensive win shares, Aurilia 5.6. In looking at the win shares system for SS, James has four categories he weights 40-30-20-10. In order, they are assists, double plays, errors and putouts. None of these is a pure measure of range, yet all contribute to it. And they are all adjusted by an expectation based on league averages. I'm hoping these two system can be combined to improve the calculation of defensive win shares.
I wanted to look at individual third basemen next. One reader wondered about Eric Chavez; he had been rated very high by other systems over the last few years, but the Oakland third basemen in total did not do well under this probabilistic system. Chavez comes out about average under this method, but Frank Menechino does most of the damage at the position (based on 200 balls in play when on the field):
Third Baseman
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Alfredo Amezaga
23.9
0.087
31.0
0.112
0.02569
Donnie Sadler
36.5
0.079
43.0
0.093
0.01407
Carlos Guillen
69.2
0.080
80.0
0.093
0.01253
Pedro Feliz
90.1
0.102
100.0
0.113
0.01119
Mike Bordick
43.4
0.085
49.0
0.096
0.01105
Denny Hocking
44.6
0.097
49.0
0.106
0.00942
Shane Halter
116.2
0.092
128.0
0.102
0.00941
Damian Rolls
179.3
0.095
195.0
0.104
0.00838
David Bell
205.3
0.097
223.0
0.105
0.00835
Chris Truby
35.9
0.096
39.0
0.104
0.00817
Mark Bellhorn
103.6
0.087
113.0
0.095
0.00795
Howie Clark
19.0
0.069
21.0
0.076
0.00726
Morgan Ensberg
216.4
0.091
233.0
0.097
0.00697
Lou Merloni
60.9
0.095
65.0
0.101
0.00630
Casey Blake
334.8
0.090
358.0
0.096
0.00626
Juan Castro
51.0
0.089
54.0
0.094
0.00519
Willie Bloomquist
60.3
0.080
64.0
0.085
0.00493
Russell Branyan
55.7
0.116
58.0
0.121
0.00489
Desi Relaford
67.6
0.095
71.0
0.099
0.00474
Matt Kata
47.8
0.098
50.0
0.102
0.00461
Greg Norton
67.8
0.093
71.0
0.097
0.00438
Robby Hammock
50.6
0.158
52.0
0.162
0.00428
Geoff Blum
151.2
0.084
158.0
0.088
0.00379
Jose Hernandez
181.6
0.104
188.0
0.107
0.00367
Craig Counsell
126.2
0.104
130.0
0.108
0.00318
Jeff Cirillo
161.1
0.080
167.0
0.083
0.00291
Vinny Castilla
367.7
0.093
379.0
0.096
0.00287
Jared Sandberg
98.1
0.089
101.0
0.091
0.00264
Jamey Carroll
144.6
0.110
148.0
0.112
0.00258
Matt Williams
84.5
0.091
86.0
0.093
0.00162
Jose Leon
23.6
0.095
24.0
0.097
0.00161
Adrian Beltre
385.7
0.103
391.0
0.105
0.00143
Edgardo Alfonzo
279.2
0.080
284.0
0.082
0.00139
Chris Stynes
284.7
0.092
289.0
0.093
0.00138
Scott Rolen
379.4
0.090
385.0
0.091
0.00131
Mike Lowell
307.4
0.092
311.0
0.093
0.00109
Alex Cintron
30.6
0.087
31.0
0.089
0.00108
Robin Ventura
183.3
0.089
185.0
0.090
0.00083
Shawn Wooten
34.7
0.081
35.0
0.082
0.00074
Hank Blalock
317.9
0.086
320.0
0.087
0.00057
Miguel Cabrera
65.7
0.083
66.0
0.084
0.00034
Fernando Tatis
113.0
0.091
113.0
0.091
-0.00001
Eric Chavez
445.3
0.110
445.0
0.110
-0.00008
Joe Crede
354.4
0.091
354.0
0.091
-0.00010
Brandon Larson
62.1
0.099
62.0
0.099
-0.00011
Aaron Boone
360.9
0.096
360.0
0.096
-0.00023
Tony Batista
355.1
0.082
354.0
0.082
-0.00026
Sean Burroughs
319.4
0.094
318.0
0.093
-0.00040
Jay Bell
20.1
0.089
20.0
0.088
-0.00048
Tony Graffanino
20.3
0.060
20.0
0.059
-0.00075
Todd Zeile
144.7
0.094
143.0
0.093
-0.00110
Wes Helms
319.5
0.090
315.0
0.089
-0.00126
Joe Randa
315.6
0.090
311.0
0.089
-0.00131
Aramis Ramirez
418.3
0.099
411.0
0.097
-0.00172
Troy Glaus
180.3
0.079
176.0
0.077
-0.00188
Bill Mueller
304.2
0.089
297.0
0.087
-0.00210
Jose Macias
42.3
0.089
41.0
0.087
-0.00281
Corey Koskie
327.5
0.092
317.0
0.089
-0.00296
Keith Ginter
69.1
0.070
66.0
0.067
-0.00313
Enrique Wilson
30.1
0.104
29.0
0.100
-0.00388
Rob Mackowiak
34.6
0.086
33.0
0.083
-0.00393
Edwards Guzman
42.2
0.075
40.0
0.071
-0.00401
Tomas Perez
122.2
0.101
117.0
0.096
-0.00426
Eric Hinske
293.4
0.087
278.0
0.082
-0.00456
Ramon Martinez
57.8
0.096
55.0
0.092
-0.00463
Dave Berg
30.8
0.079
29.0
0.074
-0.00466
Ty Wigginton
399.9
0.094
380.0
0.090
-0.00468
Placido Polanco
48.6
0.090
46.0
0.085
-0.00481
Dave Hansen
22.3
0.088
21.0
0.083
-0.00509
Mark DeRosa
56.3
0.107
53.0
0.101
-0.00631
Mark McLemore
66.3
0.098
62.0
0.092
-0.00633
Danny Klassen
35.4
0.094
33.0
0.088
-0.00638
Lenny Harris
57.5
0.089
53.0
0.082
-0.00699
Tim Hummel
45.0
0.087
41.0
0.079
-0.00778
Shea Hillenbrand
135.2
0.089
123.0
0.081
-0.00804
Julius Matos
14.2
0.061
12.0
0.051
-0.00948
Chris Gomez
44.2
0.099
40.0
0.090
-0.00949
Eric Munson
231.4
0.090
206.0
0.080
-0.00986
Frank Menechino
27.3
0.090
24.0
0.079
-0.01082
Garrett Atkins
37.4
0.078
32.0
0.067
-0.01129
Mark Teixeira
30.6
0.097
27.0
0.086
-0.01140
Wilson Delgado
21.6
0.076
18.0
0.064
-0.01261
Aubrey Huff
17.1
0.070
14.0
0.058
-0.01262
Scott Spiezio
99.7
0.081
84.0
0.068
-0.01274
Damion Easley
51.2
0.083
43.0
0.069
-0.01317
Tyler Houston
44.5
0.107
39.0
0.094
-0.01330
John McDonald
28.3
0.076
23.0
0.062
-0.01424
Dmitri Young
49.8
0.113
43.0
0.097
-0.01536
Looks like Casey Blake has the best range of the regular third baseman. I haven't seen him play much. Is anyone surprised by that?
It's time to start looking at the range of individual players. I'm starting with first basemen, since people have noticed the wide disparity between the A's and Devil Rays. This table contains data for all first basemen who were on the field for at least 50 balls in play.
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Bobby Kielty
4.5
0.087
6.0
0.115
0.02793
Denny Hocking
11.4
0.087
15.0
0.114
0.02711
Benji Gil
3.5
0.053
5.0
0.075
0.02185
Dave Hansen
24.7
0.084
31.0
0.105
0.02140
Mike Hessman
2.2
0.026
4.0
0.047
0.02054
John Mabry
13.5
0.080
16.0
0.095
0.01481
Ron Coomer
21.6
0.066
26.0
0.079
0.01345
Russell Branyan
20.4
0.067
24.0
0.079
0.01178
Brian Banks
10.0
0.051
12.0
0.062
0.01048
Mike Kinkade
14.0
0.071
16.0
0.081
0.00997
Justin Morneau
8.9
0.075
10.0
0.084
0.00936
Travis Lee
315.8
0.081
346.0
0.088
0.00771
Robin Ventura
41.2
0.062
46.0
0.069
0.00715
Kevin Young
32.6
0.050
37.0
0.057
0.00671
Tom Wilson
9.0
0.060
10.0
0.067
0.00664
Morgan Burkhart
1.7
0.032
2.0
0.038
0.00613
J.T. Snow
174.0
0.071
188.0
0.077
0.00569
Dave McCarty
15.4
0.127
16.0
0.132
0.00493
Doug Mientkiewicz
261.3
0.072
278.0
0.077
0.00463
Julio Franco
73.3
0.058
79.0
0.063
0.00451
Mark Teixeira
211.7
0.072
223.0
0.076
0.00384
Kevin Millar
201.0
0.078
210.0
0.081
0.00349
Derrek Lee
279.7
0.069
293.0
0.072
0.00327
David Segui
16.4
0.082
17.0
0.085
0.00297
Craig Paquette
5.7
0.054
6.0
0.057
0.00285
Lyle Overbay
156.8
0.088
161.0
0.091
0.00235
Brian Buchanan
21.0
0.045
22.0
0.048
0.00223
John Olerud
297.4
0.077
306.0
0.079
0.00222
Todd Zeile
44.9
0.083
46.0
0.086
0.00205
Jeff Conine
246.1
0.076
252.0
0.077
0.00182
Edwards Guzman
10.6
0.046
11.0
0.048
0.00182
Casey Blake
39.3
0.088
40.0
0.090
0.00160
Carlos Baerga
27.5
0.080
28.0
0.081
0.00139
Phil Nevin
65.2
0.084
66.0
0.085
0.00105
Adam Dunn
21.8
0.075
22.0
0.076
0.00086
Paul Konerko
217.1
0.077
219.0
0.077
0.00066
Mark Grace
62.5
0.083
63.0
0.084
0.00062
David Ortiz
88.3
0.074
89.0
0.075
0.00061
Sean Casey
260.8
0.065
263.0
0.065
0.00054
Todd Helton
365.2
0.081
367.0
0.082
0.00041
Tino Martinez
243.6
0.073
245.0
0.073
0.00040
Albert Pujols
84.5
0.071
85.0
0.072
0.00038
Tony Clark
86.4
0.053
87.0
0.054
0.00036
Daryle Ward
22.9
0.082
23.0
0.083
0.00024
Brian Daubach
53.9
0.064
54.0
0.064
0.00016
Joe Vitiello
20.0
0.082
20.0
0.082
-0.00003
Greg Colbrunn
23.0
0.081
23.0
0.080
-0.00014
Jason Phillips
131.7
0.061
131.0
0.061
-0.00030
Mendy Lopez
14.1
0.071
14.0
0.071
-0.00037
Ryan Klesko
186.5
0.068
185.0
0.067
-0.00055
Richie Sexson
348.6
0.076
346.0
0.076
-0.00057
Aubrey Huff
37.4
0.063
37.0
0.062
-0.00064
Scott Spiezio
173.6
0.071
172.0
0.070
-0.00066
Carlos Delgado
316.0
0.078
313.0
0.077
-0.00073
Robert Fick
169.5
0.059
167.0
0.059
-0.00086
Ken Harvey
205.5
0.079
203.0
0.078
-0.00098
Erubiel Durazo
58.1
0.069
57.0
0.068
-0.00131
Orlando Merced
10.2
0.068
10.0
0.067
-0.00136
Randall Simon
178.6
0.071
175.0
0.069
-0.00143
Travis Hafner
66.5
0.063
65.0
0.061
-0.00144
Jason Giambi
153.3
0.068
150.0
0.066
-0.00144
Jeff Bagwell
280.8
0.069
275.0
0.068
-0.00144
Ben Broussard
203.3
0.071
199.0
0.069
-0.00150
Jim Thome
288.2
0.070
282.0
0.068
-0.00151
Rafael Palmeiro
106.3
0.073
104.0
0.071
-0.00156
Hee Seop Choi
112.3
0.082
110.0
0.081
-0.00165
Matthew LeCroy
19.6
0.062
19.0
0.060
-0.00179
Andres Galarraga
102.9
0.065
100.0
0.063
-0.00184
Tomas Perez
10.2
0.091
10.0
0.089
-0.00190
Carlos Rivera
42.4
0.064
41.0
0.062
-0.00215
Matt Stairs
38.5
0.057
37.0
0.055
-0.00219
Eric Karros
132.5
0.065
128.0
0.063
-0.00222
Wil Cordero
209.0
0.067
202.0
0.065
-0.00224
Robb Quinlan
38.3
0.068
37.0
0.066
-0.00227
B.J. Surhoff
33.3
0.061
32.0
0.059
-0.00232
Raul Ibanez
41.4
0.069
40.0
0.066
-0.00234
Carlos Pena
236.8
0.065
228.0
0.062
-0.00240
Brad Wilkerson
31.0
0.076
30.0
0.074
-0.00247
Shawn Wooten
44.9
0.067
43.0
0.064
-0.00275
Jeff Liefer
29.2
0.068
28.0
0.065
-0.00276
Nick Johnson
120.6
0.072
116.0
0.069
-0.00277
Larry Barnes
10.4
0.077
10.0
0.074
-0.00298
Mike Sweeney
89.7
0.074
86.0
0.071
-0.00303
Todd Sears
24.0
0.071
23.0
0.068
-0.00309
Shane Halter
17.9
0.066
17.0
0.062
-0.00345
Brad Fullmer
33.7
0.075
32.0
0.071
-0.00382
Shea Hillenbrand
136.1
0.075
129.0
0.071
-0.00389
Matt Franco
18.2
0.058
17.0
0.054
-0.00395
Shane Spencer
9.8
0.051
9.0
0.047
-0.00403
Craig Wilson
44.2
0.063
41.0
0.058
-0.00454
Adam Riggs
18.2
0.077
17.0
0.072
-0.00494
Mo Vaughn
33.8
0.060
31.0
0.055
-0.00497
Carlos Mendez
9.6
0.088
9.0
0.083
-0.00509
Kevin Witt
52.8
0.073
49.0
0.067
-0.00523
Todd Pratt
9.7
0.078
9.0
0.072
-0.00553
Herbert Perry
4.5
0.054
4.0
0.048
-0.00574
Scott Hatteberg
231.7
0.068
211.0
0.062
-0.00612
Fred McGriff
112.3
0.061
101.0
0.055
-0.00613
Andy Abad
11.7
0.103
11.0
0.096
-0.00617
Jose Leon
7.1
0.047
6.0
0.040
-0.00708
Paul Lo Duca
32.4
0.068
29.0
0.061
-0.00720
Jay Bell
5.0
0.047
4.0
0.038
-0.00945
Pedro Feliz
20.7
0.076
18.0
0.066
-0.00989
Jay Gibbons
18.2
0.059
15.0
0.049
-0.01037
Frank Thomas
40.6
0.068
34.0
0.057
-0.01108
Frank Catalanotto
8.9
0.119
8.0
0.107
-0.01190
Jolbert Cabrera
8.1
0.088
7.0
0.075
-0.01224
Graham Koonce
4.7
0.082
4.0
0.069
-0.01255
Michael Cuddyer
6.9
0.075
5.0
0.055
-0.02052
Josh Phelps
13.0
0.068
9.0
0.047
-0.02088
As you can see, Travis Lee is very good, and Scott Hatteberg isn't. Let's see if we can find where the difference is. Let's break the two of them down by batted ball type.
Scott Hatteberg
Batted Ball Type
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
B
10.2
0.108
9.0
0.096
-0.01241
G
147.7
0.091
136.0
0.084
-0.00723
L
10.5
0.018
6.0
0.010
-0.00780
P
63.4
0.179
60.0
0.169
-0.00956
Travis Lee
Batted Ball Type
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
B
9.0
0.148
12.0
0.197
0.04918
G
205.4
0.125
213.0
0.129
0.00461
L
16.4
0.022
18.0
0.024
0.00213
P
85.0
0.207
103.0
0.251
0.04387
As you can see, Hatteberg is poor at on every batted ball type. Travis Lee is particularly good at catching pop ups. Let's look at the two of them by direction. Direction X represents the first base line, C represents the third base line, M is up the middle.
Scott Hatteberg
Batted Ball Type
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
M
0.7
0.004
1.0
0.006
0.00185
Q
1.4
0.011
2.0
0.016
0.00519
S
2.0
0.017
2.0
0.017
-0.00000
T
1.2
0.009
1.0
0.008
-0.00172
U
14.1
0.100
6.0
0.043
-0.05738
V
42.4
0.289
36.0
0.245
-0.04385
W
67.6
0.501
59.0
0.437
-0.06400
X
61.2
0.557
65.0
0.591
0.03416
Y
24.3
0.695
24.0
0.686
-0.00944
Z
16.3
0.711
15.0
0.652
-0.05870
Travis Lee
Batted Ball Type
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
D
1.0
0.004
1.0
0.004
-0.00000
M
0.5
0.002
1.0
0.004
0.00212
N
1.4
0.007
3.0
0.015
0.00769
O
0.6
0.004
2.0
0.013
0.00921
R
0.8
0.005
1.0
0.006
0.00131
S
2.2
0.014
3.0
0.018
0.00464
T
3.7
0.019
3.0
0.015
-0.00347
U
13.9
0.113
16.0
0.130
0.01713
V
48.9
0.379
57.0
0.442
0.06298
W
103.2
0.596
108.0
0.624
0.02795
X
88.5
0.575
96.0
0.623
0.04844
Y
29.6
0.672
32.0
0.727
0.05534
Z
21.3
0.711
23.0
0.767
0.05557
As you can see, unless you hit the ball right at Hatteberg, he has trouble fielding it. Meanwhile Lee gets to balls all over the infield. More to come.
I was just thinking about the range model, and it strikes me that the base-out situation may be much more important than the handedness of pitchers or batters. I'll have to check that out.
I'm received a number of comments on the probabilistic model of range indicating that people think this system will help answer the question, "How much do pitchers contribute to the hits allowed against them?" One way of looking at this is to look at expected DER. If the expected DER is high, then the pitchers are inducing balls in play that are easy to field. If low, the opposite is true. Here's the team chart sorted on expected DER:
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Athletics
3122.8
0.714
3112.0
0.712
-0.00247
Mariners
3082.7
0.712
3120.0
0.720
0.00861
Dodgers
2847.6
0.708
2828.0
0.703
-0.00487
Giants
3068.8
0.704
3091.0
0.709
0.00509
Phillies
3079.9
0.703
3073.0
0.701
-0.00158
White Sox
3006.7
0.703
3018.0
0.705
0.00263
Cardinals
3245.3
0.702
3229.0
0.698
-0.00353
Devil Rays
3179.2
0.701
3204.0
0.707
0.00547
Angels
3093.0
0.698
3108.0
0.702
0.00340
Astros
2955.6
0.698
2981.0
0.704
0.00600
Mets
3140.2
0.697
3099.0
0.688
-0.00915
Padres
3016.6
0.696
3009.0
0.695
-0.00174
Diamondbacks
2907.1
0.694
2888.0
0.689
-0.00455
Twins
3200.2
0.694
3226.0
0.699
0.00560
Marlins
3000.8
0.692
2999.0
0.692
-0.00041
Tigers
3324.2
0.692
3283.0
0.683
-0.00857
Pirates
3196.9
0.691
3196.0
0.691
-0.00019
Expos
3057.3
0.691
3066.0
0.693
0.00197
Indians
3155.4
0.690
3190.0
0.698
0.00756
Cubs
2753.7
0.689
2759.0
0.691
0.00133
Royals
3225.4
0.689
3231.0
0.690
0.00119
Braves
3108.9
0.688
3150.0
0.697
0.00909
Orioles
3154.1
0.688
3132.0
0.683
-0.00482
Yankees
3110.6
0.688
3074.0
0.679
-0.00809
Reds
3193.5
0.688
3195.0
0.688
0.00032
Red Sox
3084.2
0.685
3076.0
0.684
-0.00183
Rockies
3190.6
0.684
3163.0
0.678
-0.00593
Brewers
3125.5
0.684
3123.0
0.683
-0.00054
Blue Jays
3092.0
0.678
3106.0
0.681
0.00306
Rangers
3070.3
0.678
3060.0
0.675
-0.00227
As you can see, the pitchers who gave their defense the easiest balls to field belonged to the staff of the Oakland A's. And the Rangers ranking at the bottom show just how bad that pitching staff was. The next step will be to apply this to individual pitchers.
Update: Here's a table of all pitchers with at least 100 balls put in play against them (fieldable balls only). Find your favorite pitcher and see how he did. Notice Gagne was higher than Schmidt, and Schmidt was much higher than Prior.
Update: Looks like I can't put the whole pitcher's table in the entry, so I'm redoing it with all pitchers who have had 200 balls put into play against them. There will be another update when that's done.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Team Positions Permalink
Like Bill James did with defensive win shares, I'm working top down. I started with overall team range, looking at DER compared to predicted DER. Now, I'm breaking each team down by position, so you'll be able to see where each organization has a weakness in range. There are 30 charts below, one for each team:
It's pretty obvious from this just how bad the Yankees shortstops were this year. Can't wait to break it down by players to see just how bad Jeter is. I was also surprised that the Dodger shortstops were on the negative side. It looks like Bret Boone's Gold Glove was not based on his range. The Cardinals had four Gold Glove winners, but their chart makes me wonder why.
I'm sure as we study these charts more questions will be raised about certain players. Enjoy studying these, and feel free to contact me with any questions or comments.
Part II of Michael Humphreys' DRA article is up on Baseball Primer. I have just scanned it at this point, but it looks very interesting, and there are lots of good comments. I'll be commenting more when I've read the post thoroughly.
And although it seemed like the Rangers were the worst defensive team in terms of actual DER, the Mets acutally fell short of expectations by the most.
Now that I'm fairly confident of the model, time to start looking at team positions to see where the weak spots are showing.
While this table shows that parks in general have a much bigger effect than handedness, batting or pitching side really matters for certain teams. So in my final model, I'm going to build in everything. So we're going to look at the probability of an out given the batted ball type, direction and speed, the stadium, the handedness of the pitcher and the handedness of the batter.
The following table calculates expected DER based on the batted ball type, direction, speed and the handedness of the batter. I basically substituted batting side for throwing hand in this calculation. The results:
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
3043.3
0.703
3120.0
0.720
0.01771
Phillies
3014.4
0.688
3073.0
0.701
0.01337
Cardinals
3177.7
0.687
3229.0
0.698
0.01108
White Sox
2979.0
0.696
3018.0
0.705
0.00911
Padres
2973.6
0.686
3009.0
0.695
0.00817
Angels
3073.6
0.694
3108.0
0.702
0.00778
Expos
3034.1
0.686
3066.0
0.693
0.00721
Braves
3119.2
0.691
3150.0
0.697
0.00681
Dodgers
2801.2
0.696
2828.0
0.703
0.00665
Reds
3167.0
0.682
3195.0
0.688
0.00603
Astros
2960.4
0.699
2981.0
0.704
0.00485
Royals
3219.2
0.688
3231.0
0.690
0.00252
Brewers
3115.2
0.682
3123.0
0.683
0.00170
Rockies
3157.0
0.677
3163.0
0.678
0.00129
Cubs
2754.0
0.689
2759.0
0.691
0.00125
Orioles
3132.0
0.683
3132.0
0.683
0.00001
Marlins
3000.3
0.692
2999.0
0.692
-0.00029
Devil Rays
3212.3
0.708
3204.0
0.707
-0.00182
Indians
3198.8
0.700
3190.0
0.698
-0.00192
Giants
3103.0
0.712
3091.0
0.709
-0.00276
Athletics
3125.6
0.715
3112.0
0.712
-0.00312
Twins
3245.7
0.704
3226.0
0.699
-0.00428
Blue Jays
3130.4
0.686
3106.0
0.681
-0.00535
Tigers
3312.2
0.689
3283.0
0.683
-0.00608
Mets
3130.7
0.695
3099.0
0.688
-0.00703
Rangers
3115.1
0.688
3060.0
0.675
-0.01216
Pirates
3255.2
0.704
3196.0
0.691
-0.01280
Diamondbacks
2946.4
0.703
2888.0
0.689
-0.01394
Yankees
3144.7
0.695
3074.0
0.679
-0.01564
Red Sox
3147.3
0.699
3076.0
0.684
-0.01585
Again, like throwning hand, batting side doesn't make a big difference in order of team compared to just using the batted ball parameters. It also seems that the boost the Dodgers and Athletics got from looking at the handedness of the pitchers is balanced by the decline when you look at the handedness of the opposing batters. To check this, I ran the calculation using both pitcher and batter handedness:
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
3043.0
0.703
3120.0
0.720
0.01778
Phillies
3015.9
0.688
3073.0
0.701
0.01303
Cardinals
3179.9
0.688
3229.0
0.698
0.01062
White Sox
2977.9
0.696
3018.0
0.705
0.00936
Padres
2975.8
0.687
3009.0
0.695
0.00766
Angels
3075.8
0.694
3108.0
0.702
0.00727
Dodgers
2799.2
0.696
2828.0
0.703
0.00717
Braves
3118.6
0.690
3150.0
0.697
0.00694
Expos
3035.3
0.686
3066.0
0.693
0.00693
Reds
3166.2
0.682
3195.0
0.688
0.00621
Astros
2962.3
0.699
2981.0
0.704
0.00442
Royals
3217.9
0.688
3231.0
0.690
0.00280
Brewers
3114.2
0.681
3123.0
0.683
0.00193
Rockies
3158.7
0.677
3163.0
0.678
0.00091
Orioles
3130.5
0.683
3132.0
0.683
0.00033
Cubs
2758.4
0.690
2759.0
0.691
0.00014
Indians
3191.9
0.698
3190.0
0.698
-0.00042
Marlins
3003.4
0.693
2999.0
0.692
-0.00101
Athletics
3119.0
0.713
3112.0
0.712
-0.00160
Devil Rays
3214.1
0.709
3204.0
0.707
-0.00222
Giants
3102.0
0.712
3091.0
0.709
-0.00253
Twins
3243.6
0.703
3226.0
0.699
-0.00382
Blue Jays
3130.8
0.687
3106.0
0.681
-0.00544
Tigers
3311.0
0.689
3283.0
0.683
-0.00582
Mets
3134.4
0.695
3099.0
0.688
-0.00785
Pirates
3253.9
0.704
3196.0
0.691
-0.01251
Rangers
3117.5
0.688
3060.0
0.675
-0.01269
Diamondbacks
2948.2
0.704
2888.0
0.689
-0.01437
Yankees
3140.4
0.694
3074.0
0.679
-0.01469
Red Sox
3148.9
0.700
3076.0
0.684
-0.01620
So they don't cancel each other out. I'll summarize the results so far in my next post.
Probabilistic Model of Range, Pitcher's Effect Permalink
Recently, I looked at the effects of ball parks on range. I was next going to see what ballparks were most different from normal, but I have quite figured out the correct way to do that yet. Instead, I'm looking at handedness today. We'l start out with the handedness of the pitchers.
The following table calculates expected DER based on the batted ball type, direction, speed and the throwing hand of the pitcher. I basically substituted throwing hand for ballpark in this calculation. The results:
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
3051.8
0.705
3120.0
0.720
0.01575
Phillies
3014.6
0.688
3073.0
0.701
0.01332
Cardinals
3172.6
0.686
3229.0
0.698
0.01219
White Sox
2977.4
0.696
3018.0
0.705
0.00948
Angels
3071.5
0.693
3108.0
0.702
0.00824
Dodgers
2794.9
0.695
2828.0
0.703
0.00823
Padres
2975.3
0.687
3009.0
0.695
0.00778
Braves
3118.2
0.690
3150.0
0.697
0.00705
Expos
3037.2
0.686
3066.0
0.693
0.00651
Reds
3166.8
0.682
3195.0
0.688
0.00607
Astros
2962.4
0.699
2981.0
0.704
0.00438
Brewers
3107.0
0.680
3123.0
0.683
0.00351
Royals
3219.8
0.688
3231.0
0.690
0.00239
Marlins
2996.1
0.691
2999.0
0.692
0.00067
Cubs
2757.3
0.690
2759.0
0.691
0.00043
Indians
3191.1
0.698
3190.0
0.698
-0.00023
Rockies
3165.3
0.679
3163.0
0.678
-0.00048
Orioles
3134.6
0.684
3132.0
0.683
-0.00057
Athletics
3118.2
0.713
3112.0
0.712
-0.00141
Devil Rays
3213.9
0.709
3204.0
0.707
-0.00219
Giants
3104.2
0.712
3091.0
0.709
-0.00303
Twins
3242.3
0.703
3226.0
0.699
-0.00352
Tigers
3309.9
0.689
3283.0
0.683
-0.00561
Blue Jays
3135.1
0.688
3106.0
0.681
-0.00638
Mets
3128.5
0.694
3099.0
0.688
-0.00654
Rangers
3118.0
0.688
3060.0
0.675
-0.01280
Pirates
3257.8
0.704
3196.0
0.691
-0.01335
Diamondbacks
2950.1
0.704
2888.0
0.689
-0.01483
Yankees
3143.9
0.695
3074.0
0.679
-0.01545
Red Sox
3153.4
0.701
3076.0
0.684
-0.01720
If you compare the above table to my original calculation (based on the three batted ball features), you see very little difference in the ordering of the teams. Unlike park effects, the handedness of the pitchers have very little to do with the team's DER. Two teams it seems to help are the Dodgers and Athletics, although at the moment I have no speculation why.
The next step I'm taking in my probabilistic model of range is to add in the park as a parameter. Here's the new table of predicted and actual defensive efficiency records:
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
3070.9
0.709
3120.0
0.720
0.01135
Twins
3174.3
0.688
3226.0
0.699
0.01121
Braves
3110.2
0.689
3150.0
0.697
0.00881
Devil Rays
3173.8
0.700
3204.0
0.707
0.00665
Giants
3064.9
0.703
3091.0
0.709
0.00599
Astros
2959.2
0.698
2981.0
0.704
0.00514
Angels
3092.1
0.698
3108.0
0.702
0.00360
White Sox
3006.9
0.703
3018.0
0.705
0.00259
Indians
3178.7
0.696
3190.0
0.698
0.00247
Cubs
2749.7
0.688
2759.0
0.691
0.00234
Cardinals
3221.4
0.697
3229.0
0.698
0.00163
Expos
3061.6
0.692
3066.0
0.693
0.00100
Blue Jays
3104.6
0.681
3106.0
0.681
0.00032
Royals
3229.7
0.690
3231.0
0.690
0.00027
Phillies
3074.0
0.702
3073.0
0.701
-0.00022
Marlins
3000.9
0.692
2999.0
0.692
-0.00045
Red Sox
3081.8
0.685
3076.0
0.684
-0.00129
Rangers
3066.9
0.677
3060.0
0.675
-0.00152
Pirates
3203.5
0.693
3196.0
0.691
-0.00163
Reds
3203.9
0.690
3195.0
0.688
-0.00192
Athletics
3123.0
0.714
3112.0
0.712
-0.00250
Rockies
3176.2
0.681
3163.0
0.678
-0.00284
Padres
3023.0
0.698
3009.0
0.695
-0.00323
Diamondbacks
2902.4
0.693
2888.0
0.689
-0.00343
Orioles
3153.3
0.688
3132.0
0.683
-0.00465
Dodgers
2846.9
0.708
2828.0
0.703
-0.00470
Brewers
3146.7
0.688
3123.0
0.683
-0.00519
Mets
3137.5
0.696
3099.0
0.688
-0.00855
Tigers
3331.3
0.693
3283.0
0.683
-0.01006
Yankees
3119.8
0.690
3074.0
0.679
-0.01013
One thing for sure, no matter how you measure it, the Mariners are great and the Yankees are poor. One of the more interesting moves is by the Red Sox. They move up to the middle of the pack from the very bottom when you don't include the park as a parameter. This makes sense, since the green monster makes many balls unfieldable. A very similar move happens with the Twins due to the baggy and the fast artifical turf on which they play.
I think the next step is to compare each field with the overall model for the majors to see where in each stadium the biggest differences are.
I'm starting work again on my probabilistic model of range. (You can read about my previous work here.) These will come in a series of posts that I hope I will be able to gather together into a single paper. The following table is for the complete 2003 season, and is based on the same statistics as my previous output.
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
3051.8
0.705
3120.0
0.720
0.01574
Phillies
3013.8
0.688
3073.0
0.701
0.01350
Cardinals
3171.7
0.686
3229.0
0.698
0.01240
White Sox
2978.2
0.696
3018.0
0.705
0.00929
Angels
3069.1
0.693
3108.0
0.702
0.00877
Padres
2974.9
0.687
3009.0
0.695
0.00788
Dodgers
2797.7
0.696
2828.0
0.703
0.00753
Braves
3117.6
0.690
3150.0
0.697
0.00717
Expos
3035.7
0.686
3066.0
0.693
0.00684
Reds
3166.7
0.682
3195.0
0.688
0.00610
Astros
2960.7
0.699
2981.0
0.704
0.00480
Brewers
3104.6
0.679
3123.0
0.683
0.00404
Royals
3221.4
0.688
3231.0
0.690
0.00205
Cubs
2753.6
0.689
2759.0
0.691
0.00136
Marlins
2993.6
0.691
2999.0
0.692
0.00124
Rockies
3162.6
0.678
3163.0
0.678
0.00008
Orioles
3135.9
0.684
3132.0
0.683
-0.00086
Indians
3195.5
0.699
3190.0
0.698
-0.00121
Devil Rays
3213.7
0.709
3204.0
0.707
-0.00213
Athletics
3125.2
0.715
3112.0
0.712
-0.00302
Giants
3105.6
0.712
3091.0
0.709
-0.00335
Twins
3243.3
0.703
3226.0
0.699
-0.00375
Tigers
3310.6
0.689
3283.0
0.683
-0.00575
Mets
3126.2
0.694
3099.0
0.688
-0.00604
Blue Jays
3134.7
0.687
3106.0
0.681
-0.00629
Rangers
3117.8
0.688
3060.0
0.675
-0.01275
Pirates
3259.0
0.705
3196.0
0.691
-0.01363
Diamondbacks
2949.8
0.704
2888.0
0.689
-0.01476
Yankees
3146.3
0.695
3074.0
0.679
-0.01599
Red Sox
3151.5
0.700
3076.0
0.684
-0.01678
I've received a lot of positive feedback about this approach, and some constructive criticism. A number of researchers believe that these figures need to be adjusted for the park and the the handedness of the pitcher. My next step is to make those adjustments and see what happens. Stay tuned.
Jeter just made a terrific play in the hole. He back-handed Mike Lowell's grounder, spun, jumped and threw Mike out a first, and it wasn't close. I thought for sure it would be a hit.
I complain a lot about Derek Jeter's defense, but he just made a very nice play on a ball chopped over Clemens' head by Rodriguez. Jeter charged in, got a good hop and fired Pudge out at first.
Soriano just hit one into short center. Watching Damon run after the ball, you can see the difference between him and Williams. Damon would have gotten to Millar's ball. Williams would not have gotten to Soriano's.
Derek Jeter finally makes a nice play at shortstop. He dove to his left, kept his eye on the ball, made a strong but wide throw to Johnson who tagged the runner. We should see that more often from Derek.
Matsui takes a page out of Jim Rice's playbook, and does a good decoy in left field to make Millar think he was going to catch the ball off the wall. He might have saved a run there. Sox, after an intentional walk, have the bases loaded and Varitek is pinch hitting for Mirabelli.
Update: Varitek hits a slow ball to shortstop, and the Yankees fail to turn the double play, although it was close. Then they make another baserunning blunder to end the inning. It's 3-1 Red Sox after 7. Mussina was taken out of the game after the Varitek RBI. He goes 6 2/3, gives up three earned runs and strikes out 10.
First Jeter, now Soriano gets to show he can't play the middle of the infield. The official scorer gave Manny Ramirez a hit on that, but a good second baseman makes that play. The DP looms large now.
Kapler leads off with an infield single off Pettitte. It was a play in the whole that a great shortstop would have made (or at least, it would have been a close play at first). Jeter didn't get the throw off.
Joe Buck's words as Millar drives in Ramirez. How many balls get by Jeter in the hole before someone realizes he can't play there anymore? Red Sox lead 5-0 in the 7th.
Torii Hunter tagged up and went to 2nd on a fly ball to Bernie Williams in centerfield. Bernie had to relay the ball to Jeter, who almost got Hunter at 2nd. But Williams isn't strong enough to throw the ball in to 2nd on the fly. Dave Justice is being properly crticial of this during the broadcast. It's another reason Bernie should not be in centerfield anymore.
Chipper Jones is a great hitter, but he can't play defense. They moved him from third because he couldn't handle the hot corner, and now twice today he's shied away from balls near the ivy covered walls of Wrigley that he could have caught. Simon got a double on Jones' timidity, and Damien Miller hits a solid double to left to cut the lead to two. It's 6-4 Braves, with no out, and Lofton representing the tying run.
Update: Lofton strikes out for out #1. Because Sosa bats third, he'll probably have a chance to tie or win this game with one swing.
Update: Smoltz is going after Sosa with first base open. Sosa has never hit a HR off Smoltz in 41 AB, according to the broadcast.
Jeter throws away the third out in the 5th innings, bringing up Pettitte nemesis Shannon Stewart. I wonder when some announcer will say that Jeter can't play short any more?
Update: Soriano fails to get to a ball up the middle, giving Stewart another hit and putting runners at first and third. The key to beating the Yankees is putting the ball in play up the middle, and the Twins are doing that in this inning with the grounders to the middle infielders. Rivas makes the mistake of grounding to third, and Boone throws him out.
This is why Pettitte's eight strikeouts are so important. They are balls that weren't put in play so the defense couldn't botch them.
This is the next article in a series on a system I'm developing which I'm calling a probabilistic Model of Range. If you haven't been following the discussion, you should read these posts first:
The next question I wish to answer is what positions on a particular team are above or below average? I'm not looking at individual players yet, but at the position of the team as a whole. What I'm doing is calculating each position's contribution to DER. (If you add up the Actual DER column, it should total to the team value above.) I'll start by looking at the best team on the list, the Seattle Mariners:
Position, 2003 Mariners
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Pitcher
162.7
0.038
147.0
0.035
-0.00370
Catcher
49.6
0.012
38.0
0.009
-0.00273
First Base
325.6
0.077
340.0
0.080
0.00338
Second Base
459.1
0.108
464.0
0.109
0.00115
Third Base
350.5
0.082
369.0
0.087
0.00435
Shortstop
473.5
0.111
483.0
0.113
0.00222
Left Field
332.7
0.078
350.0
0.082
0.00406
Center Field
500.2
0.118
534.0
0.125
0.00793
Right Field
341.6
0.080
343.0
0.081
0.00033
Not surprisingly, the Mariners are positive at every fielding position except catcher and pitcher, and those two positions don't contribute much to the team DER. What surprised me is the right fielders. It's mostly Ichiro, and this shows that he basically did what he was expected to do.
Now let's look at the worst team on the list, the NY Yankees:
Position, 2003 Yankees
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Pitcher
165.5
0.037
199.0
0.045
0.00758
Catcher
44.2
0.010
45.0
0.010
0.00019
First Base
324.4
0.073
310.0
0.070
-0.00327
Second Base
516.8
0.117
523.0
0.118
0.00141
Third Base
394.7
0.089
401.0
0.091
0.00142
Shortstop
522.6
0.118
465.0
0.105
-0.01305
Left Field
318.3
0.072
317.0
0.072
-0.00029
Center Field
447.9
0.101
407.0
0.092
-0.00927
Right Field
334.3
0.076
324.0
0.073
-0.00233
The Yankees have great fielders on the mound. Unfortunately, they don't have great fielders behind them. Especially disturbing is the lack of defense at two of the most important positions, SS and CF (I must admit I'm a bit surprised to see 2B doing so well). Yankees shortstops have made almost 60 fewer plays than expected, while their centerfielders are around -40. That just doesn't work.
We can also use this to rank positions. Here's the ranking of team shortstops:
Team SS
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Expos
491.6
0.113
530.0
0.122
0.00883
Cubs
484.5
0.123
518.0
0.132
0.00853
White Sox
480.2
0.114
514.0
0.122
0.00804
Devil Rays
510.4
0.115
544.0
0.122
0.00754
Astros
528.8
0.127
556.0
0.134
0.00654
Angels
470.1
0.108
492.0
0.113
0.00504
Royals
531.2
0.116
553.0
0.121
0.00476
Marlins
488.8
0.115
509.0
0.120
0.00474
Cardinals
509.6
0.113
520.0
0.115
0.00229
Mariners
473.5
0.111
483.0
0.113
0.00222
Giants
489.2
0.115
496.0
0.117
0.00160
Reds
533.4
0.117
540.0
0.118
0.00144
Dodgers
521.7
0.133
526.0
0.134
0.00111
Mets
577.5
0.130
581.0
0.131
0.00079
Blue Jays
522.8
0.117
525.0
0.117
0.00049
Phillies
527.5
0.123
526.0
0.123
-0.00035
Athletics
555.9
0.130
554.0
0.129
-0.00044
Braves
556.2
0.126
554.0
0.125
-0.00051
Rockies
566.4
0.124
561.0
0.122
-0.00117
Pirates
537.6
0.118
531.0
0.117
-0.00145
Indians
575.9
0.128
567.0
0.126
-0.00199
Brewers
530.1
0.118
521.0
0.116
-0.00203
Tigers
587.8
0.125
571.0
0.121
-0.00357
Twins
510.0
0.113
492.0
0.109
-0.00400
Rangers
515.1
0.116
495.0
0.111
-0.00451
Red Sox
541.7
0.122
517.0
0.117
-0.00559
Orioles
515.3
0.115
488.0
0.109
-0.00610
Diamondbacks
499.8
0.121
474.0
0.115
-0.00627
Padres
533.7
0.126
486.0
0.114
-0.01122
Yankees
522.6
0.118
465.0
0.105
-0.01305
None of these have park adjustments. That will be the next step.
In my original post on the probabilistic model of range, I ranked teams based on the ratio of balls turned into outs to expected outs. I didn't really like that, but again, I was in a hurry on Friday.
One of the nice things about long bike rides is that you can think about these things, and I decide what I was really doing was figuring out expected and actual DERs, and I could just rank teams by the difference. So here's the data (updated through yesterday) ranked by difference in DER.
Team
Expected Outs
Expected DER
Actual Outs
Actual DER
DER Difference
Mariners
2931.0
0.703
3001.0
0.720
0.01678
Phillies
2892.0
0.687
2958.0
0.703
0.01568
Cardinals
3064.6
0.685
3125.0
0.698
0.01350
Dodgers
2649.5
0.696
2690.0
0.706
0.01063
Angels
2946.9
0.693
2982.0
0.701
0.00825
Braves
2998.1
0.689
3032.0
0.697
0.00778
Expos
2938.5
0.684
2969.0
0.691
0.00711
Padres
2844.9
0.688
2874.0
0.695
0.00704
White Sox
2849.5
0.694
2878.0
0.701
0.00694
Reds
3045.3
0.681
3068.0
0.686
0.00507
Astros
2838.3
0.698
2858.0
0.703
0.00483
Brewers
2990.4
0.680
3010.0
0.685
0.00445
Royals
3059.0
0.688
3078.0
0.692
0.00427
Orioles
2979.8
0.683
2985.0
0.684
0.00120
Cubs
2658.7
0.689
2661.0
0.690
0.00060
Marlins
2869.1
0.690
2871.0
0.691
0.00046
Indians
3098.7
0.698
3094.0
0.697
-0.00106
Athletics
3007.5
0.716
3000.0
0.714
-0.00178
Twins
3099.8
0.702
3089.0
0.700
-0.00244
Giants
2966.0
0.710
2955.0
0.708
-0.00263
Rockies
3060.2
0.681
3048.0
0.679
-0.00272
Devil Rays
3080.4
0.708
3068.0
0.705
-0.00285
Tigers
3170.8
0.691
3140.0
0.685
-0.00672
Mets
3012.5
0.694
2982.0
0.687
-0.00704
Blue Jays
3009.1
0.688
2975.0
0.680
-0.00780
Rangers
3007.0
0.688
2954.0
0.676
-0.01212
Diamondbacks
2840.2
0.705
2784.0
0.691
-0.01393
Pirates
3162.3
0.706
3092.0
0.690
-0.01568
Red Sox
3012.4
0.701
2939.0
0.683
-0.01706
Yankees
3012.6
0.695
2935.0
0.677
-0.01791
I like this ranking better. It's a good starting point to start looking at individual positions and fielders on a team.
David's work is EXACTLY the same as my UZR and it would be nice if he referenced it as such. A person doing work in an area has a responsibility to research the work already done in that area.
Park effects CANNOT be included in these kinds of results, other than the effect that the park (weather, altitude, turf) has on the speed of the batted ball and to some small extent, the percentage of line drives, fly balls, and ground balls. So you might see SOME park effects reflected in this kind of analysis, but not much. The Oakland and Coors Field thing may be more of a coincidence than anything else.
Also, a significant part of park effects is the size of the foul territory (e.g., Oakland and LA). That normally doesn't show up in any kind of defensive measure, including Pinto's version of UZR...
I have apologized for my oversite, and Michael has thanked me for that. However, I'd like to disagree that our systems are exactly the same, and point out what I see as the differences.
First of all, what Michael deserves credit for is the methodology. He looked at the probability of getting outs in a zone for an average fielder and is comparing that to a given fielder. This is a probabilistic model, although he doesn't state this explicitly. His model is p(o,f|zone), or in English, the probability of an out by a fielder given the zone the ball is hit into. If you look back at my post I state my model as the following:
I'm asking the question, what is the probability of a batted ball becoming an out, given the parameters of that batted ball?
There's an important difference here. Michael is starting with zone ratings, and putting them in a probabilistic model. I'm starting with a probabilistic model, and I really don't care what the parameters turn out to be, as long as they work. The difference can really be seen in part II of Lichtman's post. Here, he's adjusting for all kinds of different factors. He figures out an adjustment factor (for example, a park effect), then multiplies his original figure by that. In my model, these factors would just be more parameters. No special adjustments are needed.
Also, in this work, I'm trying to get rid of any sort of defined zone. In order to decide if a ball is in a zone, you have to know the distance it traveled. But that distance depends on the whether or not a fielder stopped the ball. So two line drives that are similar otherwise will look very different if a fielder catches one but not the other. Does it make a difference? I'm not sure, but the idea of a zone is an artifical construct, and I would rather have it fall out from the parameters of the batted ball than from post-contact factors.
One of the other things I never liked about zone ratings (by the way, I worked extensively on the zone rating code when I was at STATS, Inc.) is that they do nothing to rate pitchers and catchers, and Michael kept this feature in his UZR. One reason for this is that zones are hard to define for these fielders. But since this work moves beyond the zone, it's not a problem. We can measure catcher and fielder stats as well as any other position. I consider this a big improvement over zone ratings.
Finally, the treatment of errors. STATS and Lichtman treat errors as if they were actually balls on which the fielder recorded an out. I once witnessed a lively discussion between Bill James and John Dewan over this. Bill thought this was wrong, that if you don't make the play you shouldn't get credit for getting to the ball. John disagreed. I did not have strong feelings about this at the time, but I've come down on Bill's side. One nice thing about this, you don't have to make a separate adjustment for the errors, as UZR does. There are just two types of balls, outs and non-outs. It doesn't matter if the non-out is an error or not; the fielder's probability will be lower, and since you would expect the errors to occur on easier balls, the fielder will pay a big penalty for his errors automatically (I have not proved the previous statement, but should be able to see if it's true once the complete system is in place).
Michael Lichtman deserves the credit for coming up with the idea of thinking about fielding in terms of probability of balls in a zone. My work has extended that idea and formalized it, making it easier to compute, and extending it to fielders not previously covered.
Measuring the ability of fielders to turn batted balls into outs is one of the most unyielding areas of baseball research. Part of the problem was that for a long time, we didn't have good information. What we'd like to produce is a number that represents the player's range. Early attempts at this looked at plays per game; as we got defensive innings, we were able to make this plays per 9. But this did not adjust for important elements; how many batters a pitcher strikes out, or the handedness of the staff.
When STATS, Inc. started keeping data, it also collected parameters about the batted ball; its distance, direction, how hard it was hit, the type (ground, fly, etc.) and with that they created Zone Ratings to try to compensate for the unknown information. Zone Ratings gives you credit for all balls a fielder turns into an out, while penalizing them for balls not fielded within their zone. The problem with zone ratings is that all balls in the zone are treated the same. One might imagine that balls hit to the edge of the zone are harder to field than balls hit in the middle of the zone (where you would expect the fielder to position himself).
One of the big discoveries of recent years is that pitchers don't seem to effect fielding stats that much. A recent discussion of this can be found in this previous post. Let's just say that the amount a pitcher effects balls in play going for hits is up for discussion.
I work at the CIIR at UMass, and our much of our current work involves using probablistic models to understand and retrieve documents (where "document is a very generic term, not limited to text). So I thought, why not apply these to fielding? I'm asking the question, what is the probability of a batted ball becoming an out, given the parameters of that batted ball?
I've used the STATS, Inc. database to obtain three parameters for each ball; its direction (a slice of pie fanning out from home plate), its batted type (ground, fly, line, bunt or pop) and how hard the ball was hit (soft, medium or hard). I then did a maximum likelihood estimate of the probability of an out given those three parameters for each of the nine fielders. Mathematically, you might write it p(o,f|d,t,h).
Let's look at a specific example. Take a ground ball up the middle to the leftfield side of 2nd base, hit with medium speed. The probability of the batter reaching base is .416. The probability of the pitcher turning it into an out is .312. Shortstop, .258; second base, .013; catcher, .0009 (these may not add up due to rounding). If it were a line drive instead of a ground ball, the probabilities change:
Batter Reached
.749
Centerfielder
.193
Pitcher
.04
Shortstop
.018
Now, how do we use this information? These probabilities can be thought of as expectations; if a team has 1000 balls hit as line drives to the above direction with medium speed, 25% of them would be turned into outs. So if a team is turning more than 25% of those into outs, they are exceeding expectations. So my first attempt at using this information is to figure out, for each team, how many balls put into play against them should have been turned into at least one out. I'll then compare that to how many they actually turned into outs, and see what teams exceed expectations the most:
Team
Expected
Actual
Ratio
Mariners
2878.0
2947.0
1.024
Phillies
2851.9
2916.0
1.022
Cardinals
3003.4
3063.0
1.020
Dodgers
2588.2
2635.0
1.018
Expos
2871.4
2911.0
1.014
Angels
2894.2
2927.0
1.011
White Sox
2790.3
2821.0
1.011
Padres
2790.8
2819.0
1.010
Braves
2939.2
2964.0
1.008
Brewers
2931.3
2952.0
1.007
Reds
2995.5
3011.0
1.005
Cubs
2590.7
2602.0
1.004
Astros
2783.2
2795.0
1.004
Royals
3002.0
3014.0
1.004
Orioles
2918.9
2930.0
1.004
Athletics
2955.1
2952.0
0.999
Marlins
2813.7
2810.0
0.999
Indians
3044.8
3040.0
0.998
Twins
3043.8
3036.0
0.997
Rockies
2996.7
2988.0
0.997
Devil Rays
3018.4
3009.0
0.997
Giants
2912.0
2899.0
0.996
Tigers
3116.0
3091.0
0.992
Mets
2950.0
2924.0
0.991
Blue Jays
2950.7
2911.0
0.987
Rangers
2952.2
2901.0
0.983
Diamondbacks
2796.2
2739.0
0.980
Pirates
3089.5
3020.0
0.978
Red Sox
2963.2
2888.0
0.975
Yankees
2959.6
2876.0
0.972
I will eventually extend this to each position on the team, then to individual fielders. One think to note, the Phillies do better here than they do in DER. I'm gone until Sunday night, but I hope this gives you something to think about. Enjoy your weekend!
Update: I mistakenly did not look for other research in this area. I'll point you to two posts on Baseball Primer by Michael Lichtman for a stat call UZR, or ultimate zone rating. Part I is here, and part II is here. The methodolgy is the same, although I think there are minor differences in the way we treat the data. I have to digest Michael's system a little more, but I'll be commenting on this soon.
Correction, 12/23/2003: Corrected a typo. Changed "So my first attempt at using this information is to figure out, for each team, how many balls put into play against them were turned into at least one out. I'll then compare that to how many they actually turned into outs, and see what teams exceed expectations the most:" to "So my first attempt at using this information is to figure out, for each team, how many balls put into play against them should have been turned into at least one out. I'll then compare that to how many they actually turned into outs, and see what teams exceed expectations the most:"'
Back in June I posted runs created against the defense. Basically, I took the most current runs created formula STATS has, took out stats that are attributable to the pitcher, (HR, BB, HBP, K), and figured runs created per 27 defensive outs. Here's the chart through yesterday:
Team
Runs Created Against Defense
Mariners
2.84
Dodgers
2.86
Athletics
2.88
Giants
3.18
Devil Rays
3.29
Angels
3.32
Astros
3.36
White Sox
3.38
Indians
3.38
Braves
3.39
Cubs
3.41
Phillies
3.44
Tigers
3.52
Expos
3.52
Pirates
3.58
Padres
3.66
Cardinals
3.77
Diamondbacks
3.77
Twins
3.77
Mets
3.79
Marlins
3.82
Royals
3.84
Brewers
3.87
Orioles
3.91
Reds
3.94
Rockies
4.03
Blue Jays
4.07
Red Sox
4.14
Yankees
4.23
Rangers
4.37
It looks like the Giants have really improved their defense. They wee ranked 14th in early June, 4th today.
The White Sox having a better defense than the Twins was not an anomoly. I think most people would assume the Twins are the better defensive team, but it's just not true. So much for having a great defensive first baseman.
The AL East is a waste land. It makes me wonder if these teams have good offenses because they play each other so often. (I just checked, and the Red Sox and Yankees scored higher outside of the division, the Blue Jays score the same in or out). There's lots of room for improvement here. Bernie Williams is 35 today. At this point, I think Matsui is the better centerfielder. It's time to switch the two of them in the outfield.
The west coast, on the other hand, is all defense. Five of the top six teams border the Pacific Ocean. I haven't taken park effects into account, so that may be helping these teams. I welcome any comments on this stat.
I just saw Torii Hunter make a bad play. Joe Crede hit a ball to deep center, to the warning track. Hunter went back, reached out, but appear to shy away from the ball at the last minute and it dropped for a double. It scored a run, and moved a runner to third who then scored on a sac fly. It would have been a good play if Hunter had made it, but it's the kind of ball you expect a good CF to catch. White Sox lead 2-0.
I don't get much of a chance to write about good defense on the Yankees, but Matsui just made a fantastic catch. With a one run lead, two on and two out Bigbi hits one the opposite way, deep. Matsui sprinted toward the left field corner and warning track, reached out, caught the ball, and crashed into the wall. He hung on, looked dazed, but ended the inning.
It figures. I take the dog out and I miss an unassisted triple play! Congrats to Furcal. You don't see those very often.
Update: As Jon Miller just pointed out, the HD picture gave you a much better view of the triple play. There have been a couple of times that I noticed the HD picture was giving you a better view of the defense. You can see more defenders moving at once, so you get a better idea of what's going on.
David Dellucci, with the bases loaded and two out, makes a terrific catch to end the inning. In RF, Delllucci had to run far to his left, nearly to the foul line, to make a diving catch of a Ben Davis pop. Jeff Weaver owes him a dinner for that one. (The runs would have been Weaver's; the ball was hit off Hitchcock.)
With all the criticism I give the Yankees middle infielders, Soriano just made a nice play to save a run. With a man on third and the infield in, Soriano dove to his right to knock down a ball, froze the runner at third and threw out the batter. The Yankees get out of the inning as McLemore flies out to right. It's 1-0 Seattle in the 2nd.
Desperate to discover the worst shortstop in major league baseball, Hoban spent day after day perfecting a complicated equation. He lived behind a 2,696-page baseball statistics guide, typing out numbers until his fingers hurt and pondering decimal points until his head spun.
Now, he had come just a few keystrokes away from unveiling the worst fielding shortstop in the game. He punched the last key:
Derek Jeter.
Wait. That couldn't be right. Hoban reevaluated statistics and double-checked his equation and plugged in more numbers and punched the key again. Still Jeter.
Uh-oh.
"I was surprised, very surprised," Hoban said recently."I didn't think I'd see his name at the bottom of the list, but it's there. And these numbers don't lie."
Jeter doesn't believe it.
"I'm the worst?" Jeter said when confronted with the numbers. "I don't think I would say that. But I couldn't really care less what some mathematical equation comes out with."
Later, Jeter makes an intelligent argument:
"How to you rank defensive shortstops?" Jeter said. "I don't see how a formula can evaluate how somebody plays.
"You get a strikeout pitcher on the mound as opposed to a ground-ball pitcher, it's going to affect the statistics you use to evaluate defense. So I don't really think you can."
Now, Jeter has a point with the strikeouts. And from the way the article describes the formula, I don't trust it that much myself. For example, the most heavily weighted factor is fielding percentage, and frankly, MLB shortstop fielding percentages are not all that different. What gets Jeter in the formula is his range, and range will be effected by the handedness of the pitchers on your team and their propensity for strikeouts.
But these have been adjusted for. In looking at this article, I wondered if Hoban had read Win Shares. That formula does take into account all of the things Jeter was refering to in his point about strikeouts. Here's Jeter's win shares per 162 games by year:
So Jeter has been declining, but it hasn't been as steady as Hoban says. What is clear is that if you look at ws/162 over the last five seasons (1998-2002), Jeter is the worst regular shortstop (minimum 500 games at shortstop):
Shortstops, 1998-2003 (min 500 games)
Total WS
Per 162 Games
Rey Sanchez
28.0
9.8
Rey Ordonez
35.3
9.6
Neifi Perez
41.2
9.2
Orlando Cabrera
31.4
9.1
Alex S. Gonzalez
32.2
8.5
Mike Bordick
31.3
8.4
Cristian Guzman
24.4
7.6
Royce Clayton
29.1
7.6
Nomar Garciaparra
26.4
7.5
Rich Aurilia
29.8
7.5
Miguel Tejada
33.4
7.4
Alex Rodriguez
33.3
7.4
Omar Vizquel
31.9
7.2
Barry Larkin
22.8
6.8
Jose Hernandez
19.4
6.7
Deivi Cruz
25.8
6.4
Edgar Renteria
26.5
6.3
Derek Jeter
23.7
5.2
Jeter is the worst regular shortstop in terms of defense over the last five years. And it's not just that he's at the bottom; he's way below the level that keeps shortstops playing. Long time readers of this site know that I've pointed out specific plays where I've seen the ball come off the bat, expected an out, and Jeter doesn't get to it. I have advocated moving Jeter to another position. His lack of defense (and Soriano's, for that matter) cost the Yankees against the Angels last year. Most of the time it doesn't matter because he makes up for his defense with his bat. But against a team that puts the ball in play a lot, I don't want Jeter playing shortstop.
Mark Redman is throwing a two-hitter, despite striking out only 1. The Marlins don't have a great defense (they have the third worst DER in the NL). I guess the Braves are hitting everything right at somebody.
While watching the Expos-Mets, I just saw Ron Calloway almost make a terrific play. Burnitz smoked one into deep right field. Calloway ran back and to his left to try to make the play, but the ball was just beyond his glove. The ball bounced off the wall, and Calloway barehanded it turned and threw a strike in the air to second base. Burnitz only beat the throw barely. Calloway showed a Guerrero like arm on that play.
I just turned on the Yankees game to watch the top of the fifth. First batter, Berkman, hits a slow roller between 1st and 2nd. Soriano runs over, dives ... and totally misses the ball. Then Hidalgo hits a soft line drive that Jeter jumps for ... and it goes off his glove. They did then turn a DP, but I see fielders make both those plays all the time.
In all fairness, in the bottom of the fifth, Kent bobbled a double play ball and could only get Jeter at first, leaving Soriano at 2nd rather than getting out of the inning. The Giambi had an RBI single and Posada a HR, so this time, the opposition made the costly mistake.
I was trying to find another way to calculate defense other than using defensive efficiency. I decided to look at runs created against the defense. So I use the runs created formula, but don't use HR, walks, HBP and strikeouts. Here's the result:
Team
Runs Created per 27 Outs Against Defense
Athletics
2.57
Mariners
2.59
Dodgers
2.89
Tigers
3.07
Cubs
3.19
Braves
3.20
White Sox
3.21
Cardinals
3.24
Pirates
3.26
Expos
3.28
Phillies
3.35
Angels
3.37
Twins
3.43
Giants
3.44
Devil Rays
3.53
Indians
3.56
Diamondbacks
3.62
Astros
3.74
Royals
3.87
Brewers
3.89
Mets
3.94
Padres
4.11
Orioles
4.14
Reds
4.17
Blue Jays
4.30
Yankees
4.38
Marlins
4.39
Rockies
4.42
Red Sox
4.46
Rangers
4.85
One of the problems with DER is that every non-out counts the same. But it matters if the hits you are giving up are mostly singles or if there is a higher proportion of extra-base hits. The A's and Mariners are doing a great job of stopping runs. The Red Sox and Rangers aren't. The Yankees do a big better in this measure than they do in DER, but it's nothing to write home about. The other interesting team here is the Tigers who are doing very well. If they could just hit, they might win some games.
But some sloppy Yankees fielding helped the Cubs add a pair in the seventh. After Mark Grudzielanek singled, Gonzalez bunted and Juan Acevedo threw wildly past first. Alfonso Soriano picked up the ball and made a bad throw to second, allowing Grudzielanek to score before Sosa hit an RBI single.
And those two runs made the difference in an 8-7 Cubs win.
For the 2nd game in a row, the Yankees defense has prevented their starter from getting a win. Pettitte leaves with the score 3-3. He should be leading 3-2.
I'm sorry to keep harping on this. I'm watching the Yankees-Reds, and Pettitte retires the first 10 batters. Sean Casey comes up, and hits a wicked line drive at Soriano. Now, I was never much of a fielder, but I remember they taught me to get in front of the ball. Soriano moves away from the ball and tries to field it by sticking out his glove. Of course, it goes by Soriano for a base hit. Kaat and O'Neill make the excuse that it's a hard hit ball and Soriano can't be expected to give up his body for it. Huh? That's exactly what Soriano should do. If it hits him in the chest, he throws the guy out.
Then of course, Griffey singles, runners on first on third, then on an easy DP ball, Soriano makes a bad throw, pulls Jeter off the bag, and Jeter can't make the throw to first in time. Tie game. Soriano gets the DP on the next batter, but where Pettitte should have a shutout, he gives up a run on shoddy defense.
Andy Pettitte's defense has cost him today. Errors by Ventura and Matsui have led to three unearned runs. While the Yankees fielding percentage isn't bad, the Yankees rank behind only Texas in defensive efficiency, the ability to turn a batted ball into an out. Two third of all batted balls (not counting HR) are allowed to fall for hits. It's a good thing their pitchers strike out as many as they do to cover this weakness.
I think there is a need to better define what is meant by a catcher's defense. By relating it to catcher's ERA I think you are mixing up defense and pitch selection/working with the pitchers. I think of catcher's defense as comprising things like blocking pitches in the dirt, ability to control the opponent's running game, handling plays at the plate and maybe ability to receive pitches to help get calls. Catcher's ERA is more related to pitch selection and working with the pitchers.
For the Giants, Santiago is far more experienced at calling a game and he is still pretty good at throwing out baserunners. But I think Benito gets a little lazy at times when it comes to moving his body to block errant pitches.Yorvit Torrealba is still a young catcher. He has looked better at the plate than expected, but is nowhere near the offensive player that Santiago is. I haven't looked up the stats, but you also need to look at which pitchers the catcher is working with. In 2002 Torrealba got a lot of his starts catching another rookie, Ryan Jensen. Jensen got a surprising number of wins (13), but he has very average stuff and proved to be very hittable (1.45 WHIP, 4.51 ERA).
Catcher's defense encompasses many things. Ivan Rodriguez has a great arm, but he's not known as a catcher who calls a good game. If you shut down the running game, but your pitch calling causes a lot of baserunners to reach base, you haven't done your job. You can't pick one part of the catcher's game and say he's a good defensive catcher. You have to look at the totality.
Giants' announcers Mike Krukow, Duane Kuiper and John Miller report that Toreallba's defense is better than Santiago's. I haven't seen him behind the plate enough to make my own judgement, but if their report is true defense doesn't explain why Giants' pitchers' ERA is higher when Yorvit is behind the plate. The announcing team also report that Giants' pitchers like Santiago better because he knows the hitters better and therefore calls a better game. Makes sense to me.
David, I've been reading a few of the Yankees blogs that are linked to via Baseball Musings. Quite a few writers are saying that Yankee fans should be worried because a) The Yankees bullpen is quite sketchy, and
b) the defense is woeful.
I checked the defenseive stats for the Yankees through last nights action and noticed that almost half of their errors this season have come from Almonte. 2B, 1B and CF are all error free as is C.
I know that I was terribly disappointed by the Yankees defens in the series against Anaheim last year but it looks to me as if things have gotten better. Giambi hasn't magically discovered new range and Bernie's arm probably isn't any better. But I don't think the Yankees are as sloppy on defense as they were last year.
My question is, does the Yankees defense look better to you this year or is it just too early to tell?
Good question, Steve. The defensive stat I like best is DER, that measures how often a ball put into play against a defense is turned into an out. I commented on how the Yankees have a poor DER a few days ago. At that time, it was .647. They have since brought it up to .665, so their defense has been better lately. But that still isn't that good. So yes, the Yankees defense can hurt them down the road. But there are two mitigating circumstances:
The Yankee pitchers are striking out more batters than last year (7.7 vs 7.0 per 9 IP), and that means the defense has to make fewer plays.
The Yankee batters are striking out less, which means they are putting more balls in play so the opposition has to make more plays. And it means the Yankees will get more hits.
Yes, the defense and bullpen is weak. But the offense and starting pitching is so strong, those weaknesses are easily covered up. Sure, they can hurt them in the post-season; in a short series weaknesses can be easily magnified. But I would expect the Yankees to address the bullpen if it continues to be an issue, and I think the offense is good enough (especially if Jeter returns and Giambi starts to hit) to cover the weak defense.
The Cleveland Indians repeated their four error performance of opening day against the White Sox this afternoon. The errors led to seven unearned runs. The Indians had only one 4-error game all last year.
An interesting matchup in the Yankees-Twins game. Defensive Efficiency measures the ability of a defense to turn a ball in play (other than HRs) into an out. The Twins lead the majors with a mark of .757 (or, 76% of balls put into play against them are turned into outs). The Yankees have the worst DER at .647. That means that for every 100 balls put into play against these two clubs, the Twins will get 11 more outs. That's almost four innings worth of outs. The Yankee pitchers make up for this somewhat by walking few batters and allowing few HR. But the Twins have a 3.22 ERA, and the Yankees a 3.35 ERA.
Of course, after this discourse, Soriano leads off with a HR!
The Minnesota Twins have a DER of .759. That's 20 points higher than any other team. That means the Twin get about 7 more innings of outs from 1000 balls in play than any other team. No wonder their pitchers have only allowed a .214 BA.
Once again, errors are the difference in the game. The Astros made two errors leading to five unearned runs. If those errors are not committed, the Astros probably win by 2.
Al Martin got throw out stealing in the first inning of the Yankees game. He's the fifth runner the Yankees have thrown out this year in 6 tries. That's the best CS% in the majors.
Update: Travis Lee led off the 2nd with a walk. After a strikeout, Lee tried stealing and got caught. The Rays are now 1 of 5 stealing against the Yankees this year. Do you think Piniella will figure out that this strategy doesn't work against this team?
Shane Spencer might have just cost the Indians a chance to tie this game. He went for a triple with none out in the top of the ninth, and Desi Relaford threw him out at third from right field. The Royals win, 1-0 and are now 8-0. According to Bill James, they'll only win 58 more games this year. :-)
Michael Tucker just made a great running catch for the Royals. John McDonald lauched a ball to deep left center, and Tucker on the full run got his glove up and had the ball settle right in. Made it look easy.
The KC Royals have the 2nd best defensive efficiency record in the majors. Catches like that are a reason why.
(Defensive efficiency is the percent of balls in play that are turned into outs. If you have a good DER, your pitchers can afford to have more balls put into play against them. If your team has a low DER, you better have a staff that can strike out a lot of batters.)
Once difference in the Pirates-Cubs game today is that the Cubs made an error and the Pirates didn't. That error led to an unearned run, which proved to be the margin of victory. I once saw a stat about team winning percentages when making at least 1 error, and teams that did so had a very poor winning percentage. This year so far, teams that make at least 1 error in a game are 67-75, a .472 winning percentage. Teams that don't make an error in a game are 70-62, a .530 winning percentage.
The Reds allowed three unearned runs in the Cubs four run first. That's 8 unearned runs the Reds have allowed in 6 games. That's creating more work for their pitchers, and for their offense.
Bernie Williams and Travis Lee robbed each other. In the bottom of the third, Lee hit a high fly ball to deep center. Bernie ran back to the wall, and doing his best Willie Mays, caught the ball over his shoulder as he crashed into the dead centerfield barrier.
In the top of the fourth, Bernie came up and hit a hard grounder right inside the first base line. Lee dived to his left to snare the ball, then tossed to an alert Joe Kennedy covering to take away an extra-base hit from Williams. It's 2-1 Devil Rays after 4.
Great play by Orlando Cabrera. Marcus Giles hit one up the middle. Cabrera dove for the grounder to stop it, then threw from his knees to nail Giles. Expos lead 4-0.
So far, the Braves have scored 2 runs vs. the Expos. Is it the Braves offense or the Expos pitching? I might suggest it's the Expos defense. As I'm listening to Skip Caray, he's talking about all the great defensive plays the Expos have made in this series. Expos pitchers have only struck out 13 in the three game through 8 innings tonight. So a lot of balls have been put in play. None have gone out of the park (good pitching), but the Braves were only batting .215 coming into the game. That's probably the defense. We'll see how this holds up against other opponents.
Update: Cabrera made another great play stopping a grounder up the middle to end the game. According to the broadcast, it's the first time the Braves were shutout in consecutive games since 1992.
You don't see this too often. Barajas on 2nd for the DBacks, Womack hits a hard ground ball to the 2nd baseman Cora, who fires to third to get Barajas trying to advance. A great play, but costly if it fails.
I was starting to think Valentine might not be too bad after his fight analysis (it's not a problem), but then he started talking about great defensive teams. While I don't disagree with his picks, his argument was that they had great first basemen! Please, Bobby, it's nice to have a great glove at first base, but if the shortstop and second basemen can't reach the ball, the first baseman isn't going to have a lot to do.